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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation consists of three essays on the credit markets. While the first essay attempts 
to examine the role of credit rating on corporate financial decisions, the second essay focuses 
on the impact of the credit default swaps (CDS) trading on corporate investment. Finally, the 
third essay investigates the reaction of the CDS market after release of periodic financial 
reports.  
Essay one investigates whether credit rating is important on corporate financial 
decisions and unravels three findings. First, we show that there is heterogeneity in the speed of 
adjustment (SOA) toward target leverage for panels of firms with different levels of credit 
rating. Firms with a lower level of credit rating and a higher credit stability have faster SOA. 
Second, our results also reveal that credit rating is a determinant of corporate investment. Third, 
we develop the hypothesis and show that SOA and corporate investment are negatively 
associated. 
Second essay examines how corporate investments are affected by the presence of CDS 
trading. Employing a range of methodologies and different definitions for corporate 
investment, we find that corporate investment of CDS issuer firms declines after CDS trading. 
Moreover, we find that the detrimental effect of CDS on corporate investment is more 
remarkable for smaller firms and the firms with lower credit risk. The findings are consistent 
with the empty creditor and tougher creditor hypotheses.  
Third essay studies the reaction of the CDS market to the release of periodic financial 
reports. The results support the value relevance of accounting information for CDS market. In 
panel data regression models, size- and sector-based analysis indicate that particular sectors 
(namely, financial, energy, health care, and utilities) and some size groups are more responsive 
to release of financial reports. This finding confirms a delay in the reaction of the CDS market 
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to the information content of these regulated reports. This implies that the limited attention 
phenomenon is present in the CDS market. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The credit market is one of the fundamental markets in the financial system. Some analysts refer 
to the credit market as the canary in the mine because it usually indicates signs of distress before 
the equity market does. Before the global financial crisis (GFC) in 2008, credit markets 
experienced substantial deterioration in the second quarter of 2007, which was preceded by a 
substantial drop in the equity market in 2008. Previous studies (see, for example, Acharya and 
Johnson, 2007; Forte and Pena, 2009; Hull, Predescu, and White, 2004; Narayan, Sharma, and 
Thuraisamy, 2014; Norden and Weber, 2009) show that the financial markets are interrelated. 
Therefore, given the important role the credit market plays in the financial system, it is vital to 
understand its behaviour and influence. In this dissertation, we focus on two main credit market 
indicators, namely, credit ratings and credit default swap (CDS). We aim to provide new insights 
on the role of these two indicators in corporate financial activities. 
A credit rating is an evaluation of the credit risk of a prospective debtor that predicts the 
debtor’s ability to pay back the debt. Dallas (1997) points to credit ratings as the entry ticket in the 
public debt market. The author notes that credit ratings lead to an increase in an issuer’s financing 
opportunities. Boot, Milbourn, and Schmeits (2005) argue that credit ratings are economically 
meaningful and derive their value from two institutional features that lead to an increase in credit 
rating usage in practice: the first is related to the monitoring role of credit rating agencies and the 
second involves their role in the investment decisions of institutional investors. 
Furthermore, CDS acts as insurance on corporate debt and is designed to transfer the credit 
exposure of the underlying fixed income products between two parties. Usually, the protection 
buyer earns a periodic fee as a CDS premium and, in return, the CDS seller promises to protect the 
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buyer in case of credit events such as bankruptcy, obligation acceleration, obligation default, 
failure to pay, restructuring, and repudiation/moratorium (for sovereign borrowers). The CDS 
market has grown spectacularly between 2000 and 2007. According to the International Swaps 
and Derivatives Association (ISDA), the notional amount of CDS grew from US$ 919 billion at 
the end of 2001 to US$ 62 trillion at the end of 2007 but experienced a bust after the GFC. The 
main participants in this market are insurance companies, hedge funds, mutual funds, pension 
funds, and other investors looking for yield or credit risk transference. 
In this dissertation, three empirical studies have been conducted to understand the 
behaviour of the credit market and its influence on corporate financial activities. The first empirical 
study examines whether corporate financial activities vary across firms with different levels of 
credit ratings. Several limitations noted in the literature on the impact of credit ratings on capital 
structure, as discussed in Section 1.2.1, motivate the study of the role of credit ratings in firms’ 
capital structure and investment decisions. Although substantial numbers of studies investigate the 
relevance of trade-off theory as one of the prominent theories in capital structure, limited studies 
pay attention to the potential heterogeneity in the speed of adjustment (SOA). Moreover, regarding 
the importance of credit ratings in capital structure, their role in the SOA is considered less often. 
Therefore, we examine if there is heterogeneity in the SOA regarding various credit rating levels. 
Furthermore, we consider credit rating stability a new credit rating–based indicator and provide 
evidence of heterogeneity in capital structure activities for firms with different levels of credit 
rating stability as well. In addition, with respect to the relation between firm financing and 
investment activities, we study the role of credit rating levels and credit rating stability on corporate 
investment. Furthermore, we link firm financing and investment by testing the hypothesis whether 
the speed with which firms revert to their target leverage influences their investment. 
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The second empirical study examines the impact of the introduction of CDS in corporate 
investment. After the emergence of the CDS market, a number of studies have examined the 
consequences of CDS introduction on a firm’s financial outcomes, such as the cost of 
issuing/trading bonds, the efficiency of equity prices, and capital structure (see, for example, 
Ashcraft and Santos, 2009; Boehmer, Chava, and Tookes, 2012; Das, Kalimipalli, and Nayak, 
2014; Saretto and Tookes, 2013). To the best of our knowledge, the impact of CDS inception on 
corporate investment has never been studied. By adopting a panel data regression framework and 
including a dummy variable that captures the impact of CDS introduction, we find that the 
corporate investments of CDS issuer firms are reduced after CDS introduction. Our finding is 
robust to a range of alternative methodologies and different definitions for corporate investment. 
The third and final empirical study provides more evidence about the dynamic behaviour 
of the CDS market by examining the reactions of the CDS market after the release of periodic 
financial reports. According to Merton’s (1974) option pricing theory, the equity and credit 
markets are theoretically associated and different studies have empirically investigated the relation 
between these two markets (see, for example, Forte and Lovreta, 2009; Longstaff, Mithal, and 
Neis, 2005; Narayan et al., 2014; Norden and Weber, 2004). Motivated by the close association 
between the stock and CDS markets based on Merton’s theory and the stock market’s reactions to 
the release of financial reports, we examine the behaviour of the CDS market after the release of 
mandatory annual and interim financial reports in the United States. We find that these reports 
contain valuable information for the CDS market, which supports the value relevance of 
accounting information to this market. We extend our analysis by studying whether the reactions 
of the CDS market to the release of periodic financial reports are driven by firm characteristics. 
The results of the size- and sector-based analysis reveal that particular sectors and size groups are 
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more responsive than others to the release of financial reports. Moreover, we document a delayed 
response from this market after the release of information that implies limited attention in this 
market. 
The findings from this dissertation contribute to several strands of the literature. First, it 
contributes to the strand of literature that shows heterogeneity in firms’ SOA (see, for example, 
Dang, Kim, and Shin, 2012; Elsas and Florysiak, 2011) and the strand that investigates the role of 
credit ratings in capital structure decisions (see, for example, Graham and Harvey, 2001; Kisgen, 
2006, 2007; Tang, 2009). The behaviours of firms in reverting to their target leverage are found to 
be heterogeneous with respect to credit rating levels and stability. Second, this dissertation adds to 
the strand of literature that documents the detrimental effects of CDS trading (see, for example, 
Ashcraft and Santos, 2009; Das et al., 2014; Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang, 2014, 2015) by 
showing that CDS inception negatively affects corporate investments. Third, we enhance the 
literature that shows accounting information contributes to CDS pricing (see, for example, Batta, 
2011; Das, Hanouna, and Sarin, 2009; Demirovic and Thomas, 2007; Demirovic, Tucker, and 
Guermat, 2015) by providing evidence regarding the response of the CDS market after the release 
of periodic financial reports. 
The remainder of this introductory chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 explains 
the motivations of each essay. Section 1.3 presents the objectives and aims of this dissertation. The 
penultimate section discusses the empirical plans made to achieve the objectives. The final section 
provides concluding remarks. 
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1.2 MOTIVATION 
1.2.1 Essay 1: The Role of Credit Ratings in Corporate Financial Decisions 
In this essay, we focus on the impact of credit ratings on capital structure and investment activities. 
Our study is motivated by several factors. First, after the introduction of trade-off theory that 
emerged from the debate over Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) (MM) theory, many studies have 
empirically investigated its relevance. Trade-off theory points to a target leverage level and states 
that there is an optimal level of capital structure at which the tax benefit of debt and the cost of 
bankruptcy are in balance. Among the vast literature on capital structure, little attention has been 
paid to the impact of credit ratings on capital structure. Kisgen’s (2006) was the first study to test 
the capital structure–credit rating hypothesis and provide evidence regarding the effect of credit 
ratings on capital structure. Second, most studies that have examined the SOA consider it to be 
homogeneous and only a few consider potential variations in the SOA. For example, Dang et al., 
(2012) allow asymmetry in the SOA with respect to different regimes and Elsas and Florysiak 
(2011) document heterogeneity in the SOA regarding firm characteristics such as deviation from 
the target level, financing deficits, and default risk. The few studies that consider SOA 
heterogeneity report no conclusive findings regarding SOA variations and firm credit ratings. 
Therefore, we consider these two limitations in the literature and try to shed light on capital 
structure decisions by testing the hypothesis of heterogeneity in the SOA regarding firm credit 
ratings. 
Third, compared to the literature on capital structure, the role of credit ratings is less studied 
in corporate investment. Gul, Zhao, and Zhou (2011) and Agha and Faff (2014), for example, 
examine how changes in a firm’s credit rating can affect corporate investment. With respect to the 
association of financing and investment decisions (see, for example, Ahn, Denis, and Denis, 2006; 
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Aivazian, Ge, and Qiu, 2005; Dang et al., 2012; McCabe, 1979) and documented evidence on the 
impact of credit ratings on firms’ financing and capital structure, we are motivated to test whether 
credit ratings are a determinant of corporate investment. 
Fourth, studies that investigate the impact of credit ratings always consider the credit rating 
level. With respect to the various applications of credit ratings in financial markets and the severe 
consequences of unstable credit ratings (see, for example, Cantor and Mann, 2003; Frost, 2007), 
we are motivated to examine the role of this factor in corporate financial decisions as well. We 
define the credit rating stability index by considering the total amount of change in credits rating 
and examine its effect on financing and investment decisions. 
Finally, with respect to the role of the leverage ratio in corporate investment (see, for 
example, Aivazian et al., 2005; Dang, 2011), we examine whether the speed with which firms 
revert to their target debt ratio based on trade-off theory matters to corporate investment. To the 
best of our knowledge, the relation between the SOA and corporate investment has never been 
studied in the literature. This motivates us to test whether the SOA influences corporate 
investment. 
 
1.2.2 Essay 2: CDS and Corporate Investment 
Since the introduction of the CDS market, several studies have examined the consequences of CDS 
trading. Our study is motivated by the findings of one strand of the literature that investigates the 
consequences of CDS inception on a firm’s financial outcomes. This strand examines the impact 
of CDS trading on corporate equity, debt, capital structure, and liquidity management. For 
example, Ashcraft and Santos (2009) examine whether CDS trading reduces the cost of bond or 
loan funding. They show limited evidence regarding the impact of CDS trading in reducing the 
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cost of debt and, unless that was claimed, the introduction of CDSs does not have a favourable 
effect on the bond market. Furthermore, Das et al. (2014) find that the CDS market has a 
detrimental effect on a firm’s underlying bond market. They argue that the bond market became 
inefficient as the CDS market developed and did not improve that market’s liquidity. 
Besides the impact of CDS on the bond market, several studies (see, for example, Arping, 
2014; Hirtle, 2009; Norden, Buston, and Wagner, 2011; Norden and Wagner, 2008) show that 
CDS trading affects the loan market as well. They show that lenders’ CDS usage does not make 
them necessarily provide more credits and, instead, CDSs increase their bargaining power. 
Therefore, creditors become tougher and consequently impose strict credit constraints during 
negotiations. 
In addition to the adverse effect of CDS trading on the corporate debt market, Boehmer et 
al. (2012) provide evidence of the unfavourable impact of CDS trading on firms in the equity 
market. The authors show that firms in the equity market with CDS trading are less liquid and less 
efficient than equity market of firms without CDS. 
In addition to the negative effect of CDS trading on firm external funding, few studies (see, 
for example, Subrahmanyam et al. 2014, 2015) present the implications of the negative effects of 
CDSs on internal funding. For example, Subrahmanyam et al. (2015) examine the cash holdings 
and liquidity management activities of firms with traded CDSs. They find that these firms hold 
more cash compared to non-CDS firms to ensure their survival in the event of renegotiation with 
creditors. We can therefore infer this situation leads to a reduction in internal funds available for 
investment use. 
With respect to the potential effect of CDS trading on internal and external financing as 
well as the well-documented relation between financing and investment activities in the literature 
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(see, for example, Chava and Roberts, 2008; McCabe, 1979; Peterson and Benesh, 1983; Whited, 
1992), we are motivated to study the consequences of CDS introduction on corporate investment. 
The impact of CDS introduction on corporate investment has been ignored thus far and we 
therefore undertake this empirical study to fill the gap. 
 
1.2.3 Essay 3: Reaction of the CDS Market to the Release of Periodic Financial Reports 
This essay aims to investigate the behaviour of the CDS market after the release of periodic 
financial reports. Three features of the literature motivate our study. First, we find that one branch 
of the CDS literature addresses the importance of accounting variables in CDS pricing and 
incorporates this information as the determinants of the CDS spread. Das et al. (2009), for instance, 
illustrate that accounting-based variables explain approximately two-thirds of the CDS spread 
variation. More importantly, these authors find that accounting-based variables are relevant to 
CDS spread changes, even without the inclusion of firm-specific and market-based variables. Batta 
(2011) also provides evidence of the role of accounting information in the CDS market, although 
the author claims that the influence of this information occurs mainly through the stock and bond 
markets. Correia, Richardson, and Tuna (2012) confirm that accounting information, in 
conjunction with market-based information, plays an instrumental role in explaining the cross-
sectional variation of CDS spreads. 
In addition to studies that focus on the role of accounting information in CDS pricing, 
others examine the response of the CDS market to the release of segregated accounting 
information, such as earnings announcements and earnings surprises (Greatrex, 2009; Zhang and 
Zhang, 2013). The key outcome from these studies is that this type of financial disclosure is value 
relevant to the CDS market. 
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The second feature of the literature relates to the content of financial reports. Periodic 
financial reports play a critical role in diminishing information asymmetry and the agency problem 
between a firm’s managers and its shareholders or debtholders.1 Moreover, according to signalling 
and agency theories, managers have incentives to voluntarily disclose information to benefit the 
firm (see, for example, Dainelli, Bini, and Giunta, 2013; Morris, 1987; Watson, Shrives, and 
Marston, 2002). 
According to the US Securities Exchange Act of 1934, companies that hold more than 
US$10 million in assets or have more than 500 shareholders are mandated to file financial reports 
annually and quarterly with the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). These reports 
are known as Form 10-K (annual) and Form 10-Q (quarterly) and include more than just 
accounting information.2 Various sections, for instance, contain detailed and comprehensive 
information on the firm. Managers must provide explanations for the  performance and condition 
in specific sections, which include risk factors, defaults upon senior securities, management’s 
discussion and analysis of financial condition and results of operations (MD&A), and quantitative 
and qualitative disclosures about market risk. 
These sections contain valuable information for credit market participants to evaluate 
counterparty risk as well as firm default risk. For example, in the MD&A section of a 2005 
quarterly financial report of the Ford Motor Company, managers point to a downgrade in the firm’s 
credit rating and its consequences on the credit market:3 
                                                          
1 See Healy and Palepu (2001) for a discussion on corporate disclosure, information asymmetry, and the agency 
problem. 
2 The SEC created the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) system in 1984. Firms have been 
obligated to file their reports through this system since 1997. 
3 Available at https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/37996/000003799605000158/e051005body.txt. 
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As a result of S&P downgrading the long-term credit rating for Ford and Ford Credit 
to BB+ (non-investment grade) on May 5, 2005, we anticipate increased borrowing 
costs. We also anticipate that Ford credit will experience restricted access to 
unsecured debt markets, which would cause its outstanding unsecured commercial 
paper and unsecured term debt balance to decline. 
Another example relates to the annual report of Baker Hughes Incorporated for the fiscal 
year ending December 31, 2009, where the risk factor section contains appropriate information 
about the credit market:4  
Failure to complete the merger with BJ Services could negatively affect our stock price 
and our future business and financial results. If the merger is not completed, our ongoing 
business may be adversely affected and will be subject to several risks, including the 
following: We will incur substantial transaction and merger-related costs as well as assume 
additional debt from BJ Services in connection with the merger and our stockholders will 
be diluted by the merger. … We will assume approximately $500 million of long-term debt 
from BJ Services. 
Moreover, there is a broad literature in finance on textual analysis and measuring 
qualitative information. Its findings show that negative and positive words in corporate periodic 
reports, newspaper articles, and investor message boards can affect financial markets (see, for 
example, Loughran and McDonald, 2011; Tetlock, Saar‐Tsechansky, and Macskassy, 2008). 
Therefore, besides accounting-based information, we expect the narrative content of other parts of 
obligatory periodic reports to contain information valuable to the CDS market. We focus on entire 
reports rather than their sections. 
                                                          
4 Available at https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/808362/000095012909000672/h65827e10vk.htm. 
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The third feature of the literature that motivates our research relates to the close relation 
between the CDS and equity markets. According to Merton’s (1974) option pricing theory, equity 
markets are theoretically related to credit markets. In this model, a firm’s debt is treated as a short 
position on a credit put option accompanied by riskless debt. In a similar vein, equity is viewed as 
a call option on the value of firms, with a strike value equal to the book value of firm liabilities. 
Several studies empirically investigate the theoretical link between the CDS and equity markets in 
the context of price discovery, co-movement, and contagion or spillover effects (see, for example, 
Forte and Lovreta, 2009; Longstaff et al., 2005; Narayan et al., 2014; Norden and Weber, 2004). 
With respect to the close association between the CDS market and the stock market, 
numerous studies examine the reaction of the latter surrounding the release of financial reports. 
For example, Asthana and Balsam (2002) specifically examine the impact of accounting 
information released electronically through the EDGAR system on stock prices. They report that 
the stock market reacts positively to disclosures contained in quarterly and annual reports. In 
addition, Balsam, Bartov, and Marquardt (2002) generate evidence associated with the information 
content of annual reports by studying the reactions of the stock market to announced accruals. 
They document a negative relation between unexpected discretionary accruals and cumulative 
abnormal stock returns around 10-Q filings. Griffin (2003) builds on earlier studies to assess the 
value relevance for stock market investors of quarterly and annual reports around filing days. The 
author illustrates that the market responds to SEC filings on the filing day and one or two days 
thereafter. Similarly, Asthana, Balsam, and Sankaraguruswamy (2004) present evidence on the 
informativeness of SEC filings via the EDGAR system. Their results indicate that the volume of 
small trades increases two days before and ends two days after the 10-K report is filed with the 
SEC. Li and Ramesh (2009) also examine the economic significance of stock market reactions to 
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annual and interim periodic SEC filings. They find that the market reacts notably when periodic 
reports contain earnings information. 
Taking into account the close relation between the stock and CDS markets and the 
importance of financial reports for stock markets, we expect the CDS market to respond to the 
release of periodic financial reports as well. 
These three features of the literature thus point out the key role of accounting information 
in influencing the CDS market. Based on this evidence, in this essay we investigate whether 
periodic financial reports are value relevant to the CDS market. To the best of our knowledge, this 
study is the first attempt to investigate the reactions of the CDS market to the release of periodic 
financial reports. 
 
1.3 OBJECTIVE AND AIMS 
In this dissertation, three empirical studies are undertaken to shed light on the behaviour of the 
credit market. Their objectives and aims are to answer the following research questions: 
1. What is the role of credit ratings in corporate financial decisions? 
2. Does the CDS market’s introduction affect corporate investment? 
3. Do periodic financial reports contain information for the CDS market? 
 
1.4 EMPIRICAL PLAN 
This section describes the empirical plan undertaken to achieve the objectives and aims presented 
in Section 1.3. 
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1.4.1 Essay 1: The Role of Credit Ratings in Corporate Financial Decisions 
In the first essay, our data set consists of all firms except for financial (Standard Industrial 
Classification, or SIC, codes 6000–6999) and utility industries (SIC codes 4900–4999) from 1985 
to 2015, because historical Standard & Poor’s (S&P) long-term credit rating data are available 
only since 1985 from Compustat. Since the aim of this essay is to understand the role of credit 
ratings in corporate financial decisions, we need to, first, construct credit rating–based panels. To 
estimate the annual credit rating for each firm, we convert each rating category to a numerical 
scale from 24 (highest credit rating, or AAA) to one (lowest credit rating, or D). We then construct 
credit rating groups based on a time-invariant approach and find the quantiles of the cross-sectional 
distributions of firm credit ratings in each year. In the next step, we compute the rounded average 
of quantile groups over all available years for each firm. This average reflects the quantile to which 
the firm belongs. We also consider the time-variant approach to create panels as one of our 
robustness checks. We then winsorize all collected data at 1% and 99% and remove firms with 
fewer than two consecutive years of data. Our final data set contains 24,926 firm–year observations 
representing 2,400 firms. 
In this essay, we implement three different methodologies to address our research 
questions. In the financing section (Secion 2.4.1), we consider a dynamic panel data model. To 
estimate the SOA towards the target level for firms with different levels of credit rating, we follow 
the partial adjustment model (PAM) proposed by Flannery and Rangan (2006). Estimating the 
dynamic panel model is a challenge in corporate finance due to complexities such as unobserved 
heterogeneity and endogeneity, residual serial correlation, short time series, unbalanced panels, 
and a fractional dependent variable. The literature documents that the results obtained from panel 
ordinary least squares (OLS) and fixed effect (FE) estimators are highly biased (in diverse 
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directions). Our approach to estimate the partial adjustment model is motivated by the findings of 
Dang, Kim, and Shin (2015) and Flannery and Hankins (2013). These authors provide a 
comprehensive analysis of the efficiency of methods in estimating the dynamic panel model. 
Through thorough investigations, they conclude that two methods for bias correction are the most 
appropriate and robust: The first involves the analytically bias-corrected least squares dependent 
variable (LSDVC) estimator for the dynamic panel data model, which is based on bias 
approximations as in Bruno (2005), and the second method is the iterative bootstrap-based 
correction (BC) procedure proposed by Everaert and Pozzi (2007). Therefore, regarding the 
characteristics of our data sample, which has a short time series and an unbalanced panel, our main 
methodologies for the financing model rely on these two methods. 
In the investment section (Section 2.4.2), we adopt a panel regression model to investigate 
the role of credit ratings on corporate investment. We consider the investment model of Julio and 
Yook (2012) and augment it with a variable that represents the firm’s credit rating level (CR). 
Motivated by Petersen (2009), we cluster our data set by firms and use clustered robust standard 
errors and the fixed effect estimator to estimate the model. We then extend our investigation by 
running the core regression model for each credit rating panel individually. Motivated by Amihud 
and Goyenko (2013), we use the 𝑅ଶ value of the regression to compare the performance of the 
investment model in each credit rating group. A higher 𝑅ଶ value implies that the variation in 
corporate investment can be explained more by the included independent variables. 
Finally, in the third section of this essay (Section 2.4.3), we implement a recursive rolling-
window regression to generate a time-varying SOA based on the BC estimator, considering an 
eight-year window. We then include this variable in our corporate investment model to determine 
the impact of financing through the SOA on corporate investment. 
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1.4.2 Essay 2: CDS and Corporate Investment 
The second essay aims to test the hypothesis whether CDS trading affects corporate investment. 
To understand this, we employ a fixed effects panel data regression model. We follow Ashcraft 
and Santos (2009), Das et al. (2014), and Saretto and Tookes (2013) and consider an indicator 
variable to find the effect of CDS trading. Our dummy variable Trading takes the value of one 
from the year in which the firm started CDS trading and a value of zero for previous years. This 
variable shows whether corporate investment is affected after a firm’s CDSs start to trade. 
Moreover, we follow An, Chen, Luo, and Zhang (2016), Chava and Roberts (2008), and Julio and 
Yook (2012) to include control variables in our corporate investment model. To estimate the 
model, we adopt a panel data regression framework. Our main interest is the coefficient of the 
variable Trading, which captures changes in the corporate investment in the period following a 
firm’s CDS trading. Moreover, since endogeneity in the timing of CDS trading and the selection 
bias problem for firms with traded CDSs are concerns, we address this issue. Besides the control 
for fixed effects, we consider two alternative approaches to examine the influence of CDS trading 
on corporate investment, namely, propensity score matching (PSM) analysis and difference-in-
differences (DID) estimation. 
We follow Saretto and Tookes (2013) for data collection and focus on the components of 
the S&P 500 Index. We begin with the sample of firms from the S&P 500 Index that have traded 
CDSs in the Bloomberg database. We then obtain trade data for five-year CDSs from the 
Bloomberg Generic Average Price (mnemonic CBGN) and assume that the onset of a firm’s CDS 
trading is the first quoted CDS spread in Bloomberg. Subsequently, we collect annual financial 
data from Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) for firms from 1950 to 2015, conditional on 
the availability of data. In the next step, we merge the CDS and firm data and winsorize the data 
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at the 1% and 99% levels to remove the effects of outliers. Our final data set consists of 5,908 
firm–year observations (165 firms). In addition, we distinguish 180 firms as non-CDS issuers 
among the components of the S&P 500 Index. We consider these firms part of a control group in 
the DID estimation and PSM technique to check the robustness of the results. 
 Moreover, we study the kinds of borrowers more affected by CDS inception. Therefore, 
we conduct additional analysis based on firm characteristics such as firm risk and size. We consider 
two proxies for firm risk, namely, credit ratings and the leverage ratio. For credit rating–based 
analysis, we focus on S&P long-term credit ratings. We extract monthly data and convert the 
alphabetical ratings to a numerical value. After finding the average monthly value in each year, 
we divide our sample into two panels, namely, speculative- and investment-grade categories. 
 Furthermore, the leverage-based panels are constructed by sorting firms on their leverage 
ratio. Then, we divide our sample into two equal categories: high-leveraged and low-leveraged 
firms. Similarly, we examine whether the impact of CDS trading on corporate investment varies 
with firm size. Using a similar approach as when we created leverage-based panels, we construct 
two panels based on the sorted firms’ size (logarithm of total assets). Finally, we examine whether 
the impact of CDS trading on issuers’ investment activities differs for size-based panels. 
 
1.4.3 Essay 3: Reaction of the CDS Market to the Release of Periodic Financial Reports 
Unlike related studies in the stock market literature that mainly use an event study methodology, 
we adopt a panel regression model to investigate the reaction of the CDS market after the release 
of periodic financial reports. Some issues, such as insufficient quoted price data, infrequent 
trading, and the impact of term structure, cause problems in applying an event study methodology 
in the credit market (Peterson, 1989). Moreover, there are different variations in this method’s 
19 
 
application regarding the choices of significance tests (Armitage, 1995) or the techniques for 
estimating expected returns, which affects the results. Therefore, as an alternative methodology, 
we use a panel data regression model to examine the response of the CDS market to the release of 
financial information. 
To collect data, we follow Narayan, et al. (2014) and focus on the constituents of the S&P 
500 Index. The data related to the CDS spread and equity price are extracted from Bloomberg and 
Datastream. We obtain the release dates of annual and quarterly reports from the Datastream 
Professional database. In addition to the date of a periodic report’s filing, we consider the release 
dates of amended reports, because their contents could contain useful information for market 
participants as well. The data are daily from May 7, 2004, to April 30, 2015. We focus on CDSs 
with a five-year tenor because these are the most liquid type in the market, but we consider CDSs 
with other tenors in additional analysis. Of the 500 constituents of the S&P 500 Index, only 196 
stocks with corresponding CDS spreads have sufficient time series data. We therefore exclude the 
remaining stocks. We winsorize the required data at 1% and 99% to remove the effects of outliers. 
Therefore, our final data set consists of 196 firms with 505,037 observations. 
We use heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors and a fixed effect estimator to 
generate reliable results. We include two dummy variables that represent the release of annual and 
quarterly reports, respectively. These dummy variables take the value of one when the periodic 
financial reports are released that day and zero otherwise. Motivated by the study of Galil, Shapir, 
Amiram, and Ben-Zion (2014), who examine different groups of variables as contributing factors 
in the CDS spread, we include three control variables based on the availability of data in our model, 
namely, stock returns, changes in stock return volatility, and changes in the spot rate (five-year 
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Treasury constant maturity rate). Moreover, we control for the effects of earnings and credit rating 
announcements by including two indicator variables. 
Additionally, inspired by Griffin (2003) and You and Zhang (2009, 2011), who evaluate 
the value relevance of quarterly and annual financial reports over a 10-day period following and 
around the filing of periodic compulsory financial reports for stock market investors, we run the 
panel regression model from days 𝑡 + 1 to 𝑡 + 10. 
Furthermore, to test whether the reactions of CDS market differ across size groups, sectors, 
and economic situations, we divide our data set into three size groups based on firm market 
capitalization as the proxy for size, 10 sectors based on the Global Industry Classification Standard 
(GICS), and three economic situations, namely, pre-GFC, during the GFC, and post-GFC. 
 
1.5 ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 empirically examines the role 
of credit ratings in corporate financial decisions. Chapter 3 investigates the impact of the CDS 
market’s emergence on corporate investment. Chapter 4 empirically investigates the behaviour of 
the CDS market after the release of periodic financial reports. Lastly, Chapter 5 draws concluding 
remarks on the three empirical studies. 
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2 THE ROLE OF CREDIT RATING IN 
CORPORATE FINANCIAL DECISIONS 
 
2.1  INTRODUCTION 
Credit rating represents the credit risk of firms through the assessment of rating agencies.  The 
complexity of financial products and globalization of financial markets have led to a surge in 
demand for credit rating in the recent years. Credit rating reduces the adverse effects of information 
asymmetry and is instrumental in capital market growth. Credit rating, for example, has a valuation 
role by providing information for market participants and it facilitates financial contracts, such as, 
loan agreements and bond covenants (Frost, 2007). Credit rating may impact capital structure 
policy in practice as revealed, for instance, by Graham and Harvey (2001), who show that credit 
rating is the second most important factor for chief financial officers to consider in deciding a 
firm's capital structure.5 
In this study, we propose and test the hypothesis that credit rating influences firm capital 
structure and investment decisions. The understanding of how fast firms remove the deviation from 
the target debt ratio and the factors that influence corporate investment are important for investors 
and firm’s managers. Examining the link between SOA and credit rating is motivated by several 
factors. First, following the capital structure irrelevance principle proposed by Modigliani and 
Miller (1958), several studies (see, for example, Byoun, 2008; Flannery and Rangan, 2006; Huang 
and Ritter, 2009; Mukherjee and Wang, 2013; Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999) have attempted to 
understand firms’ financing behavior. One gap in this literature is that limited attention has been 
                                                          
5 See, for example, Brigham and Gapenski (1999) and Damodaran (1997). 
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devoted to understanding the relation between capital structure or investment decisions and credit 
rating. The exception is Kisgen (2006), who is the first to explore the importance of credit rating 
on capital structure decisions. He finds that credit rating directly affects firms’ capital structure 
decisions and concludes that firms’ near downgrade/upgrade issue less debt relative to equity than 
firms not near a change in rating. 
The second factor motivating our hypothesis is the literature on leverage SOA that has 
roots in the trade-off theory. Trade-off theory is one of the most prominent theories of capital 
structure, which focuses on market frictions, and specifically on financial distress cost and tax. 
Unlike other alternative capital structure theories, namely the market timing theory (Baker and 
Wurgler, 2002), the pecking order (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984), the inertia theory 
(Welch, 2004), and the trade-off theory, point to a target level of leverage and state that there is an 
optimal level of capital structure at which the tax benefit of debt and the cost of bankruptcy is 
balanced. Therefore, a considerable number of studies (see, for example, Bradley, Jarrell, and  
Kim, 1984; Hennessy and Whited, 2005; Strebulaev, 2007; Titman and Tsyplakov, 2007) has 
evaluated the validity of these theories. These studies test whether firms have a long-run target 
leverage and (if so) how fast they converge to this target level. A limitation of most of studies is 
that they implicitly assume homogeneity in SOA. In other words, they ignore the firm-specific 
adjustment costs in estimation of SOA and assume that all firms within the sample converge to the 
target leverage at the same pace.  Those studies that pay attention to this issue document some 
evidences of heterogeneity in SOA by allowing the asymmetry in SOA with respect to different 
regimes (Dang et al., 2012) and some firm characteristics, such as deviation from target level, 
financing deficit and default risk (see, for example, Dang et al., 2012; Elsas and Florysiak, 2011). 
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Moreover, Leland (1994) and Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989) argue that firms take 
different paths toward the target level when they face different levels of adjustment cost. 
Consistent with this view, Kemper and Rao (2013) criticize the credit rating-capital structure 
hypothesis proposed by Kisgen (2006) and conclude that this hypothesis is not applicable to all 
the firms, and relevant mostly to low credit rating firms. Thus, we can infer that the behavior of 
firms with different levels of credit rating or credit rating stability should have a heterogeneous 
effect on the target level adjustment.  
The third motivating factor is the role of econometric estimators. The estimation of 
dynamic panel data models in corporate finance is a concern due to the presence of a lagged 
dependent variable and the fixed effect factor (Dang et al., 2015; Flannery and Hankins, 2013). 
Recently, Dang et al., (2015) and Flannery and Hankins (2013) investigate and compare the 
estimation approaches and conclude that LSDVC and BC are the most appropriate and robust 
methods for estimating dynamic panel models.6 Therefore, we apply these two less biased 
methods in the capital structure literature to estimate SOA in our study.  
                                                          
6  Dang et al. (2015), by adopting Monte Carlo simulation,  investigate five main instrumental variable-based 
approaches, namely the just-identified instrumental variable estimator (Anderson and Hsiao, 1981), the first-difference 
generalized methods of moments (GMM) estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991),  the system GMM estimator  (Blundell 
and Bond, 1998), and the long-difference GMM estimator (Hahn, Hausman, and  Kuersteiner, 2007; Huang and Ritter, 
2009).  They use three bias-corrected estimators also, specifically the LSDVC (Bruno, 2005; Kiviet, 1995), the BC  
(Everaert and Pozzi, 2007), and a simulation-based indirect inference method (see, for example, Gouriéroux, Phillips, 
and  Yu, 2010). Finally, they use an augmented double censored Tobit estimator (Elsas and Florysiak, 2015) that 
accounts for the fractional nature of the dependent variable. They show that the instrumental variable and GMM 
estimators are unreliable, and sensitive to the presence of unobserved heterogeneity, residual serial correlation, and 
changes in control parameters. They conclude that the bias-corrected fixed-effects estimator, based on an analytical, 
bootstrap, or indirect inference approach, is the most appropriate and robust method.  
In another study, Flannery and Hankins (2013) utilize Monte Carlo simulations to examine the performance of seven 
econometric methodologies for estimating dynamic panel models, namely OLS, FE, first-difference GMM,  the system 
GMM estimator, the long-difference GMM estimator, and four period differencing methods, and LSDVC. They show 
that LSDVC is the most accurate estimator across a range of data limitations.  Although the endogenous explanatory 
variables tend toreduce the precision of the LSDVC estimates, the damage is limited to the estimated coefficients on 
the endogenous variables and this approach remains accurate for the lagged dependent variable and exogenous 
regressors. 
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The fourth factor motivating our hypothesis test has roots in the stability of credit rating. 
Stability is key and is desired by market participants. Frequent changes in credit rating can have 
severe consequences for firms that experience this instability (Frost, 2007). To capture this factor 
(credit rating changes), we create an index, which we call the credit rating stability index. Given 
that credit rating influences leverage, we expect firms with different credit rating stabilities to have 
different SOA to a target leverage. A further motivation for this relation is provided in Section 
1.2.1. Inspired by studies that show short-sell ban and credit crisis affect corporate investment (see, 
for example, Dasgupta and Sengupta, 1993; Gilchrist, Himmelberg, and  Huberman, 2005; 
Grullon, Michenaud, and Weston, 2015), we also examine whether the importance of credit rating 
holds during changes in economic conditions, such as the GFC and the short-sell ban policy in 
2008. Following this, we expand our investigation to a search of whether the significance of 
corporate investment’s determinants and the explanatory power of the investment model are 
different among firms with various levels of credit rating. Finally, we focus on the relation between 
financing and investment decisions and link the two by testing the hypothesis that SOA influences 
the corporate investment. 
Our approach towards testing the proposed hypothesis is as follows. We begin by 
examining whether SOA toward target leverage varies among firms with different credit rating 
levels and credit rating stabilities. To achieve this objective, we use an unbalanced panel data set 
consisting of 2,400 firms, culminating into a total of 24,926 firm years. The SOA is estimated 
based on the LSDVC and BC estimators using PAM. Following this, we test whether credit rating 
is the determinant of corporate investment by adopting a panel regression model and using 
clustered robust standard errors and the fixed effects estimator. We then design the link between 
SOA and corporate investment, and empirically test this relation. We adopt a time-varying PAM 
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to estimate SOA over time. In other words, we implement the rolling regression model based on 
the BC estimator to generate a time-series for SOA.7 This allows us to augment the corporate 
investment model with the time-varying SOA as a determinant of corporate investment. 
We generate six main findings. First, we show that there is heterogeneity in SOA for the 
panel of firms with different levels of credit rating and credit rating stability. Second, the results 
confirm that SOA toward target leverage for the firms with high (low) credit rating is slow (fast). 
Third, the panel of firms with higher stability in credit rating converges to the target level faster 
compared to the less stable firms. Fourth, we illustrate that credit rating is a determinant of 
investment decision and its role is significant during various economic situations. Fifth, the 
performance of the investment model to explain the variation in corporate investment is higher for 
the panel of firms with medium and low credit rating levels. Finally, we do find some evidence of 
a negative association between SOA and corporate investment. 
Our approaches and findings make the following contributions to the literature. First, this 
study contributes to the strand of literature (see, for example, Dang et al., 2012; Elsas and 
Florysiak, 2012) that pays attention to the heterogeneity of SOA. The literature shows that there is 
asymmetry in SOA with respect to different regimes and documents the heterogenity in SOA with 
respect to some firm characteristics, such as deviation from target level, financing deficit and 
default risk. We show that a firm’s SOA is heterogeneous with respect to the firm’s credit rating. 
Moreover, our study is related to the studies that investigate the role of credit rating on capital 
structure (see, for example,Graham and Harvey, 2001; Kisgen, 2006; Kisgen, 2007; Tang, 2009). 
These studies confirm that a firm’s credit rating has an influential role on their capital structure. 
                                                          
7 We contacted the authors of  paper “Everaert, G & Pozzi, L 2007, 'Bootstrap-based bias correction for dynamic 
panels', Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, vol. 31, no. 4, pp. 1160-84.” and they organised to modify the 
related codes to be used with a rolling regression command in Stata. We are thankful to the authors for this service. 
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We add to this literature by considering a new credit rating-based index, namely, the credit rating 
stability index. We show that the heterogeneous behavior of SOA exists with regards to the credit 
rating stabilities as well. 
Second, this study adds to the few studies that highlight the role of credit rating on 
corporate investment (see, for example, Gul et al., 2011). These studies show that firms are 
associated with more (less) capital investments in the period following credit rating upgrades 
(downgrades). Our study shows that credit rating is a determinant of corporate investment. When 
we augment the classic (traditional) investment model with a credit rating variable, it turns to be 
highly significant. Its significance remains when we consider it during different economic 
conditions.  
 Third, the study provides new evidence on the relationship between financial leverage and 
investment and extends the prior literature by studying the role of SOA on corporate investment.  
The related literature (see, for example, Bolton, Chen, and  Wang, 2011; Chava and Roberts, 2008; 
McCabe, 1979; McDonald, Jacquillat, and  Nussenbaum, 1975; Myers and Majluf, 1984; Peterson 
and Benesh, 1983) confirms that financing and investments are associated. We enhance this 
literature by showing that the speed with which firms revert to their target debt ratio also matters 
to corporate investment. We document a negative relationship between SOA and corporate 
investment. 
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 discusses each of our hypotheses. 
In Section 2.3, we present the methodology and data. Section 2.4 discusses the results and, in 
Section 2.5, we examine the relevance of other capital structure theories. This is followed by 
robustness checks in Section 2.6. We discuss our findings in Section 2.7.  In the final section, we 
provide some concluding remarks. 
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2.2 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Capital structure literature pays attention to the role of credit rating on corporate financial 
decisions. Kisgen (2006) was the first to investigate the importance of credit rating on a firm’s 
financing. On the associated cost and benefit of a firm’s credit rating, he develops the credit rating-
capital structure hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, firms near downgrade and upgrade rely 
more on equity issuance than on debt financing.  
In another study, Kisgen (2007) provides details on how capital structure decision can be 
influenced by credit rating. He points to the access of high-credit rated firms to commercial paper 
markets. This market provides low cost funds from a variety of lenders in respectively shorter 
period and without obligation for prior registration with SEC. He also argues that there are several 
credit-rating based regulations that restrict the investment activities of financial institutions. 
Moreover, since rating agencies are specialized in collecting and evaluating credit worthiness 
information, Kisgen (2007) highlights the screening and signaling roles of these agencies and 
contends that the information content of credit rating is informative for public.8 In addition, he 
discusses how firms with lower credit rating must bear more costs compared to firms with high 
credit rating. Downgraded firms, for example, may face a rise in the coupon rate, be forced to 
repurchase bond or experience more restrictions in loan contracts, implying a higher cost of capital 
for those firms. In line with this, Tang (2009) shows how firms with higher credit rating have better 
access to the debt markets with lower cost of borrowing and capability to issue more debt.  
Moreover, Kisgen (2009) provides evidence for the role of credit rating in influencing 
capital structure and investigates the behavior of a firm’s leverage adjustment after a one year 
                                                          
8 The literature documents a movement in bond and stock price after a change in credit rating,  which affects the 
leverage ratio directly. See, for example,  Hand, Holthausen, and  Leftwich, (1992), Holthausen and Leftwich, (1986), 
and Weinstein (1977). 
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change in credit rating. He finds that firms react asymmetrically to the upgrade and downgrade 
change, and documents a lower amount of debt after downgrading. He further shows that this effect 
is severe when the investment-grade firms downgrade to speculative grade. In a related study, 
Maung and Chowdhury (2014) show that the effect of credit rating change on capital structure is 
not concurrent, and it takes more than one year to adjust the leverage ratio. 
Motivated by the credit rating-capital structure hypothesis proposed by the Kisgen (2006) 
and documented evidences of the role of credit rating on capital structure in the work of, for 
instance Kisgen (2007, 2009), Maung and Chowdhury (2014) and Tang (2009), we argue that the 
discrete cost (benefit) of different levels of credit rating and credit stabilities does matter in 
determining a firm’s capital structure. Kisgen (2006) states that if the rating-dependent cost 
(benefit) is a concern for managers they will consider it in search of the target leverage ratio based 
on the trade-off theory. With respect to the benefit or cost of credit rating, we expect firms with 
different levels of credit rating to experience different friction costs and follow different paths 
toward their target ratios. This motivates our first hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2.1: There is heterogeneity in SOA for firms with different levels of credit 
rating and credit rating stability. 
According to the trade-off theory, the target leverage ratio is a result of the balance between 
bankruptcy cost and benefit of debt’s tax savings. For firms with lower credit rating, the 
bankruptcy cost is a worry that has severe consequences, such as a higher cost of capital and strict 
financial contracts. Kisgen (2007) discusses that credit rating affect a firm’s capital structure. He 
argues that firms with low credit rating have limited access to commercial paper market as a low-
cost fund. Furthermore, he points to several regulations of financial institutions and other 
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intermediaries that are tied to the rating.9 From this, we can infer that these rating-based regulations 
can affect potential investors of low credit rating firms. Moreover, there are considerable literature 
showing that firm’s rating downgrades are followed by reduction in their stock and bond prices 
(see, for example, Ederington and Goh, 1998; Ederington, Yawitz, and  Roberts, 1987; Hand et 
al., 1992), which is unfavorable for firms. These arguments imply that low grade firms will 
converge to their target leverage ratio faster. 
Moreover, capital restructuring imposes additional costs that provide firms with higher 
credit rating less incentives to change capital structures. Byoun (2008) argues that the most 
adjustment to target leverage occurs when firms are above (below) target debt with financial 
surplus (deficit); otherwise, firms desire to keep their current debt level to avoid the corresponding 
costs of bond or equity re-issuance. Furthermore, Myers' (1977) debt overhang theory argues that 
an increase in leverage may lead to future underinvestment and cause a reduction in firm value.10 
Based on the work of Jensen and Meckling (1976), Myers and Majluf (1984) and Myers (1977), 
we can infer that firms with higher credit rating are less constrained by the debt overhang problem. 
Debt overhang is more problematic for low credit rating firms. Therefore, high credit quality firms 
have less incentives to change their current leverage ratio. We, therefore, expect a lower SOA for 
the firms with higher credit rating and vice versa. Therefore, our second hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 2.2: The firm with lower (higher) credit rating converges to the target level 
faster (slower). 
                                                          
9 For example, mutual funds can hold up to 5% of their asset in non-investment grade bond and they must sell the 
security if it downgrades to  a rating below B (Kisgen, 2009). 
10 Debt overhang is a condition of an organization that has existing debt so great that it cannot easily borrow more 
money, even when that new borrowing is actually a good investment that would more than pay for itself. It was first 
discussed by Myers (1977). 
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Credit rating determines a borrower’s credit risk, therefore stable credit rating allows 
borrowers to access funds cheaply. Cantor and Mann (2003) discuss the role of credit rating 
stability. They state that financial market participants consider credit rating in choosing securities 
to construct portfolios. Some empirical studies (see, for example, Campbell, Hilscher, and  
Szilagyi, 2008; Narayan, Narayan, Phan, Thuraisamy, and  Tran, 2015; Vassalou and Xing, 2004) 
show that credit risk and equity risk premium are related. Narayan et al., (2015) examine whether 
momentum profits of Asia-Pacific Islamic stocks are shaped by credit quality. They consider three 
portfolios of stocks based on the firm’s credit quality and they find that a portfolio of low credit 
quality stocks earns more than a portfolio of high credit quality stocks.  In this regard, information 
provided through credit rating, Cantor and Mann (2003) argue, is useful in portfolio governance, 
performance attribution, and regulation of financial markets, institutions or financial contracts  
  These discussions suggest that the consequences of unstable credit rating can be severe, 
leading to costly contract renegotiations and portfolio alterations (Cantor and Mann, 2003; Frost, 
2007). A change in credit rating can lead to unfavorable consequences for unstable rating 
borrowers.  For example, the less stable firms may face strict covenants and higher cost of capital 
for external financing. This idea motivates us to our next hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2.3: Firms with higher (lower) credit stability converge to the target level 
faster (slower). 
The impact of credit rating on capital structure decisions is investigated in some studies 
(see, for example, Chava and Roberts, 2008; Kisgen, 2006; Kisgen, 2007) but the role of credit 
risk in influencing corporate investment is less studied. A study by Gul et al. (2011) examines 
corporate investment behavior after credit rating transitions. They conclude that capital 
expenditures increase after an upgrade and decrease after a credit rating downgrade. In another 
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study, Bannier, Hirsch, and Wiemann (2012) examine whether credit rating agencies have a 
monitoring role over a firm’s investment decisions on behalf of the debtholder. They demonstrate 
that when firms experience a negative (positive) rating change, they reduce (increase) their 
investment expenditures.  Moreover, Agha and Faff (2014) consider the joint effects of credit 
rating changes and financial flexibility on corporate financial decisions. Their key finding is that 
a firm’s financial flexibility/inflexibility status leads to asymmetric responses to credit rating 
upgrade and downgrade with respect to the cost of capital, financing decisions, and investment 
policies. 
Given the costs to capital associated with credit rating, we expect a firm’s credit rating to 
be a determinant of its investment decision.  Based on studies such as Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
Myers and Majluf (1984) and Myers (1977) we can predict that firms with better credit conditions 
have more investments since they are less controlled by the overhang problem. Moreover, firms 
with better credit rating have greater bargaining power and less strict covenants in debt contracts. 
This, in turn, can lead to a higher level of corporate investment. Therefore, our next hypothesis is 
as follow: 
Hypothesis 2.4: Credit rating is a determinant of corporate investment and higher credit 
rating leads stimulate corporate investment. 
The way credit rating influences corporate investment may be financial event dependent 
also. For instance, GFC or the short-selling ban could dictate how precisely credit rating influences 
investments. We explore this. We test whether corporate investment—credit rating relation was 
different under different economic conditions, namely, before, during, and after the GFC, as well 
as during the 2008 short-sell ban period. The motivation is simple and clear. The GFC represents 
a negative shock to the supply of external finance. Some studies provide details about the real 
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effects of the subprime mortgage crisis on corporations. Tong and Wei (2008), for example, show 
that many non-financial firms experienced a dramatic decline in stock prices due to the onset of 
the GFC. Moreover, Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) investigate bank lending behavior during the 
GFC. They find that new lending activities with the purpose of real investments declined during 
GFC. Furthermore, Campello, Graham, and Harvey (2010) and Campello, Giambona, and Harvey 
(2011) provide evidence of a negative effect of the GFC on firm’s real decisions. They argue that 
the failure of financially constrained firms to borrow funds during GFC, force them to waive the 
profitable investments. In another study, Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy (2010) examine corporate 
investment of firms conditional on financial positions following the onset of GFC. They find that 
corporate investment declined during GFC and this reduction is more remarkable for financially 
constrained firms.  
Motivated by these studies, we investigate the impact of credit rating before, during, and 
after GFC. We expect the credit rating and corporate investment to be associated positively during 
normal economic conditions but negatively during times of crisis.  
The motivation for analyzing the credit risk—investments nexus during the short-selling 
ban periods has roots in the work of Gilchrist, et al., (2005) and Grullon, et al., (2015) who show 
that short-selling impacts corporate investment. Given the short-selling—stock price relation, 
Grullon et al., (2015) argue that short-selling activity can affect corporate behavior, specifically 
financing and investment decisions. They discuss that the impact of short-selling constrains on 
stock price and corporate decisions results from two main channels. The first channel owes to 
Miller’s (1977) prediction, which is that short-selling constraints would lead to overpriced stocks. 
In other words, this can be perceived as the price overvaluation channel. Grullon et al. (2015) 
argue that short-selling can lead to stock price bubbles and firms exploit such bubbles by issuing 
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new shares at inflated prices. Consequently, this overvaluation can lead to overinvestment by 
reducing a firm’s cost of capital falsely; see Gilchrist et al. (2005) for a lucid discussion on this.  
In addition to the overvaluation channel, Grullon et al. (2015) point to the role of short-
selling constraints in reducing the impact of strategic traders (bear raid). This can be perceived as 
the bear raid channel. A bear raid is a type of stock market strategy, where a trader tries to force 
down the stock price to cover a short position and make profits. Goldstein, Ozdenoren, and Yuan 
(2013) examine the impact of bear raid traders on firm’s cash, current debt and operating earnings 
a quarter following bear raid. They find that the firms that are subject to short-selling attack 
experience a decrease in their current debt, cash and operating earnings which ultimately hurts the 
corporate investment. Therefore, constrains on short-sell activities reduce this negative impact of 
bear raid on firm’s investment activities. 
With regards to the overvaluation and bear-raids channels, the removal of short-sell 
constraints leads to a rise in stock prices and consequently to an increase in investments. As a 
result, we expect a positive relation between credit rating and investments during the period of the 
2008 short-selling ban. 
Based on these discussions, we design our fifth hypothesis as follows:  
Hypothesis 2.5: The impact of credit rating on corporate investment is positive during the 
short-selling ban period and non-GFC periods while the effect is negative during GFC. 
The introduction of the MM theory saw several studies investigating its relevance. Fama 
(1974) and McDonald et al. (1975), for example, examine the relation between, financing, 
investment, and dividends of firms and support the interdependency between them, consistent with 
the MM theory. Moreover, McCabe (1979), Dhrymes and Kurz (1967) and Peterson and Benesh 
(1983) find support for the association between a firm’s financing and investment behaviors. 
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Furthermore, Ahn et al. (2006), Aivazian et al. (2005) and  Dang et al. (2012) examine the 
association between financing and investment decision and confirm that firms’ leverage ratio 
affects the corporate investment. According to the trade-off theory, firms have a target leverage 
ratio and in the case of any deviation from the target ratio, actions will be taken to converge toward 
the optimum level. Taken the role of leverage ratio on corporate investment, and the existence of 
target leverage ratio, then, the speed that firms revert to the optimal level would be influence 
corporate investment as well.  
The actions that firms take to reach to a target debt ratio are different depending whether 
firms are under or over a target leverage (Byoun, 2008). Those firms that are over-leveraged reduce 
debt or raise equity and those that are under-leveraged raise debt or repurchase equity depending 
on the financial deficits/surplus to converge to their target leverage (Flannery and Rangan, 2006). 
A faster SOA for firms that are under-leveraged depends on the firm’s financial deficit situations 
which would mean issuing more debt or retiring equity. Issuing more debt leads to an increase in 
leverage ratio and consequently more credit risk and alternatively retiring equity may lead to 
decrease in available funds for corporate investment. This, in turn, can lead to a negative 
relationship between corporate investment and SOA for these firms. 
 In an alternative scenario, firms that are over the target ratio reduce their current leverage 
to converge to a target level by repurchasing debt (if financial deficit is positive) or issuing more 
equities (if financial deficit is negative).  Given that repurchasing debt and debt restructuring are 
not cost-free, we can infer that these activities reduce the available funds for corporate investment 
as well. Moreover, based on the pecking order theory, issuing equity is a last prioritized source of 
financing. Since investors believe managers know more about the condition of firms, new equity 
can signify overvalued stocks thus sending negative signals to the market. As a result, investors 
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place a lower value on the new equity issuance which affects the corporate investment negatively 
by reducing funds available for corporate investment. 
These discussions motivate our final hypothesis as follows:  
Hypothesis 2.6: The SOA (to a target) and corporate investment are negatively associated. 
 
2.3 RESEARCH DESIGN 
2.3.1 Methodology 
Our approaches to addressing our main research questions are as follows. To establish the role of 
credit rating on financing, we adopt dynamic panel data model, and to study the role of credit 
rating on corporate investment, we use panel regression model. To examine the association 
between financing and investment behavior through the role of SOA on corporate investment, we 
initially implement a rolling window estimation strategy to generate SOA and then use a panel 
regression model to investigate whether SOA statistically significantly influences corporate 
investment. In what follows we provided a detailed explanation. 
 
2.3.1.1 Financing model 
Along with the trade-off theory, firms have a target leverage ratio and in the case of any deviation 
from this target, actions will be taken to converge toward the optimum ratio. The speed that firms 
revert to the optimal level is dependent on the adjustment cost (Flannery and Rangan, 2006) and 
the costs of such an adjustment are influenced by the degree of financial constraints and the level 
of a firm’s flexibility (Faulkender, Flannery, Hankins, and  Smith, 2012; Flannery and Hankins, 
2007). In the presence of this cost, the full adjustment is hardly possible and, based on this view, 
Flannery and Rangan (2006) proposed PAM.  
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To find SOA for firms with different levels of credit rating toward the target level, we 
follow the PAM proposed by Flannery and Rangan (2006). In this model, the target leverage for 
each firm at time 𝑡 is specified by a vector of firm characteristics (such as EBIT-TA, MB, DEP-TA, 
Size, FA-TA, RD-TA, IND-MED, R&D_dummy) at time 𝑡 − 1, which represents the cost and 
benefit of capital structure’s components.11 Therefore, the PAM can be demonstrated with two 
structural equations. In the first equation, the target leverage is determined by the  𝑘 × 1 vector of 
firm characteristics and unobserved factors, which is captured by fixed effects.  
𝑀𝐷𝑅௜௧ାଵ∗ = 𝛽𝑋௜௧ + 𝛼௜                                                                                                                 (2.1) 
𝑀𝐷𝑅௜௧ାଵ −  𝑀𝐷𝑅௜௧ =  𝛾 (𝑀𝐷𝑅௜௧ାଵ∗ −  𝑀𝐷𝑅௜௧ ) + 𝜀௜௧ାଵ                                                       (2.2) 
In these equations, 𝑀𝐷𝑅௜௧ାଵ is the leverage ratio of firm 𝑖 at the end of year 𝑡 + 1, 𝑀𝐷𝑅௜௧ାଵ∗  
is the target leverage, 𝑋௜௧ is the vector of lagged firm characteristics, and 𝛼௜ represents the firm 
fixed effect. Equations (2.1) and (2.2) can be estimated in two ways. The first one is a two-stage 
approach which is using equation (2.1) to obtain the fitted value for the target leverage initially 
and then use this in the second equation to find SOA (Byoun, 2008; Fama and French, 2002). 
Some studies argue that this method suffers from a generated regressor problem, leading to invalid 
estimates in the second stage. As an alternative approach, one can substitute equation (2.1) into 
equation (2.2) to obtain: 
𝑀𝐷𝑅௜௧ାଵ = (1 − 𝛾)𝑀𝐷𝑅௜௧ + 𝛾𝛽𝑋௜௧ + 𝛾𝛼௜ + 𝜀௜௧ାଵ                                                                          (2.3) 
Estimating equation (2.3) is a challenge in corporate finance due to complexities, such as 
unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity, residual serial correlation, small time series, 
unbalanced panel or the fractional nature of the dependent variable. Given these issues, the 
literature points out that OLS and FE estimators are highly biased (in diverse directions) and 
                                                          
11 Specific definitions for firm characteristic variables are provided in Table A.1. 
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estimates from these methods can be used as the lower and upper bounds for a correct estimation. 
Two main econometrics approaches are taken to cope with the bias resulting from OLS and FF 
estimators. The first approach is via an instrumental variable for lagged dependent variables (see, 
for example, Anderson and Hsiao, 1981; Arellano and Bond, 1991; Blundell and Bond, 1998; 
Huang and Ritter, 2009) and, the second approach, is correcting the estimation bias either 
analytically or by simulation. Flannery and Hankins (2013) and Dang et al. (2015) provide a 
comprehensive analysis of the efficiency of these methods for estimating dynamic panel models. 
They conclude that these two approaches for bias correction are the most appropriate and robust 
methods. Inspired by these studies, we use two estimators that address the bias issue. In particular, 
we use LSDVC estimator for the dynamic panel-data model, which is based on bias 
approximations as in Bruno (2005).12 Bruno (2005) extends the LSDV bias approximations in 
previous related studies, such as Kiviet (1995) and Bun and Kiviet (2003), for unbalanced panels. 
The approximations are acquired by altering the within operator to accommodate the dynamic 
selection rule.13  
The second estimator we use is BC procedure proposed by Everaert and Pozzi (2007).14 
They claim that this procedure provides a good alternative for existing dynamic panel data 
estimators for a panel with small to moderate 𝑡. This method is considered superior to the LSDVC 
since it is independent of the choice of the initial estimator. This method starts from the original 
                                                          
12 For estimation by LSDVC method, the initial estimator is required. The alternative initial estimators are: 1) AH 
estimator based on the Anderson and Hsiao (1981), with the dependent variable lagged two times, used as an 
instrument for the first-differenced model with no intercept (ivreg); 2) Standard one-step AB estimator based on the 
Arellano and Bond (1991) with no intercept (xtabond); 3) standard BB estimator based on the Blundell and Bond 
(1998) with no intercept, as implemented by the user-written Stata routine xtabond2 by Roodman (2003); and 4) a 
row vector of initial values supplied directly by the user. 
13 To apply the LSDVC procedure, we used xtlsdvc command in Stata. 
14 To apply the BC procedure, we used xtbcfe command in Stata. 
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biased LSDVC estimates and continues until the unbiased estimates are found by searching over 
the parameter space through an iterative bootstrap method.  
 
2.3.1.2 Investment model  
Our proposed investment model follows closely Julio and Yook (2012). The key difference is that 
our model is an augmented version of Julio and Yook (2012) in the sense that we include an 
additional variable representing a firm’s credit rating (CR). The regression specification is 
summarized as equation (2.4).   
𝐶𝐼௜௧ =  𝛼଴ + 𝛼ଵ. 𝑄௜௧ିଵ + 𝛼ଶ. 𝐶𝐹௜௧ + 𝛼ଷ. %∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝐶𝑅௜௧ + 𝛼௜ + 𝜀௜௧                                               (2.4) 
Motivated by Petersen (2009), we cluster our data set by firms and use clustered robust 
standard errors and the fixed effect estimator; 𝐶𝐼௜௧ is the corporate investment in year 𝑡; 𝑄௜௧ିଵ is 
the Tobin’s Q in year 𝑡 − 1; 𝐶𝐹௜௧ is the cash flow in year 𝑡; and  %∆𝐺𝐷𝑃௜௧ି  is the change in GDP 
in year 𝑡 − 1. 
Motivated by the study of Amihud and Goyenko (2013), we use the 𝑅ଶ from the regression 
model to compare the performance of the investment model in each credit rating group. A higher 
𝑅ଶ implies that the variation in corporate investment can be explained more by the included 
independent variables.  
2.3.1.3 Association of SOA and corporate investment 
Our third research question aims to examine how SOA influences corporate investment. To 
investigate this, we do not have historical data on SOA. We, therefore, generate this variable by 
implementing a recursive rolling window regression. We use  BC estimator  and we consider eight 
years as the window to estimate time-varying SOA. Since approximately 60% of firms in our 
dataset have historical data less than 10 years, a rolling window estimation strategy will reduce the 
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sample size.15 The data set, for instance, reduces to 759 firms (3,974 firm-years) based on the BC 
method compared to 2,400 firms (24,926 firm-years). 
 
2.3.2 Variables  
In estimating SOA to a target leverage, we need to define the leverage ratio. The literature 
predominately uses two definitions of leverage, namely book leverage (backward looking) and 
market leverage (forward looking). In our study, we consider both definitions. Panel A of Table 
A.1, shows how we define the dependent variables in financing and investment models. Moreover, 
following Flannery and Rangan (2006), we include a set of firm characteristic variables. A 
description of these variables is in Panel B of Table A.1. Furthermore, Panel C of Table A.1 notes 
the control variables that we include in our investment model.  
 
2.3.3 Data 
Our data set consists of all firms except financial (SIC 6000–6999) and utility industries 
(SIC 4900–4999) from 1985 to 2015 because the historical S&P long term credit rating data are 
available from 1985 in Compustat. 16 To estimate the annual credit rating for each firm, we convert 
each rating category to one numerical scale from 24 (highest credit rating (AAA)) to 1 (lowest 
credit rating (D)). We construct the credit rating groups based on a time invariant approach and 
compute the quantiles of the cross-sectional distributions of firm’s credit rating in each year. We 
then compute the rounded average of quantile groups over the all available years for each firm. 
This average reflects the quantile that the firm belongs to. Subsequently, we winsorize all the 
                                                          
15 We know that SOA is between 0 and 1, therefore, we use the adjusted xtbcfe command in Stata and restrict the lag 
coefficient to be less than and equal to 1. 
16 We exclude financial and utility firms following Flannery and Rangan (2006). 
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obtained data at 1% and 99% to remove the effect of outliers. Moreover, we exclude firms with 
less than two consecutive years of data. Over the sample period (1985-2015), we have 24,926 firm-
year observations representing 2,400 firms. This approach to arriving at our dataset is summarized 
in Table 2.1. 
Next, we explain our measure of credit rating stability. Our starting point is to observe the 
monthly credit rating data and note the monthly scores. When the monthly score is higher (lower) 
than the previous month’s score, we record an upgrade (downgrade). The overall score of credit 
stability is the summation of the monthly downgrades and upgrades.  
Table 2.1: Dataset construction 
This table shows the steps taken to construct our data set and the number of firms and firm-year observations in our 
data sample. The data for credit rating and firms’ financial data are obtained from Compustat and data for gross 
domestic product (GDP) are from Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) website which is 
(https://fred.stlouisfed.org). 
Steps Firms  Firm-Year 
Data of all firms available in Compustata from 1980 to 2015 32,778 376,264 
Remove financial industry (SIC 6000–6999) and utilities (SIC 4900–4999) 22,826 242,046 
Merge credit rating data from 1985 to 2015 with firm data and remove missing value 2,821 25,347 
Remove firms with less than two years data 2,400 24,926 
 
2.3.4 Descriptive Statistics 
To get an understanding of the importance of credit rating in our study, we attempt to understand 
the distribution of credit rating and credit rating stability of firms. We provide the details in an 
appendix (see Tables A.2 and A.3). Most firms have BBB/BB and B credit ratings and a minority 
have CCC or lower ratings. Moreover, approximately 50% and 10% of firms experienced at most 
5 and 10 changes in their credit ratings, respectively. We construct five panels of firms based on 
the S&P credit rating level and three panels based on the credit rating stability. The first group 
(high credit rating) includes firms with AAA/AA credit ratings and the last group comprises firms 
with CCC and lower ratings.  The other three groups include firms with A, BBB and BB/B ratings. 
For constructing credit stability-based panels, we classify firms with less than 3 changes in their 
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credit ratings as the most stable firms. Similarly, firms with 3-8 and 9-26 changes are classified as 
the moderate stable and unstable firms, respectively. 
Table 2.2 and 2.3 contain selected basic descriptive statistics on the variables. These 
statistics reveal several features of the data that can be summarized as follows. First, there is a 
significant difference in the level of MDR (BDR) among the group of firms categorized by credit 
ratings and credit rating stability. For instance, firms with a lower level of credit rating and credit 
stability have a higher value of market (book) debt ratio. Second, those firms that belong to the 
riskiest group and low stability category, record lower earnings before interest and tax scaled by 
total assets (EBIT-TA) and market-to-book-ratio (MB), which are the proxies for profitability and 
growth, respectively. Moreover, firms with better credit rating are large compared to firms with 
low credit rating. The main message emanating from these statistics is that firm characteristics 
differ based on credit rating, proving cursory support to our first hypothesis that SOA is likely to 
be heterogeneous to credit quality of firms.  
With respect to the variables related to the investment model, the value of Q, CF, and CI 
for the firms with CCC and lower ratings are smaller compared to firms with better credit ratings. 
This pattern exists in credit stability-based panels as well. This implies casual support for 
Hypothesis 2.4 that the high ranked firms have a higher level of corporate investment. 
To investigate the role of credit rating on corporate investment, in Table 2.4 we compare 
the CI during various economic phases, namely pre-GFC, GFC, post-GFC, and short-selling ban 
for the firms with different credit rating levels.  We see that except for the panel of  firms with 
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Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics by credit rating categories 
This table provides information about the mean and standard deviation (SD) for the variables that are involved in our financing and investment models. The 
variables are market debt ratio (MDR), book debt ratio (BDR), earnings before interest and tax divided by total asset (EBIT-TA), market to book ratio (MB), 
depreciation scaled by total assets (DEP-TA), size as the log of total asset, fixed asset proportion (FA-TA), research and development expenses as a proportion of 
total assets (R&A-TA), median industry market debt ratio (IND-MED). Moreover, FD is a measure of the firm’s financial deficit defined in Frank and Goyal (2003), 
EFWA is the firm’s external finance weighted average book-market ratio defined in Baker and Wurgler (2002) and SPC is the share price effect defined in Flannery 
and Rangan (2006). The variables related to our investment models are corporate investment (CI), Tobin’s Q (Q), cash flow (CF) and change in GDP (%∆𝐺𝐷𝑃).  
Number of observation (N) and number of firms (N Firms) are provided in last two rows.  
Credit Rating 
Group Whole sample AAA/AA A BBB BB/B CCC and lower 
Variables Mean SD Mean SD  Mean SD Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD 
MDR 34.8% 24.1% 14.9% 12.7% 20.2% 13.2% 27.6% 17.3% 45.3% 25% 71% 26.8% 
BDR 34.7% 21.0% 20.7% 11.9% 25.0% 12.3% 28.9% 14.9% 42.6% 23.0% 58.8% 32.5% 
EBIT-TA 0.080 0.110 0.135 0.067 0.117 0.059 0.095 0.06 0.064 0.075 -0.017 0.095 
MB 1.323 1.567 1.905 1.108 1.552 0.833 1.308 0.748 1.151 0.652 1.043 0.702 
DEP-TA 0.050 0.046 0.047 0.023 0.047 0.022 0.046 0.026 0.051 0.034 0.072 0.047 
SIZE 8.100 1.557 10.021 1.426 9.017 1.305 8.444 1.262 7.279 1.223 6.251 1.141 
FA-TA 0.359 0.237 0.361 0.204 0.338 0.196 0.371 0.24 0.363 0.248 0.43 0.253 
R&D-TA 0.031 0.046 0.044 0.042 0.03 0.033 0.028 0.035 0.031 0.06 0.022 0.046 
IND-MED 0.314 0.092 0.286 0.089 0.312 0.087 0.313 0.089 0.318 0.093 0.357 0.09 
FD 0.007 0.101 -0.014 0.073 -0.007 0.082 -0.000 0.090 0.017 0.113 0.054 0.140 
EFWA 2.165 2.325 3.089 2.870 2.460 2.428 2.412 2.380 1.886 2.139 1.359 1.768 
SPC -0.005 0.079 -0.004 0.039 -0.008 0.050 -0.007 0.065 -0.003 0.099 0.003 0.109 
CI 0.218 0.161 0.205 0.097 0.213 0.112 0.211 0.139 0.227 0.189 0.182 0.205 
Q 6.318 7.28 8.299 7.639 6.774 6.465 6.417 7.427 5.984 7.446 3.73 5.464 
CF 0.414 0.467 0.539 0.391 0.499 0.377 0.459 0.454 0.356 0.499 0.086 0.439 
%∆𝐺𝐷𝑃 0.050 0.051 0.05 0.021 0.05 0.032 0.05 0.041 0.053 0.068 0.06 0.084 
N  24,926 1,270 4,367 7,250 11,510 529 
N Firms  2,400 74 265 540 1,393 128 
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Table 2.3: Descriptive statistic by credit rating stabilities 
This table reports information about the mean and standard deviation (SD) for the variables that are involved in our 
financing and investment models for the panels of firms with different level of credit rating stabilities. The variables 
are market debt ratio (MDR), book debt ratio (BDR), earnings before interest and tax divided by total asset (EBIT-TA), 
market to book ratio (MB), depreciation scaled by total assets (DEP-TA), size as the log of total asset, fixed asset 
proportion (FA-TA), research and development expenses as a proportion of total assets (R&A-TA), corporate 
investment (CI), Tobin’s Q (Q), cash flow (CF) and change in GDP (%∆𝐺𝐷𝑃).  FD is a measure of the firm’s financial 
deficit defined in Frank and Goyal (2003). We classify the firms with less than 3 changes in their credit rating as the 
most stable firms. Similarly, the firms with 3 to 8 and 9 to 26 changes are defined as the moderate and instable firms, 
respectively. 
  High Credit Stability Medium Credit Stability Low Credit Stability Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
MDR 30.5% 22.3% 34.6% 23.8% 39.1% 25.4% 
BDR 33.5% 20.4% 35.3% 21.5% 35.5% 21.1% 
EBIT-TA 0.089 0.097 0.078 0.135 0.074 0.096 
MB 1.484 2.395 1.289 0.81 1.191 0.868 
DEP-TA 0.05 0.037 0.052 0.064 0.05 0.035 
SIZE 7.914 1.634 8.177 1.581 8.219 1.435 
FA-TA 0.353 0.24 0.371 0.244 0.353 0.226 
R&D-TA 0.037 0.058 0.028 0.039 0.027 0.038 
CI 0.223 0.162 0.215 0.147 0.219 0.171 
Q 7.297 7.851 6.003 6.997 5.625 6.819 
CF 0.461 0.477 0.398 0.447 0.384 0.472 
%∆𝐺𝐷𝑃 0.049 0.048 0.051 0.054 0.051 0.053 
 
Table 2.4: Corporate investment during different economic situations by rating groups 
This table indicates the investment ratio for the firms with different levels of credit rating before, during and after 
GFC as well as the short-sell ban duration. According to the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’ the start of crisis is 
27 February 2007. Therefore, we consider the years before 2007 as the pre-GFC period, 2007-2010 as GFC period 
and the later years as the post-GFC duration. The short-sell ban for all stocks in US started in 19 September 2008 and 
ended in 8 October 2008.Therefore, we consider the year 2008 as short-sell ban period. 
Credit-level 
 AAA/AA A BBB BB/B CCC and below 
Pre-GFC 0.173 0.212 0.217 0.222 0.215 
GFC 0.344 0.144 0.196 0.203 0.201 
Post-GFC 0.506 0.223 0.222 0.228 0.206 
Short-sell ban 0.227 0.316 0.244 0.235 0.23 
 
AAA/AA credit ratings, the CI declines during the crisis period for all groups of firms. In contrast, 
CI in short-sell ban period increased compared to the pre-crisis period. This finding provides 
support for our hypothesis that credit rating negatively impacted investments during the crisis 
period and positive during the short-sell ban period (see Hypothesis 2.5).  
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2.4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
2.4.1 Heterogeneity in SOA Regarding to Different Levels of Credit Rating  
Tables 2.5 and 2.6 contain results  of PAM based on the  LSDVC and BC estimators for 
panels of firms with different  levels of credit ratings. Our main interest is on the coefficient of the 
lagged dependent varaible (1-𝛾). The result reveals that  SOA toward the target ratio (𝛾) is faster 
for firms with the lowest level of credit rating. This finding is consistent with respect to both the 
estimation methods and choice of dependent variables (MBR and BDR). The signs of control 
variables are mostly compatible with the results of Flannery and Rangan (2006). Figure 2.1 shows  
the variation in SOA toward the target debt ratio for the five levels of credit rating. As we move 
from less risky firms to the most risky firms the value of 𝛾 increases. To make sense of these 
estimates, we use the half-life measure, which represents the number of years needed to remove 
50% of the deviation from the target debt ratio.17 The estimated  half-life based on the LSDVC 
(BC) estimator (with MDR as dependent variable)  is 3.95 (2.5) years for the firms with a high 
level of credit rating while it is only 0.79 (0.98) years for firms with a low level of rating. The 
results confirm that  SOA toward the target debt ratio is heterogenous with regards to the level of 
credit rating and this speed is faster for firms with CCC and lower credit ratings. We replicate the 
analysis for credit stability-based panels. According to Table 2.7, firms which are highly stable 
have a faster SOA (0.45 years) in comparison to the less stable firms (0.25 years). This result is 
consistent when we use BDR as our dependent variable. The half-life for high, medium, and low 
stable firms based on the MDR as the dependent variable estimated using the BC estimator are 
1.17, 1.64, and 2.39 years, respectively. 
                                                          
17 We calculate the half-life measure as 𝑡௛௔௟௙ ௧௜௠௘ =
୪୭୥(଴.ହ)
୪୭୥(ଵିఊ)
.  
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Figure 2.1: SOA toward the leverage target 
This figure shows the SOA toward leverage ratio for the panel of firms with different levels of credit rating based on 
the two recommended estimation methods namely LSDVC and BC to estimate the PAM. The dependent variable is 
market debt raio. 
 
2.4.2 Credit Rating as Determinant of Corporate Investment Decision 
This section discusses the link between credit rating and corporate investment consistent with 
Hypothesis 2.6. To establish the role of credit rating as the determinant of corporate investment, 
we augment the investment model proposed in Julio and Yook (2012) with a variable that 
represents a firm’s credit rating. The results are provided in Table 2.8. In Column 2 we add the 
level of credit rating as the determinant of corporate investment. Moreover, we examine the role 
of credit rating on corporate investment before, during, and after GFC. Columns 3-6 present these 
results. According to the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’ the GFC period is from 27/02/2007 
to 31/12/2010. Therefore, we consider the years 2007-2010 as the GFC period and the years before 
2007 and after 2010 as the pre-GFC and post-GFC.  
The short-sell ban occurred during the GFC, and therefore, we also investigate the role of 
credit rating on investment decision during this specific year; see Section 2.2 for a discussion on 
short-sell ban. 
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Table 2.5: Result based on the LSDVC and BC methods for whole sample  
This table provides the result for PAM based on the two methods. The first method is LSDVC estimators for the 
dynamic panel-data model proposed by Bruno (2005). Our initial estimator is based on the difference GMM supposed 
by Arellano and Bond (1991). The second method is based on the BC procedure proposed by Everaert and Pozzi 
(2007). We consider MDR and BDR as the dependent variables. Our model is 𝑀𝐷𝑅(𝐵𝐷𝑅)௜௧ାଵ = (1 −
𝛾)𝑀𝐷𝑅(𝐵𝐷𝑅)௜௧ + 𝛾𝛽𝑋௜௧ + 𝛾𝛼௜ + 𝜀௜௧ାଵ . 𝑋௜௧ is a vector of control variables such as earnings before interest and tax 
divided by total asset (EBIT-TA), market to book ratio (MB), depreciation scaled by total assets (DEP-TA), Size as the 
log of total asset, fixed asset proportion (FA-TA), research and development expenses as a proportion of total assets 
(R&A-TA), median industry market debt ratio (IND-MED), dummy variable for not reported R&D expenses (R&D-
Dummy). N is the number of observations and ***, **, and * denote results are significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively. 
Credit Group LSDVC BC MDR BDR MDR BDR 
MDR/BDR 0.676*** 0.761*** 0.705*** 0.779*** 
 (65.43)  (78.42) (34.56) (32.68) 
EBIT-TA -0.086*** 0.012 -0.058* 0.028 
 (-2.90) (0.53) (-1.73) (0.98) 
MB 0.001 -0.001 0.006** 0.001 
 (0.58) (-0.57) (2.22) (0.55) 
DEP-TA -0.178 0.196** -0.203* 0.165 
 (-1.61) (2.43) (-1.67) (1.22) 
Size 0.015*** 0.010*** 0.019*** 0.008*** 
 (5.46) (4.89) (7.5) (4.68) 
FA-TA 0.042* -0.007 0.052** -0.002 
 (1.68) (-0.39) (2.46) (-0.13) 
R&D Dummy -0.005 -0.003 -0.015 -0.007 
 (-0.40) (-0.31) (-0.85) (-0.74) 
R&D-TA -0.046 0.001 -0.068 -0.032 
 (-0.48) (0.02) (-0.77) (-0.35) 
IND-MED 0.05** 0.002 0.073*** 0.015 
 (2.07) (0.10) (3.26) (0.90) 
N 24,926 24,926 
 
The results are presented in Table 2.8 show that the slope coefficients relating to credit 
rating are highly significant in all five regressions. The t-statistics are in the 5.92 and 26.78 range. 
Credit rating in Column 2 is positive which means that firms with a higher level of credit rating 
are able to invest more due to more accessibility to external financing and lower cost of capital.  
Consistent with the study of Duchin et al. (2010) the sign of credit rating during GFC is negative, 
implying that firm’s investment decreased during financial crisis. The sign of credit rating in the  
post-GFC is negative but the magnitude of effect (in comparison to the GFC) has declined 
remarkably by 80%. Similarly, the effect of credit rating during the short-sell ban is highly 
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significant (t-statistic = 2.66). The positive sign is consistent with Hypothesis 2.5 arguing that 
short-selling ban had a positive effect on corporate investment. Corporate investment can also be 
influence by credit rating stability of firms, consistent with Hypothesis 2.3. We test this hypothesis 
and report results in Table 2.9. Our findings are as follows. The first feature of the results relates 
to the incentive to invest. We see that Q is statistically insignificant (at the 5% significance level) 
for a panel of firms with high credit rating. However, as the credit quality declines, the role of Q 
improves with the t-statistic in the 2.97 to 13.82 range. The second feature of the results relates to 
the CF. This variable is statistically significant (t-statistic = 2.74 to 16.28) for panels of firms with 
A and lower ratings but it is statistically insignificant for the highest credit rating group (those 
ranked AAA/AA). The third feature of results is related to economic activity variable used as a 
control for investments. We see that %∆𝐺𝐷𝑃 is strongly significant (t-statistic = 4.06) for firms 
with the highest credit rating and its significance level declines for other credit rating groups while 
it is insignificant for BB/B rating firms. The fourth feature of the results relate to the fit of the 
regression models. We notice that the overall 𝑅ଶ is higher in investment regression models 
comprising of those firms ranked BBB and lower compared to firms rated in the A and above 
categories. The implication is that credit rating improvements obviously matter more to 
investments of those firms that have weak credit profiles. As their credit profiles improve so do  
investments. By comparison, firms that already have a superior credit profile do not see much 
change in investments as, for example, when firms move from a rating of AA to AAA. In other 
words, the marginal gain in investment when moving from a rating of B to A is much higher than 
from moving to AAA from AA. 
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Table 2.6: Result based on the LSDVC and BC methods for panel of firms with different levels of credit rating 
This table provides the results for PAM based on the two methods. The first method LSDVC estimators for the dynamic panel-data model proposed by Bruno 
(2005). Our initial estimator is based on the difference GMM supposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). The second method is based on BC procedure proposed by  
Everaert and Pozzi (2007). We consider MDR and BDR as the dependent variables and we report the corresponding SOA and half-life measure. Our model is  
𝑀𝐷𝑅(𝐵𝐷𝑅)௜௧ାଵ = (1 − 𝛾)𝑀𝐷𝑅(𝐵𝐷𝑅)௜௧ + 𝛾𝛽𝑋௜௧  + 𝛾𝛼௜ + 𝜀௜௧ାଵ . 𝑋௜௧ is a vector of control variables such as earnings before interest and tax divided by total asset 
(EBIT-TA), market to book ratio (MB), depreciation scaled by total assets (DEP-TA), Size as the log of total asset, fixed asset proportion (FA-TA), research and 
development expenses as a proportion of total assets (R&A-TA), median industry market debt ratio (IND-MED), dummy variable for not reported R&D expenses 
(R&D-Dummy). We divide our dataset into five credit groups namely AAA/AA, A, BBB, BB/B and CCC and lower based on the Standard and Poor’s (S&P) credit 
rating. ***, **, and * denote results are significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Estimation 
Method 
  
BC LSDVC 
Credit 
Rating MDR SOA 
Half-life 
measure 
(years) 
BDR SOA 
Half-life 
measure 
(years) 
MDR SOA 
Half-life 
measure 
(years) 
BDR SOA 
Half-life 
measure 
(years) 
AAA/AA 0.758*** 0.242 2.50 0.706*** 0.294 1.99 0.839*** 0.161 3.95 0.795*** 0.205 3.02 
 (14.50)   (10.13)   (-23.59)   (23.44)   
A 0.776*** 0.224 2.73 0.866*** 0.114 5.73 0.756*** 0.244 2.48 0.855*** 0.145 4.42 
 (29.23)   (42.92)   (40.24)   (56.56)   
BBB 0.754*** 0.246 2.45 0.821*** 0.179 3.51 0.707*** 0.293 2.00 0.795*** 0.205 3.02 
 (24.39)   (23.74)   (40.03)   (50.22)   
BB/B 0.763*** 0.237 2.56 0.841*** 0.159 4.00 0.708*** 0.292 2.01 0.783*** 0.217 2.83 
 (21.11)   (22.34)   (42.23)   (51.08)   
CCC and lower 0.493*** 0.507 0.98 0.133 0.867 0.34 0.415*** 0.585 0.79 0.078 0.922 0.27 
 (2.36)   (0.64)   (2.54)   (0.59)   
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Table 2.7: Regression Result based on the BC methodology for panels of firms with 
different levels of credit rating stability 
This table provides the result for PAM based on the BC procedure proposed by Everaert and Pozzi (2007) for the 
panels of firms with three levels of credit rating stability. Credit rating stability is an index which represents the 
frequency of changes in firm’s S&P credit rating. The firms with (0-2) , (3-8) and (9_26) number of changes are 
classified as highly stable, medium stable and less stable firms, respectively. We consider MDR and BDR as dependent 
variables. Our model is  𝑀𝐷𝑅(𝐵𝐷𝑅)௜௧ାଵ = (1 − 𝛾)𝑀𝐷𝑅(𝐵𝐷𝑅)௜௧ + 𝛾𝛽𝑋௜௧ + 𝛾𝛼௜ + 𝜀௜௧ାଵ.  𝑋௜௧ is a vector of control 
variables such as earnings before interest and tax divided by total asset (EBIT-TA), market to book ratio (MB), 
depreciation scaled by total assets (DEP-TA), Size as the log of total asset, fixed asset proportion (FA-TA), research 
and development expenses as a proportion of total assets (R&A-TA), median industry market debt ratio (IND-MED), 
dummy variable for reported R&D expenses (R&D-Dummy). N is the number of observations and ***, **, and * 
denote results are significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
credit stability 
Level 
High credit Stability Medium credit stability Low credit Stability 
(0-2) (3-8) (9-26) 
  MDR BDR MDR BDR MDR BDR 
MDR/BDR 0.554*** 0.701*** 0.655*** 0.729*** 0.748*** 0.839*** 
 (8.27) (11.33) (25.93) (28.74) (24.97) (27.76) 
EBIT-TA 0.05 0.004 -0.026 0.073* -0.107* -0.032 
 (0.48) (0.03) (-0.77) (1.84) (-1.96) (-0.80) 
MB -0.012*** -0.007 0.005* 0.0006 0.006 0.003 
 (-2.40) (-1.23) (1.77) (0.24) (1.50) (0.74) 
DEP-TA 0.322 0.081 -0.145 -0.013 -0.333 0.384 
 (1.04) (0.23) (-0.95) (-0.09) (-1.39) (1.42) 
Size 0.011 0.003 0.019*** 0.008*** 0.022*** 0.011*** 
 (1.58) (0.39) (4.74) (2.96) (4.49) (3.05) 
FA-TA 0.088 -0.006 0.043 -0.0009 0.068 -0.013 
 (1.34) (-0.10) (1.31) (-0.03) (1.61) (-0.40) 
R&D-Dummy -0.061 -0.032 -0.004 -0.011 -0.024 0.004 
 (-1.06) (-1.28) (-0.28) (-0.92) (-0.52) (0.13) 
R&D-TA 0.005 0.057 -0.129 0.038 0.126 0.024 
 (0.04) (0.26) (-1.46) (0.30) (1.09) (0.16) 
IND-MED 0.052 0.033 0.098*** 0.026 0.044 0.0004 
 (0.95) (0.97) (4.01) (1.44) (1.19) (0.01) 
N 1,101 15,276 6,789 
 
A final feature of the results relates to the absolute value of coefficients for CF and Q. The 
magnitude of effect increases from panels of high credit rating firms to low credit rating firms 
(except CF for CCC and lower panels of firms). This indicates that the impact of these variables 
on corporate investments are lower for less risky firms. It confirms our earlier argument that credit 
rating improvements in low credit profiled firms influences investment most compared to those 
firms that are already enjoying a high credit profile. 
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Table 2.8: Credit rating as the determinants of corporate investment  
This table reports the results of our investment models. The Column 1 is related to the result of the investment model 
without inclusion of CR. Column 2 reports the result for our core model which is 𝐶𝐼௜௧ =  𝛼଴ + 𝛼ଵ. 𝑄௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛼ଶ. 𝐶𝐹௜,௧ +
𝛼ଷ. %∆𝐺𝐷𝑃௜௧ିଵ + 𝐶𝑅௜,௧ + 𝛼௜ + 𝜀௜,௧.  𝑄௜,௧ିଵ is Tobin’s Q ratio, 𝐶𝐹௜,௧ is the cash flow,  %∆𝐺𝐷𝑃௜௧ିଵis the change in GDP 
growth, and 𝐶𝑅௜,௧ is the credit rating level. We convert each S&P credit rating category to one numerical scale from 
24 which indicates the highest credit rating (AAA) to 1 for the lowest rate (D). The Columns 3-5 are related to the 
effect of credit rating in pre, during and post GFC.  The models are 𝐶𝐼௜௧ =  𝛼଴ + 𝛼ଵ. 𝑄௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛼ଶ. 𝐶𝐹௜,௧ +
𝛼ଷ. %∆𝐺𝐷𝑃௜௧ିଵ + 𝐷௣௥௘ିீி஼  . 𝐶𝑅௜,௧ + 𝛼௜ + 𝜀௜,௧, 𝐶𝐼௜௧ =  𝛼଴ + 𝛼ଵ. 𝑄௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛼ଶ. 𝐶𝐹௜,௧ + 𝛼ଷ. %∆𝐺𝐷𝑃௜௧ିଵ + 𝐷ீி஼  . 𝐶𝑅௜,௧ +
𝛼௜ + 𝜀௜,௧ and 𝐶𝐼௜௧ =  𝛼଴ + 𝛼ଵ. 𝑄௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛼ଶ. 𝐶𝐹௜,௧ + 𝛼ଷ. %∆𝐺𝐷𝑃௜ ௧ିଵ + 𝐷௣௢௦௧ିீி஼  . 𝐶𝑅௜,௧ + 𝛼௜ + 𝜀௜,௧ , respectively. 
According to the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’ the start of GFC is 27 February 2007. Therefore, we consider the 
years before 2007 as the pre-GFC, 2007-2010 as GFC period and the later years as the post-GFC. The Column 6 
shows the impact of credit rating on investment during short-sell ban in US. The short-sell ban for all stocks in US 
started in 19 September 2008 and ended in 8 October 2008.We consider the year 2008 as the short-sell ban period. 
The corresponding model is 𝐶𝐼௜௧ =  𝛼଴ + 𝛼ଵ. 𝑄௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛼ଶ. 𝐶𝐹௜,௧ + 𝛼ଷ. %∆𝐺𝐷𝑃௜,௧ିଵ + 𝐷௦௛௢௥௧_௦௘௟௟_௕௔௡ . 𝐶𝑅௜,௧ + 𝛼௜ + 𝜀௜,௧. 
We used the cluster robust standard error and fixed effect estimator. ***, **, and * denote results are significant at 
1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Intercept 0.128*** -0.0008 0.106*** 0.131 0.132*** 0.130*** 
  (37.84) (-0.8) (26.78)) (38.49) (39.68) (37.82) 
Q 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
  (14.33) (13.78) (15.14) (14.46) (14.78) (14.18) 
CF 0.103*** 0.098*** 0.104*** 0.103*** 0.105*** 0.104*** 
  (18.72) (18.08) (19.24) (18.75) (19.10) (18.76) 
%∆𝐺𝐷𝑃 0.051** 0.036 -0.004 0.036 0.042* 0.051** 
  (2.13) (1.58) (-0.19) (1.55) (1.72) (2.14) 
CR  0.009***     
  (12.57)     
PRE-GFC*CR   0.004***    
   (26.78)    
GFC*CR    -0.010***   
    (-5.90)   
POST-GFC*CR     -0.002***  
     (-8.29)  
SHORTSELL-BAN*CR      0.0006*** 
      (2.66) 
Fixed Effect Yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Within 𝑅ଶ 0.14 0.16 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.14 
 
 
Moreover, we replicate the analysis for panels of firms with different levels of credit rating 
stability. These results are reported in Table 2.10.  We see that %∆𝐺𝐷𝑃 is statistically insignificant 
for high and medium stable firms while it is statistically significant for firms with low stability. 
The CF and Q are statistically significant for all three groups but the t-statistics improve as we 
move towards the less stable firms. The performance of the model in explaining the variation in 
corporate investment is better for the panel with low credit stability. 
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Table 2.9: Investment model in a panel of different levels of credit rating  
This table provides the result of investment model for a panel of different levels of credit rating. We divide our dataset 
into five credit rating groups namely AAA/AA, A, BBB, BB/B and CCC and lower. We run the investment regression 
model which is 𝐶𝐼௜௧ =  𝛼଴ + 𝛼ଵ. 𝑄௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛼ଶ. 𝐶𝐹௜,௧ + 𝛼ଷ. %∆𝐺𝐷𝑃௜௧ିଵ + 𝛼௜ + 𝜀௜,௧. The 𝑄௜,௧ିଵ is Tobin’s Q ratio, 𝐶𝐹௜,௧ is 
the cash flow,  %∆𝐺𝐷𝑃 is the change in GDP growth separately for each panel. We use the cluster robust standard 
error and fix effect estimator. N is the number of observations and the last two rows report the within and overall 𝑅ଶ. 
***, **, and * denote results are significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
  Whole Sample AAA/AA A BBB BB/B CCC and lower 
Intercept 0.128*** 0.140*** 0.135*** 0.121*** 0.130*** 0.108*** 
 (37.84) (6.88) (13.53) (19.80) (32.85) (5.64) 
Q 0.007*** 0.003* 0.003*** 0.006*** 0.009*** 0.019*** 
 (14.33) (1.93) (2.97) (7.15) (13.82) (3.49) 
CF 0.103*** 0.022 0.080*** 0.104*** 0.115*** 0.057*** 
 (18.72) (0.92) (5.81) (9.80) (16.28) (2.74) 
%∆𝐺𝐷𝑃 0.051** 0.636*** 0.334** 0.120 * -0.013 -0.146** 
 (2.13) (4.06) (2.46) (2.12) (-0.52) (-2.41) 
N 24926 1270 4367 7250 11510 529 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Within 𝑅ଶ 0.14 0.09 0.10 0.15 0.17 0.12 
Overall 𝑅ଶ 0.20 0.06 0.12 0.26 0.23 0.19 
 
Table 2.10: Investment model for panel of firms with different levels of credit rating 
stability 
This table provides the result of investment model for panels of firms with three levels of credit rating stability. Credit 
rating  stability is an index which represents the frequency of changes in firm’s S&P credit rating. The firms with (0-
2) , (3-8) and (9_26) number of  changes are classified as highly stable, medium stable and less stable firms, 
respectively. The investment regression model is CI୧୲ =  𝛼଴ + 𝛼ଵ. 𝑄௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛼ଶ. 𝐶𝐹௜,௧ + 𝛼ଷ. %∆𝐺𝐷𝑃௜௧ିଵ + 𝛼௜ + 𝜀௜,௧. 
The 𝑄௜,௧ିଵ is Tobin’s Q ratio, 𝐶𝐹୧,୲ is the cash flow,  %∆𝐺𝐷𝑃 is the change in GDP growth separately for each panel. 
We use the cluster robust standard error and fix effect estimator. The last two rows report the within and overall 𝑅ଶ. 
***, **, and * denote results are significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
  High credit Stability  (0-2) 
Medium credit stability 
(3-8) 
Low credit Stability 
 (9-26) 
Intercept 0.143*** 0.133*** 0.113*** 
 (13.16) (28.46) (21.29) 
Q 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.009*** 
 (7.17) (9.50) (10.82) 
CF 0.106*** 0.111*** 0.085*** 
 (7.49) (13.15) (11.64) 
%∆𝐺𝐷𝑃 -0.113 -0.015 0.156*** 
 (-1.02) (-0.65) (2.76) 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Within 𝑅ଶ 0.10 0.12 0.18 
Overall 𝑅ଶ 0.14 0.20 0.24 
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2.4.3 Association of SOA and Corporate Investment 
This section tests Hypothesis 2.6, specifically, we examine how SOA to leverage influences 
corporate investment. Our first goal in testing this hypothesis is to generate time-varying SOA 
using a rolling window approach.18 The time-varying SOA is then used as a determinant of 
corporate investment. The standard investment regression (as in Column 1 of Tale 2.9) is then 
augment with this SOA variable and the null hypothesis that SOA is zero is tested.  
 Panels A and B of Table 2.11 present details about the generated SOA and corporate 
investment for whole sample and credit rating-based panels. We see that the firms with lower credit 
rating have higher SOA and a lower rate of corporate investment which supports the hypotheses 
2.2 and 2.4.  
Table 2.11: Generated SOA by rolling window regression 
This table provides details (mean, standard deviation (SD), maximum (Max.), minimum (Min.) and number of 
observations (N)) about the generated SOA which is obtained by recursive rolling regression. We generate SOA 
variable by using the BC estimator and we consider eight years as the window to estimate time-varying SOA. We 
classify our sample into three equal groups based on the firm’s long-term S&P credit rating.  
Panel A: Generated SOA 
  Mean SD Min.  Max. N 
Whole Sample 0.39 0.314 0.001 0.999 3973 
High Credit 0.39 0.316 0.001 0.999 1426 
Medium credit 0.38 0.306 0.004 0.999 1322 
Low credit 0.4 0.314 0.006 0.999 1143 
Panel B: Corporate investment 
  Mean SD Min.  Max. N 
Whole Sample 0.194 0.12 0.019 0.974 3973 
High Credit 0.196 0.091 0.019 0.974 1426 
Medium credit 0.194 0.112 0.019 0.974 1322 
Low credit 0.193 0.156 0.019 0.974 1143 
 
  The results that are provided in Table 2.12 show that SOA has a negative relationship 
with corporate investment. It is statistically significant when we consider the whole data sample 
                                                          
18We generate this variable by implementing a recursive rolling window regression. We use the BC estimaor and we 
consider eight years as the window to estimate time-varying SOA. 
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and the panels of firms with high and medium credit rating. The results confirm that SOA are 
influential for corporate investment. 
To provide more details about the role of SOA on corporate investment, we redo our 
analysis based on the firm’s leverage positions. Following Flannery and Rangan (2006), we 
estimate the desired debt ratio by equation (1.1); see Section 2.3.1. Following this, we find the 
deviations between target and actual debt ratio and categorize firms as the overleveraged 
(underleveraged) group when deviation is positive (negative). 
 The results presented in Table 2.13 show that unlike the underleveraged firms, the SOA is 
statistically significant for overleveraged firms. It also confirms that there is negative association 
between SOA and corporate investment.  
Table 2.12: Association of SOA and corporate investment 
This table provides the result for the effect of SOA on corporate investment. We generate SOA by rolling window 
regression. The investment regression model is CI୧୲ =  𝛼଴ + 𝛼ଵ. 𝑄௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛼ଶ. 𝐶𝐹௜,௧ + 𝛼ଷ. %∆𝐺𝐷𝑃௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛼௜ + 𝜀௜,௧. The 
𝑄௜,௧ିଵ is Tobin’s Q ratio, 𝐶𝐹௜,௧ is the cash flow, %∆𝐺𝐷𝑃 is the change in GDP growth separately for each panel. We 
classify our sample into three equal groups (high, medium and low credit rating) based on the firm’s long-term S&P 
credit rating.  We use the cluster robust standard error and fix effect estimator. N is the number of observations and 
the last two rows report the within and overall𝑅ଶ. ***, **, and * denote results are significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively. 
  Whole Sample High Credit rating Medium Credit rating Low Credit rating 
Intercept 0.107*** 0.113*** 0.112*** 0.102*** 
 (15.13) (9.48) (11.09) (9.11) 
SOA -0.019*** -0.025** -0.022** -0.006 
 (-2.97) (-2.71) (-1.97) (-0.44) 
Q 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 
 (5.85) (4.77) (4.46) (2.84) 
CF 0.080*** 0.056*** 0.071*** 0.104*** 
 (6.73) (3.58) (4.33) (4.95) 
%∆𝐺𝐷𝑃 0.388*** 0.415** 0.378** 0.303* 
 (4.42) (3.94) (3.17) (1. 46) 
N 3,891 1,426 1,322 1,143 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Within 𝑅ଶ 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.16 
Overall 𝑅ଶ 0.20 0.14 0.23 0.25 
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2.5 ALTERNATIVE CAPITAL STRUCTURE THEORIES  
The aim of this section is to test whether the other capital structure theories are relevant for the 
whole sample and the panels of firms with different levels of credit rating.  
 
2.5.1 Relevance of non-Trade-off Theories 
Following Flannery and Rangan (2006), we include variables related to pecking order (FD) as 
discussed by Frank and Goyal (2003) (see equation (2.5)), market timing (EFWA) of Baker and 
Wurgler (2002) (see equation (2.6)), and stock price changes (SPC) of Inertia theory (Welch, 2004) 
(see equation (2.7)). FD is firm’s financial deficit (as defined in Frank and Goyal, 2003), EFWA 
is External finance weighted average of a firm’s past market-book ratios (as defined in Baker and 
Wurgler, 2002) and SPC is surprise impact of share 
Table 2.13: Association of SOA based on the firm’s leverage positions 
This table provides the results for the effect of SOA on corporate investment when firms are underleveraged and 
overleveraged. Following Flannery and Rangan (2006), we estimate the desired debt ratio by 𝑀𝐷𝑅௜,௧ାଵ∗ =  𝛽 𝑋௜,௧ +
𝜀௜,௧ାଵwhich 𝑋௜,௧ is a vector of firm’s characteristics. After that, we find the deviation between target and actual debt 
ratio. We categorize the firms as the overleveraged group when the deviation is positive and underleveraged in case 
of negative deviation. Moreover, we generate SOA by rolling window regression. The investment regression model 
is 𝐶𝐼௜௧ =  𝛼଴ + 𝛼ଵ. 𝑆𝑂𝐴௜,௧ିଵ+𝛼ଶ. 𝑄௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛼ଷ. 𝐶𝐹௜,௧ + 𝛼ସ. %∆𝐺𝐷𝑃௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛼௜ + 𝜀௜,௧ which 𝑄௜,௧ିଵ is Tobin’s Q 
ratio, 𝐶𝐹௜,௧ is the cash flow,  %∆𝐺𝐷𝑃௜,௧ିଵ is the change in GDP growth separately for each panel. We use the cluster 
robust standard error and fix effect estimator. N is the number of observations and the last two rows report the within 
and overall 𝑅ଶ. ***, **, and * denote results are significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
  Whole Sample Underleveraged firms Overleveraged firms 
Intercept 0.107*** 0.103*** 0.108*** 
 (15.13) (7.52) (13.08) 
SOA -0.019*** 0.000 -0.023*** 
 (-2.97) (1.00) (-3.04) 
Q 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.006*** 
 (5.85) (2.60) (5.06) 
CF 0.080*** 0.058*** 0.087*** 
 (6.73) (2.81) (6.39) 
%∆𝐺𝐷𝑃 0.388*** 0.273* 0.410*** 
 (4.42) (1.74) (4.02) 
N 3,891 701 3,190 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Within_R2 0.17 0.14 0.17 
Overall R2 0.20 0.22 0.19 
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price change (as defined in Flannery and Rangan, 2006). The corresponding regression models 
with inclusion of these variables are as follow. 
∆𝐵𝐷𝑅௜,௧ାଵ = (1 − 𝛾). 𝐵𝐷𝑅௜,௧ + 𝛿. 𝐹𝐷௜,௧ +  𝛽. 𝑋௜,௧ +  𝜀௜,௧ାଵ                                                            (2.5) 
𝐵𝐷𝑅௜,௧ାଵ = (1 − 𝛾). 𝐵𝐷𝑅௜,௧ + 𝛿. 𝐸𝐹𝑊𝐴௜,௧ +  𝛽. 𝑋௜,௧ +  𝜀௜,௧ାଵ                                                        (2.6) 
𝑀𝐷𝑅௜,௧ାଵ = (1 − 𝛾). 𝑀𝐷𝑅௜,௧ + 𝛿. 𝑆𝑃𝐶௜,௧ାଵ +  𝛽. 𝑋௜,௧ +  𝜀௜,௧ାଵ                                                        (2.7) 
 
By these regression models we aim to examine whether FD, EFWA, and SPC are 
statistically significant and if they are, then what is the economic value. Moreover, we test whether 
SOA is changed after the inclusion of these variables. The point is that if FD, EFWA or SPC do 
render substantial changes in SOA, then this would put into question the relevance of trade-off 
theory and entertain the possible role of pecking order theory, market timing theory and/or inertia 
theory. 
The null hypothesis is that these alternative theories are relevant. The results relating to the 
importance of other capital structure theories are presented in Table 2.14.  We begin with the 
pecking order theory. The specification in Column 1 explains the change in BDR with changes in 
our standard explanatory variables and the firm financing deficit. The FD coefficient is statistically 
significant and positive (t-statistic=19.32) when we consider full sample for analysis, and also the 
same is true for all credit rating-based panels except for the panel with most risky firms. The 
inclusion of FD alters the other variables signs and significance levels. This provides evidence for 
the importance of pecking order theory as the complementary capital structure theory. This is 
consistent with the studies by Fama and French (2005) and Barclay and Smith (2005) that suggest 
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considering both the pecking order and trade-off theories as a unified capital structure theory. This 
is because both models have elements that explain some aspects of capital structure decision. 19 
We next consider the market timing as the competing theory and include EFWA in the 
regression model (equation (2.6)). The result indicates that the EFWA is statistically insignificant 
and the change in the coefficient of lagged variable is inconsiderable after inclusion of this 
variable. This result, rejects our null hypothesis for relevance of the market timing theory as an 
alternative capital structure theory.  
Likewise, we provide results for testing the importance of stock price changes (SPC) 
variable. Welch (2004) discuss that the trade-off theory has no relevance and the share price 
changes play the main role in capital structure. If this is true, the SPC variable should have 
dominant role over trade-off related variables to explain the change in capital structure. The results 
in Table 2.14 show that SPC variable is highly significant with a t-statistic of 32.55. Moreover, 
there is an increase in the coefficient of lagged dependent variable (0.822) when compared to the 
reported values in Table 2.6 (0.779). This indicates a decline in SOA after inclusion of the SPC 
variable. The half-life measure for the whole sample before inclusion of the SPC variable is 2 years 
but it increases to 3.5 years after the SPC variable is included. This finding is consistent with the 
Welch (2004) who shows that stock return is a first order determinant of debt ratio with the ability 
to explain the dynamic of debt ratio by 40%. Moreover, we also conduct the same analysis for 
credit rating-based panels by including FD, FEWA, and SPC variables in regression models. The 
                                                          
19 The discussions in Barclay and Smith (2005) and Fama and French (2005) are relevant here and we provide direct 
evidence of this discussion. “Although the pecking order theory is incapable of explaining the full array of financial 
policy choices, this does not mean that information costs are unimportant in corporate decision-making. On the 
contrary, such costs will influence corporate financing choices and, along with other costs and benefits, must be part 
of a unified theory of corporate financial policy” (Barclay and Smith, 2005, p.16 ). “Thus, it is probably time to stop 
running empirical horse races between them as stand-alone stories for capital structure. Perhaps it is best to regard the 
two models as stable mates with each having elements of truth that help explain some aspects of financing decisions” 
(Fama and French, 2005, p.580-581). 
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coefficient of lagged dependent variables and alternative capital structure variables are reported in 
Table 2.15. The detailed results are in Tables A.4-A.6. The results show that SOA and 
corresponding half-life measures for all credit rating-based panels (except the riskiest panel) 
increase after the inclusion of the SPC variable compared to results without it.  
 
2.5.2 Economic Significance of Capital Structure Theories 
This section discusses the economic significance aspect of these capital structure theories. 
Statistical importance does not necessarily guarantee economic importance. This needs to be tested 
and this section does. We use the slope coefficients of FD, EFWA, and SPC to explore the 
economic significance of these variables. We compare the economic importance of the trade-off 
theory variables vis-a-vis alternative capital structure theories. The results are presented in 
Table 2.16. We find that a one standard deviation increase in trade-off variables increases leverage 
by 2.4% (FD), 3.5% (EFWA), and 1% (SPC) based on the whole sample estimates. These slope 
coefficients imply that debt increases by 11.5% (FD), 24.99% (EFWA), and 4.12% (SPC) of the 
standard deviation of leverage (which is 24.1% for MDR and 21% for BDR). The effect of one 
standard deviation increase in EFWA on debt is 0.22% of the standard deviation of BDR and the 
corresponding effect on leverage from a one standard deviation increase in FD is 23.52% of 
standard deviation of BDR which is 21%. The results imply that while the economic significance 
of the market timing is incomparable with the economic significance of the trade-off variable, the 
economic effect of the pecking order is considerable. 
  Finally, we observe that one standard deviation increase in the SPC increases the market 
debt ratio by 6.7%. These slope coefficients imply that debt increases by 27.6% of the standard 
deviation of the market value of debt (which is 24.1%). 
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The results show that the SPC has noticeable role in explaining the capital structure 
compared to the trade-off theory. This finding is observed in all credit-based panels except for the 
panel with most risky firms. For the firms with lowest level of credit rating, trade-off theory seems 
the dominant one. This finding is consistent with the Kemper and Rao (2013) who criticize the 
credit rating-capital structure hypothesis. They conclude that this hypothesis is not applicable to 
all the firms, and it appears to be driven by low credit rating firms. 
To sum up, the statistical significance of FD and SPC implies that we have a generalized 
version of trade-off theory model of corporate debt to explain the leverage in all panels of firms 
with various credit rating except the riskiest firms. For the low credit rating group, the trade-off 
theory is the leading one because the economic significance of trade-off variables is noticeably 
more than the other theories variables. This finding supports our key message of this chapter that 
there is heterogeneity in SOA and the firms with low credit rating have faster SOA compared to 
the high credit quality firms. 
 
2.6 ROBUSTNES CHECK 
This section is devoted to testing the sensitivity of our main results. We do additional analysis to 
check our conclusions in (a) financing model related to the estimation of SOA in credit rating-
based panels, (b) investment model regards to the impact of credit rating on corporate investment, 
and (c) the relation of SOA on corporate investment are robust. 
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Table 2.14: Alternative capital structure theories 
This table provides the result for the SOA based on the BC after inclusion of other capital structure variables. In 
Column 1, which is related to pecking order theory, the reression model is ∆𝐵𝐷𝑅௜,௧ାଵ =  𝛾. 𝐵𝐷𝑅௜,௧ + 𝛿. 𝐹𝐷௜,௧ +
 𝛽. 𝑋௜,௧ +  𝜀௜,௧ାଵ , where FD is a measure of the firm’s financial deficit defined in Frank and Goyal (2003). In Column 
2, which is related to market timing theory, the regression model is 𝐵𝐷𝑅௜,௧ାଵ =  𝛾. 𝐵𝐷𝑅௜,௧ + 𝛿. 𝐸𝐹𝑊𝐴௜,௧ +  𝛽. 𝑋௜,௧ +
 𝜀௜,௧ାଵ, where EFWA  is the firm’s external finance weighted average book-market ratio defined in Baker and Wurgler 
(2002).  In the last column, which is related to inertia theory, the model is 𝑀𝐷𝑅௜,௧ାଵ =  𝛾. 𝑀𝐷𝑅௜,௧ + 𝛿. 𝑆𝑃𝐶௜,௧ାଵ +
 𝛽. 𝑋௜,௧ +  𝜺𝒊,𝒕ା𝟏 where SPC is the share price effect defined in Flannery and Rangan (2006). ***, **, and * denote 
results are significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 1 Pecking order theory 
2 
Market timing theory 
3 
Inertia theory 
Dependent variable ΔBDR MDR BDR 
Lag dependent variable -0.055** 0.779*** 0.822*** 
 (-2.72) (32.88) (41.05) 
FD 0.326***   
 (19.23)   
EFWA  0.0002  
  (0.90)  
SPC   0.842*** 
   (32.55) 
EBIT-TA 0.154*** 0.028 0.045* 
 (5.25) (0.96) (1.83) 
MB 0.002 0.001 -0.004** 
 (0.66) (0.55) (-2.23) 
DEP-TA 0.156 0.163 -0.013 
 (1.17) (1.21) (-0.11) 
Size 0.014*** 0.008*** 0.003 
 (6.02) (4.64) (1.57) 
FA-TA -0.037* -0.002 0.045** 
 (-1.93) (-0.14) (2.29) 
R&D-Dummy -0.010 -0.007 -0.011 
 (-0.92) (-0.74) (-0.69) 
R&D-TA -0.027 -0.029 -0.214** 
 (-0.29) (-0.32) (-2.39) 
IND-MED -0.044** 0.015 0.069*** 
  (-2.78) (0.92) (3.75) 
 
 
 
2.6.1 Additional analysis related to Financing Model  
Several studies allude to the possibility that the relevance of trade-off theory is sensitive to 
the regression model specifications, leverage measures, and data subsamples. These issues can 
shape conclusions on SOA and should, thus, not be ignored. We, therefore, investigate the 
robustness of our conclusions regarding the estimation of SOA for firms with different levels of 
credit rating from these perspectives. Specifically, we: (1) utilize alternative estimators, namely, 
OLS, FE, differenced GMM, system GMM, and LSDVC with alternative initial estimator; (2) 
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consider alternative measures of leverage ratio; and (3) adopt an alternative approach to create 
panels. 
 
2.6.1.1 Results Based on Alternative Estimators 
In Panel A of Table 2.17, we present results based on alternative estimation methods. In the first 
two rows, we provide results based on the OLS and FE estimators. The literature related to the 
estimation of a dynamic model with fixed effects documents that OLS and FF are considerably 
bias (see, for example, Beggs and Nerlove, 1988; Bond, 2002; Nickell, 1981) and results obtained 
from these estimators can be considered as the lower and upper bounds of SOA. 
 
Table 2.15: Alternative capital structure theories in panel of firms with different credit 
rating levels 
This table provides the result for the SOA based on the BC after inclusion of other capital structure variables. We 
divide our dataset into five credit rating groups namely AAA/AA, A, BBB, BB/B and CCC and lower based on the 
S&P credit rating. In panel A, which is related to pecking order theory, the reression model is ∆𝐵𝐷𝑅௜,௧ାଵ =
 𝛾. 𝐵𝐷𝑅௜,௧ + 𝛿. 𝐹𝐷௜,௧ +  𝛽. 𝑋௜,௧ +  𝜀௜,௧ାଵ , where FD is  a measure of the firm’s financial deficit defined in Frank and 
Goyal (2003) In panel B, which is related to market timing theory, the regression model is 𝐵𝐷𝑅௜,௧ାଵ =  𝛾. 𝐵𝐷𝑅௜,௧ +
𝛿. 𝐸𝐹𝑊𝐴௜,௧ +  𝛽. 𝑋௜,௧ +  𝜀௜,௧ାଵ, where EFWA  is the firm’s external finance weighted average book-market ratio 
defined in Baker and Wurgler (2002). In panel C, which is related to the inertia theory, we consider SPC as the share 
price effect defined in Flannery and Rangan (2006) instead of EFWA in previous model. ***, **, and * denote results 
are significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Credit Groups AAA/AA A BBB BB/B CCC and Lower 
Panel A: Pecking order explanation 
ΔBDR 0.030 -0.025 0.006 -0.037 -0.071 
 (1.10) (-1.03) (0.25) (-1.20) (-0.45) 
FD 0.359*** 0.330*** 0.356*** 0.320*** 0.052 
 (12.25) (17.86) (14.12) (11.03) (0.24) 
Panel B: Market timing explanation 
BDR 0.720*** 0.862*** 0.823*** 0.841*** 0.117 
 (10.72) (30.94) (25.22) (23.90) (0.48) 
EFWA -0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.001 0.006 
 (-0.39) (1.41) (0.82) (0.04) (0.14) 
Panel C: Stock price mechanics explanation 
MDR 0.779*** 0.846*** 0.823*** 0.893*** 0.427 
 (11.80) (35.22) (26.22) (24.19) (0.5) 
SPC 0.658*** 0.759*** 0.801*** 0.898*** 0.803 
 (4.69) (17.10) (17.08) (23.71) (0.95) 
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Table 2.16: Economic significance 
This table reports the economic significance of the trade-off (target leverage) vs pecking order (FD) in Panel A, market timing (EFWA), in Panel B, and stock 
price change (SPC) models, in Panel C, by comparing their ability to explain variations in BDR, change in BDR and MDR.  
    Whole sample AAA/AA A BBB/BB B CCC and Lower 
Panel A: Market timing explanation 
Trade-off Absolute 0.024 0.019 0.015 0.066 0.007 0.091 % of leverage SD 11.51% 15.74% 12.07% 44.18% 3.23% 48.67% 
Market timing (EFWA) Absolute 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.011 % of leverage SD 0.22% -0.96% 0.79% 0.64% 0.93% 3.26% 
Panel B: Pecking order explanation 
Trade-off Absolute 0.035 0.019 0.031 0.050 0.030 0.063 % of leverage SD 24.99% 6.08% 19.11% 45.67% 34.20% 47.56% 
Pecking order (FD) Absolute 0.033 0.026 0.027 0.032 0.036 0.007 % of leverage SD 23.52% 8.37% 16.50% 29.13% 41.56% 7.51% 
Panel C: Stock price mechanics explanation 
Trade-off Absolute 0.010 0.001 0.012 0.042 0.017 0.054 % of leverage SD 4.12% 0.65% 9.07% 24.54% 6.73% 39.34% 
Stock price (SPC) Absolute 0.067 0.026 0.038 0.052 0.089 0.088 % of leverage SD 27.60% 20.21% 28.75% 30.10% 35.56% 32.66% 
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The results of OLS and FE suggest much different slope coefficients compared to our main 
results (see Table 2.6). Given the bias associated with these estimators—which we merely 
confirm—we do not emphasis much on these estimates. In the next two rows, we focus on the 
GMM estimation method. Results reported in row (3) are based on the difference GMM proposed 
by Arellano and Bond (1991) while results in row (4) are based on the system GMM of Blundell 
and Bond (1998). In row (5), SOA is estimated using the LSDVC estimator (same as our main 
result but we now use an alternative initial estimator (AH) which was proposed by Anderson and 
Hsiao (1982).20 Moreover, in the last two rows of Panel A, we consider BDR as dependent variable 
and utilize the OLS and system GMM methods to estimate SOA for panels of firms with different 
levels of credit rating. Most of results confirm that firms with higher credit rating have a lower 
SOA toward leverage ratio and vice versa. 
 
2.6.1.2 Results based on alternative measure of leverage 
In Panel B of Table 2.17, we use two alternative definitions for MDR. Following Flannery and 
Rangan (2006), we define MDR1 as a summation of long term debt and short-term debt divided 
by (total asset minus book equity plus market equity) and MDR2 as long-term debt divided by 
the sum of total assets minus current liabilities and book equity plus market equity.21 Panel B, 
shows the results when we use LSDVC estimator with MDR1 as dependent variable and BC 
estimator with MDR2 as proxy for leverage.22 The results of from these estimators confirm that 
                                                          
20 The AH estimator, with the dependent variable lagged two times, is used as an instrument for the first-differenced 
model with no intercept 
21 The corresponding WRDS code for MDR2 is (DLTT)/ (AT-LCT-TEQ+ (PRCC_F*CSHO)) and for MDR1 is 
(DLTT+DLC)/ (AT-TEQ+ (PRCC_F*CSHO)). 
22 We use LSDVC with initial estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). 
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SOA for low credit quality firms is faster compared to the firms with higher credit quality. These 
results are consistent with what we found earlier. 
 
2.6.1.3 Results based on alternative panel creation 
We recognize that the approach taken to form panels can also be a source of sensitivity. In this 
section, we therefore use an alternative approach to creating credit rating based firm panels. The 
results provided in Section 2.4 were based on a time invariant approach. This approach can be 
criticized because the decile of firms over the entire period is unchanged.23 In this proposed 
alternative approach, we make the sub-samples time variant to obviate concerns around 
misclassification. With this approach, the quantile of firms can change over the entire time period. 
Table 2.17: Robustness checks for the SOA based on the alternative estimation and 
measure definitions 
This table reports the results for the PAM for the panel of firms with different levels of credit ratings based on the 
various estimation methods and alternative definitions for dependent variables. In Panel A we present the results based 
on the OLS, FF, GMM with AB initial (differenced GMM) and also GMM with BB initial estimator (system GMM). 
In Panel B we utilize the MDR1 and MDR2 as alternative measures for market debt ratio and LSDVC estimators for 
with AB initial estimator and the BC estimator. 
Dependent variable-estimator AAA/AA A B BBB/BB CCC and lower 
Panel A: Results based on alternative estimation methods 
MDR-OLS 0.108*** 0.173*** 0.202*** 0.195*** 0.443*** 
MDR-FE 0.308*** 0.335*** 0.393*** 0.442*** 0.9 
MDR-Differenced GMM(AB) 0.342*** 0.428*** 0.487*** 0.614*** 0.908 
MDR-System GMM(BB) 0.240*** 0.275*** 0.247*** 0.242*** 0.695*** 
MDR-LSDVC(AH) 0.337*** 0.230*** 0.303*** 0.417*** 0.686 
BDR-OLS 0.103*** 0.108*** 0.108*** 0.192*** 0.564*** 
BDR-System GMM(BB) 0.238*** 0.205*** 0.247*** 0.191*** 0.691*** 
Panel B: Results based on alternative measure for leverage 
MDR1-LSDVC (AB) 0.010*** 0.169*** 0.262*** 0.310*** 0.965 
MDR2-BC 0.107*** 0.170*** 0.217*** 0.378*** 0.478*** 
 
                                                          
23 The time invariant approach to create subsamples of firms with regards to the cross-sectional characteristics, such 
as credit rating, may lead to misclassification. For instance, assume that a firm has three observations for annual credit 
rating. The first firm-year belongs to panel group 4, the second observation to group 3 and the third one belongs to 
group 4. In this case, the average credit rating is 3.66 and is rounded to 4, thus, this firm with all its firm-year 
observations goes in panel group 4.   
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We replicate the analysis based on the LSDVC and BC estimators for the newly 
constructed panels of firms. Table 2.18 reports SOA for firms which belong to the higher quantile 
(risky firms). The SOA is faster for risky firms compared to the less risky firms. The results are 
consistent with our earlier findings suggesting that our main findings are insensitive to the manner 
in which credit rating based panels are formed. Moreover, we provide further analysis for the panel 
of firms with different level of credit stabilities. We sort our sample based on the change in credit 
rating stabilities and then divide it into three equal groups.  We then estimate SOA using the 
LSDVC estimator. The results are presented in Table 2.19. Consistent with the results provided in 
Table 2.7, we find that firms with higher credit stability move faster toward the target ratio 
compared to the low-stable firms. 
Table 2.18: Robustness checks for the speed of adjustment based on the time variant 
approach to create panels 
This table reports the results for estimation of PAM for panel of firms with different levels of credit rating. As an 
alternative approach, we construct the panels based on the firm’s credit rating in the time variant way and then estimate 
the model with LSDVC estimator and the BC estimator. 
  Quantile 1 Quantile 2 Quantile 3 Quantile 4 Quantile 5 
LSDVC 0.251 0.305 0.236 0.241 0.410 
BC 0.230 0.254 0.209 0.187 0.343 
 
2.6.2 Additional analysis related to Investment Model  
Moreover, to check the robustness of our results regards to the role of credit rating on 
corporate investment we do the following additional analysis: (1) we use alternative measures for 
corporate investment and check whether the significance of credit rating is sensitive to the measure 
of corporate investment; (2) we estimate the effect of credit rating on corporate investment  in an 
augmented regression model to examine whether the inclusion of additional control variables 
influences the significance and sign of CR; and (3) we adopt alternative approach to create panels 
to test whether the way that we create sub sample affects the results.  
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2.6.2.1 Results based on alternative measure of corporate investment 
We focus next on the corporate investment determinants model. We have documented a strong 
relation between credit rating (and credit stability) of firms and corporate investment. A skeptic 
may ask whether the effect of credit rating we document is sensitive to the measure of corporate 
investment. This section deals with any possible sensitivities in our results arising from the precise 
measure of corporate investment. Our response is to consider two alternative definitions for 
corporate investment. Following Julio and Yook (2012) we define CI1 as the ratio of capital 
expenditures to beginning of year total assets and CI2 as the growth in capital structure. 24 
Table 2.19: Robustness for Credit Rating Stability 
This table provides additional results for the PAM for the panel of firms with different credit rating stabilities. To 
create the panel, we sort the firms by credit stability index and then divide the sample into three equal terciles. The 
result is based on the LSDVC method. Our model is  𝑀𝐷𝑅(𝐵𝐷𝑅)௜௧ା = (1 − 𝛾)𝑀𝐷𝑅(𝐵𝐷𝑅)௜௧ + 𝛾𝛽𝑋௜௧ + 𝛾𝛼௜ +
𝜀௜௧ାଵ.  𝑋௜௧  is a vector of control variables such as earnings before interest and tax divided by total asset (EBIT-TA), 
market to book ratio (MB), depreciation scaled by total assets (DEP-TA), Size as the log of total asset, fixed asset 
proportion (FA-TA), research and development expenses as a proportion of total assets (R&A-TA), median industry 
market debt ratio (IND-MED), dummy variable for reported R&D expenses (R&D-Dummy). N is the number of 
observations. ***, **, and * denote results are significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
Credit Stability 
Level 
High credit Stability Medium credit stability Low credit Stability 
Tercile1 Tercile2 Tercile3 
  MDR BDR MDR BDR MDR BDR 
MDR/BDR 0.574*** 0.692*** 0.629*** 0.691*** 0.713*** 0.813*** 
 (36.71) (48.77) (37.11) (45.14) (50.01) (57.65) 
EBIT-TA -0.027 0.101*** 0.023 0.116*** -0.154*** -0.067* 
 (-0.78) (3.40) (0.39) (2.59) (-2.87) (-1.83) 
MB -0.008** -0.005 0.007 -0.002 0.003 0.003 
 (-2.47) (-1.75) (1.17) (-0.43) (0.55) (0.73) 
DEP-TA 0.182 0.433*** -0.212 -0.169 -0.390* 0.260* 
 (1.39) (3.85) (-1.13) (-1.18) (-1.83) (1.77) 
Size 0.008** 0.006** 0.015** 0.009** 0.019*** 0.012*** 
 (2.10) (2.00) (2.59) (2.21) (3.43) (3.37) 
FA-TA 0.024 -0.002 0.034 -0.024 0.045 -0.014 
 (0.77) (-0.08) (0.95) (-0.85) (1.06) (-0.47) 
R&D-Dummy -0.59** -0.032 0.022 -0.005 -0.010 0.013 
 (-2.35) (-1.72) (1.18) (-0.37) (-0.30) (0.56) 
R&D-TA -0.017 0.046 -0.068 0.033 0.107 0.033 
 (-0.45) (1.41) (-0.48) (0.31) (0.83) (0.37) 
IND-MED 0.006 -0.055** 0.160*** 0.080*** 0.021 -0.006 
 (-0.2) (-1.98) (4.37) (2.85) (0.46) (-0.21) 
N 8,596 7,703 8,627 
                                                          
24 The corresponding WRDS code for CI1 is CAPX/ lag (AT) and for CI2 is CAPX-lag (CAPX) / lag(CAPX). 
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Table 2.20 presents the corresponding results. Consistent with the results reported in 
Table 2.8, the coefficients of credit rating (CR) in columns 1 and 6 are strongly significant and the 
signs are positive. Consistent with our main results, the CR variable has a positive sign during the 
short-sell ban period and it is statistically significant. The significance of credit rating remains in 
various economic situations (with respect to GFC) based on the CI1. The coefficient of CR in the 
crisis period is negative based on CI2 proxy and the absolute value is smaller relative to the pre-
crisis period based on the CI1 proxy. On the whole, therefore, these results imply that credit rating 
influences corporate investment regards of the definitions for corporate investment.  
 
2.6.2.2 Results based on the augmented model for corporate investment 
While we have used a well-established corporate investment model, it is natural to ask whether 
model specification plays a role in influencing our main results. To explore this angel of sensitivity, 
we use an alternative investment model equation (2.9). The main feature of this model is that it 
includes a range of additional control variables. The definition of these variables is given in Table 
A.1. We run the following regression model for each panel of firms with various levels of credit 
rating.  
𝐶𝐼௜௧ =  𝛼଴ + 𝛼ଵ. 𝑄௜௧ିଵ + 𝛼ଶ. 𝐶𝐹௜௧ + 𝛼ଷ. %∆𝐺𝐷𝑃௜௧ିଵ  + 𝛼ସ. 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒௜௧ିଵ  + 𝛼ହ. 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇_𝑇𝐴௜௧ିଵ +
𝛼଺. 𝐹𝐴_𝑇𝐴௜௧ିଵ+𝛼଻. 𝑀𝐷𝑅௜௧ିଵ + 𝛼଼. 𝑀𝐵௜௧ିଵ + 𝛼௜ + 𝜀௜௧                                                                           (2.9) 
The results are reported in Table 2.21. Consistent with our main findings (Section 2.4), the 
explanatory power of included variables is higher for the firms with B and lower credit ratings. 
The Tobin’s Q and cash flow are statistically insignificant for the panel with less risky firms and 
the profitability (EBIT-TA), leverage ratio (MDR), and the change in economic situation (%∆𝐺𝐷𝑃) 
are variables that are highly significant for this same group of firms. The firms with B credit rating 
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has the highest 𝑅ଶ. The  %∆𝐺𝐷𝑃 is statistically significant for panel of firms with AAA/AA credit 
rating. 
2.6.2.3 Results based on the alternative panel creation 
So far in producing our main results we have created five panels of credit rating firms. The issue 
is the greater the number of panels the less the number of firms (observations) per panel. A natural 
question that arises is whether reducing the number of panels influences our main results. To 
explore this, we now create three panels instead of five based on a firm’s credit rating. The results 
are reported in Table 2.22. These results are consistent with our main results reported in Table 2.9:  
and confirms that the investment model for firms with medium and low credit ratings performs 
better than investment model with high credit rating firms. 
 
2.6.3 Association of SOA and corporate investment 
We also test the robustness of our results with regards to the association of SOA and corporate 
investment by augmenting our baseline regression model with additional control variables, such 
as firm’s size, leverage ratio, and market to book ratio. The results provided in Table 2.23 confirm 
that SOA and corporate investment is negatively related. It also shows that SOA is statistically 
significant for the panels of firms with high and medium credit rating. 
 
2.7 DISCUSION OF RESULTS 
2.7.1 Financing Model 
The results provided in Section 2.4.1 show that there is heterogeneity in SOA toward leverage 
ratio in regards to the panel of firms with different credit rating levels and credit stabilities. This 
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Table 2.20: Robustness check for the role of credit rating in corporate investment  
This table presents the results for the role of credit rating as the determinant of corporate investment. We consider two alternative definitions for corporate 
investment, investment rate measured by the ratio of capital expenditures to beginning of year total assets (CI1) and growth in capital expenditure (CI2). The 
Columns 1-5 are related to CI1 and the rest is for CI2 as the dependent variables. The control variables are Tobin’s Q ratio (Q), cash flow (CF), change in GDP 
growth (%∆𝐺𝐷𝑃). Moreover, to investigate the role of credit rating in corporate investment for different economic situation we consider four interaction variables. 
According to the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’ the start of crisis is 27 February 2007. Therefore, we consider the years before 2007 as the pre-GFC period, 
2007-2010 as GFC period and the later years as the post-GFC duration. The models are 𝐶𝐼௜௧ =  𝛼଴ + 𝛼ଵ. 𝑄௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛼ଶ. 𝐶𝐹௜,௧ + 𝛼ଷ. %∆𝐺𝐷𝑃 + 𝐷௣௥௘ିீி஼  . 𝐶𝑅௜,௧ + 𝛼௜ +
𝜀௜,௧, 𝐶𝐼௜௧ =  𝛼଴ + 𝛼ଵ. 𝑄௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛼ଶ. 𝐶𝐹௜,௧ + 𝛼ଷ. %∆𝐺𝐷𝑃 + 𝐷ீி஼  . 𝐶𝑅௜,௧ + 𝛼௜ + 𝜀௜,௧ and  𝐶𝐼௜௧ =  𝛼଴ + 𝛼ଵ. 𝑄௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛼ଶ. 𝐶𝐹௜,௧ + 𝛼ଷ. %∆𝐺𝐷𝑃 + 𝐷௣௢௦௧ିீி஼  . 𝐶𝑅௜,௧ + 𝛼௜ +
𝜀௜,௧ , respectively. The Column 5 shows the impact of credit rating on investment during short-sell ban in US. The corresponding model is 𝐶𝐼௜௧ =  𝛼଴ + 𝛼ଵ. 𝑄௜,௧ିଵ +
𝛼ଶ. 𝐶𝐹௜,௧ + 𝛼ଷ. %∆𝐺𝐷𝑃 + 𝐷௦௛௢௥௧_௦௘௟௟_௕௔௡ . 𝐶𝑅௜,௧ + 𝛼௜ + 𝜀௜,௧.We used the cluster robust standard error and fixed effect estimator. ***, **, and * denote results are 
significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
  CI1 CI2 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Intercept 0.017 0.025*** 0.044*** 0.047*** 0.045*** -0.246*** -0.205** -0.088*** -0.104** -0.096** 
 (1.52) (2.92) (6.53) (7.62) (7.04) (-3.33) (-2.95) (-1.98) (-2.22) (-2.13) 
Q 0.003** 0.004** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.021 0.024** 0.030** 0.028** 0.028** 
 (2.15) (2.62) (2.75) (3.10) (2.81) (1.60) (2.05) (2.27) (2.07) (2.23) 
CF 0.012*** 0.012 0.013* 0.013* 0.013*** 0.260** 0.256** 0.258** 0.257** 0.264** 
 (1.47) (1.52) (1.73) (1.73) (1.63) (2.28) (2.21) (2.22) (2.26) (2.23) 
%∆𝐺𝐷𝑃 -0.067*** -0.060*** -0.054*** -0.049** -0.060*** -0.543** -0.505* -0.499*** -0.543** -0.506** 
 (-3.08) (-2.73) (-3.00) (-2.56) (-3.22) (-2.07) (-1.92) (-2.04) (-2.27) (-2.06) 
CR 0.005***     0.027**     
 (3.88)     (2.37)     
PRE_GFC*CR  0.004***     0.024**    
  (3.56)     (2.27)    
GFC*CR   0.003***     -0.011   
   (6.53)     (-0.48)   
POST_GFC*CR    0.003*     0.025  
    (-1.86)     (0.75)  
SHORTSELL_BAN     0.007*     0.026* 
     (7.04)     (1.86) 
𝑅ଶ 0.014 0.003 0.0001 0.0005 0.0004 0.016 0.016 0.022 0.023 0.024 
Within 𝑅ଶ 0.116 0.104 0.062 0.061 0.075 0.032 0.031 0.010 0.009 0.010 
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Table 2.21: Robustness check for investment model (including additional control variables) 
This table presents the results for the investment model with augmented control variables for each panel of firms with 
different levels of credit rating. The control variables are Tobin’s Q ratio (Q), cash flow (CF), change in GDP growth 
(%∆𝐺𝐷𝑃), the log of total asset (Size), earnings before interest and tax divided by total asset (EBIT-TA), fixed asset 
proportion (FA-TA), leverage ratio (MDR) and market to book ratio (MB). We use the cluster robust standard error 
and fixed effect estimator. N is the number of observation. In the last row, we report the 𝑅ଶfor each regression model. 
  AAA/AA A BBB BB/B CCC and lower 
Q 0.0002 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.009** 
 (-0.08) (3.10) (4.40) (8.78) (2.38) 
CF -0.001 0.055*** 0.069*** 0.068*** 0.013 
 (-0.07) (4.36) (7.45) (10.26) (0.64) 
%∆𝐺𝐷𝑃 0.332** 0.064 0.028 -0.009 -0.077 
 (2.16) (0.74) (0.56) (-0.48) (-1.30) 
Size -0.015 -0.050*** -0.036*** -0.057 -0.115*** 
 (-0.96) (-7.70) (-8.57) (-12.62) (-4.67) 
EBIT-TA 0.283*** 0.299*** 0.264*** 0.225*** 0.108 
 (2.78) (4.34) (5.51) (5.76) (0.08) 
FA-TA -0.142 -0.126** -0.190*** -0.378*** -0.653*** 
 (-1.66) (-2.59) (-6.03) (-12.29) (-5.56) 
MDR -0.180*** -0.082*** -0.080*** -0.175*** -0.236* 
 (-3.93) (-3.25) (-4.61) (-12.72) (-5.18) 
MB 0.100 -0.004 0.020*** 0.011* 0.046* 
 (0.92) (-0.59) (2.94) (1.65) (1.96) 
Intercept 0.035 0.637*** 0.633*** 0.772*** 1.264*** 
 (0.17) (8.83) (11.36) (19.26) (6.93) 
N 1,270 4,367 7,250 11,510 529 
Overall-𝑅ଶ 0.07 0.07 0.22 0.19 0.15 
 
documented heterogeneity arises from the discrete cost and benefits associated with different 
rating levels. The SOAs for firms with lower credit rating is faster compared to the firms in the 
higher credit rating groups. This finding can be explained in four ways. First, according to the 
trade-off theory, a firm will balance the costs of bankruptcy and other costs related to debt with 
the benefit of debt’s tax saving. The cost arises from bankruptcy risk are likely to be of greater 
concern for the firms with lower rating. Table 2.2 shows that the market debt ratio for the firms 
with lower credit rating is higher compared to the firms with high credit rating. Therefore, the cost  
of bankruptcy risk may outweigh the benefits of tax shield saving, and induce the risky firms to 
converge to the target ratio faster. In contrast, as long as the bankruptcy risk is not a significant 
matter for firms with a higher credit rating, these types of firms are less incentivized to eliminate 
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the deviation from the target and prefer to use the benefits of debt tax saving while they are over-
leveraged.  
Table 2.22: Investment model in a panel of three levels of credit rating 
This table provides the result of investment model for a panel of three levels of credit rating namely AAA/AA, A/BBB, 
BB and lower. We run the investment regression model which is 𝐶𝐼௜௧ =  𝛼଴ + 𝛼ଵ. 𝑄௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛼ଶ. 𝐶𝐹௜,௧ +
𝛼ଷ. %∆𝐺𝐷𝑃௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛼௜ + 𝜀௜,௧.  The  𝑄௜,௧ିଵ is Tobin’s Q ratio, 𝐶𝐹௜,௧ is the cash flow, %∆𝐺𝐷𝑃 is the change in GDP 
growth separately for each panel. We use the cluster robust standard error and fixed effect estimator. The last three 
rows report the number of observations and adjusted 𝑅ଶ. N is the number of observations. ***, **, and * denote results 
are significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
  AAA/AA A/BBB BB and lower 
Intercept 0.139*** 0.126*** 0.131*** 
 (6.96) (23.65) (33.85) 
Q 0.002* 0.005*** 0.009*** 
 (1.79) (7.24) (14.21) 
CF 0.031 0.095*** 0.113*** 
 (1.33) (11.01) (16.39) 
%∆𝐺𝐷𝑃 0.643*** 0.189*** -0.022 
 (4.19) (3.63) (-0.90) 
N 1,328 11,633 11,965 
Within_𝑅ଶ 0.06 0.13 0.17 
Overall_𝑅ଶ 0.07 0.23 0.22 
 
Second, this finding is consistent with the overhang problem argued by Myers (1977). The 
firms with higher leverage and lower credit rating try to converge to the target ratio faster to avoid 
the issues related to debt overhang problem.  
Third, consistent with the negative relationship between firm’s size and SOA reported by 
Flannery and Rangan (2006), the study by Dang et al. (2012) argue that the opportunity cost of 
deviation from the target ratio is lower for larger firms. The firms with higher credit rating are 
larger (see log of total asset in Table 2.2) and, therefore, we expect a lower SOA for less risky 
firms and vice versa.  
Fourth, some studies (see,  Bronars and Deere, 1991; Dasgupta and Sengupta, 1993; Jorion 
and Zhang, 2007; White, 1989) discuss that firms with financial distress specially those are under 
chapter 11 bankruptcies can benefit various subsidies, such as lower cost of debt, extra financing 
resources provided by debtor-in-possession creditors or government, and use union concession 
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through improvement in bargaining power. Consequently, these benefits can lead to a higher SOA 
compared to liquidated and surviving corporations. 
Table 2.23: Association of SOA and corporate investment (robustness check) 
This table provides the result for the effect of SOA on corporate investment with additional control variables. We 
generate SOA by rolling window regression. The investment regression model is 𝐶𝐼௜௧ =  𝛼଴ +
𝛼ଵ. 𝑆𝑂𝐴௜,௧ିଵ+𝛼ଶ. 𝑄௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛼ଷ. 𝐶𝐹௜,௧ + 𝛼ସ. %∆𝐺𝐷𝑃௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛼ହ. 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛼଺. 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛼଻. 𝑀𝐵௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛼௜ + 𝜀௜,௧. 
The 𝑄௜,௧ିଵ is Tobin’s Q ratio, 𝐶𝐹௜,௧ is the cash flow, %∆𝐺𝐷𝑃 is the change in GDP growth, SIZE is the log (total asset), 
leverage and MB is market to book ratio. We classify our sample into three equal groups (high, medium and low credit 
rating) based on the firm’s long-term S&P credit rating. We use the fixed effect estimator. N is the number of 
observations. The last two rows report the within and overall_𝑅ଶ. ***, **, and * denote results are significant at 1%, 
5% and 10%, respectively. 
  Whole Sample High Credit rating Medium credit rating Low credit rating 
Intercept 0.421*** 0.368*** 0.221** 0.669*** 
 (6.44) (3.70) (2.57) (5.05) 
SOA -0.015** -0.022** -0.020** 0.007 
 (-2.35) (-2.49) (-1.76) (0.55) 
Q 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.005** 0.007** 
 (4.46) (3.74) (2.46) (2.45) 
CF 0.073*** 0.061*** 0.063*** 0.065*** 
 (6.49) (4.30) (4.03) (-3.91) 
%∆𝐺𝐷𝑃 0.276*** 0.258*** 0.284*** 0.305* 
 (3.76) (2.90) (2.79) (1.88) 
Size -0.032** -0.024** -0.012 -0.065*** 
 (-4.49) (-2.40) (-1.43) (-3.91) 
Leverage -0.130*** -0.110** -0.056 -0.225*** 
 (-4.78) (-2.62) (-1.47) (-5.37) 
MB 0.017** 0.011 0.027** 0.044** 
 (2.39) (1.39) (2.36) (2.40) 
N 3,891 1,426 1,322 1,143 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Within_R2 0.21 0.23 0.21 0.26 
Overall R2 0.18 0.12 0.22 0.22 
 
The results of SOA for the panels of firms with different credit rating stabilities, we find 
that the firms with lower (higher) stability index have lower (higher) SOA. This implies that firms 
with more stability in their credit rating have better access to external financing with lower a cost 
of capital. In contrast, firms with a history of considerable changes to their credit rating face severe 
constraints in receiving loans and face a higher cost of capital to issue debts/equities. This is 
consistent with the capital structure-credit rating hypothesis, which argues that firms with different 
credit rating follow a different path toward target leverage. 
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There is a concern for distinction in the results when the instability in credit rating results 
from upgrade or downgrade of rating. To investigate this, we construct panels when (a) there are 
no changes in credit rating, (b) the number of upgrades are more than the numbers of downgrade 
(positive instability), (c) the number of upgrades are less than the number of downgrades (negative 
instability), and (d) when the number of upgrades are equal to the numbers of downgrade (equal 
instability). The results provided in Table A.7 show that there is no considerable distinction in 
SOA for the firms that have positive, negative and equal stability indices. 
Moreover, since SOA is faster for low credit quality firms and slower for unstable firms it 
implies that results of credit rating-based and credit stability-based analysis are in opposite 
direction. Therefore, we provide additional analysis to understand this pattern in the results. 
Specifically, we provide the average rating of firms with various levels of credit rating stability in 
Table A.8. We see that high credit quality firms are not those that are most stable and there is no 
considerable difference in average annual rating of firms with different credit stability levels. As 
a result, the higher stability does not mean necessarily the better credit quality. 
 
2.7.2 Investment Model 
The results presented in part B of section 2.4.2 confirm the role of credit rating as a determinant 
of corporate investment decision. Credit rating, which signifies a firm’s credit risk, is highly 
considered by fund suppliers. When credit risk of firms increases the bargaining power declines 
in financial market and they may face more financial pressure. The creditors incorporate this 
information in requiring their returns on the provided funds and they likely raise the cost of 
capital or even reject to provide additional funds. Therefore, it may negatively affect the net 
present value of projects and investment decisions. Consistent with our hypothesis, the results 
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confirm that firms with higher credit rating and higher credit stability have higher levels of 
investments due to lower cost of capital and more accessibility to external financing resources.  
Moreover, credit rating is strongly significant for various sub-samples of data (before, 
during and after the GFC and short-sell ban periods). According to the credit supply shock theory 
(Gorton, 2010), firms experience a negative shock to the external financing resources in the GFC 
period. This reduction in credit supply together with the financing friction can explain a reduction 
in debt issuance and capital expenditure especially for the financially constrained firms and the 
firms with dependency on external finance (Duchin et al., 2010; Kahle and Stulz, 2013). 
Furthermore, Kahle and Stulz (2013) find that the shock in current firm’s products demand and 
uncertainty about the future demand could result the fall in corporate investment. These provide 
support for the negative sign or reduction in absolute value for the impact of credit rating in the 
crisis period. 
On the role of credit rating in the short-sell ban period, the results are consistent with our 
expectation. The coefficient of the interaction variable is statistically significant and the positive 
sign confirms the increase in capital expenditure during the short-sell ban period is consistent with 
the overvaluation and bear raid channels discussed by Grullon et al., (2015). 
Regarding the performance of the investment model for the credit rating-based panels, we 
find that the role of credit rating in influencing corporate investment for firms with moderate and 
low credit rating is more noticeable relative to the firms with superior credit rating. Earlier studies 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977; Myers and Majluf, 1984) discuss that the high credit 
risk firms suffer more from underinvestment problem and they likely forgo the positive net present 
value projects. Moreover, Tobin’s Q and cash flow as the proxies for investment opportunities are 
more significant for low and moderate credit risk panels. This implies that these two factors are 
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considered as perquisites for investors in risky markets. Furthermore, for the high credit quality 
panel, only %∆𝐺𝐷𝑃 rate is statistically significant whereas as credit quality deteriorates all control 
variables explain corporate investment. This implies that fundamental is more active in credit 
quality declining market. 
  
2.7.3 Association of SOA and Corporate Investment 
The results related to the role of SOA on corporate investment indicate that the higher speed to 
remove the deviation from target debt ratio has a negative effect on corporate investment. This 
result is robust for panels of firms with various credit rating. The higher SOA for the firms that are 
under the target would mean issuing more debt which leads an increase in leverage ratio or 
repurchase equity that decreases the available funds for corporate investment. With the assumption 
of being over target debt ratio, the higher SOA is to repurchase debt or issuing more equity. 
Regarding the preference of firms for debt financing based on the pecking order theory, repurchase 
debt and its additional cost of debt restructuring would reduce the available funds for corporate 
investment too. Consequently, as we expected a negative association between SOA toward target 
debt ratio and corporate investment has been documented. This finding is consistent with the 
agency theories of corporate finance that assert leverage has a disciplining role to prevent 
overinvestment and the hypothesis that leverage reduce the motivations to invest in poor projects.  
The results also provide support for the association of financing and investment behavior based on 
the MM theory in absence of perfect market. The negative relationship between SOA and corporate 
investment is more remarkable for the firms with higher and medium credit rating compared to the 
firms with low credit rating. The higher speed for firms with better credit rating leads to an increase 
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in leverage ratio which may cause to underinvestment or debt overhang problem and consequently 
negative effect on investment.    
 
2.8 CONCLUSION 
In this study, we provide more evidences toward the role of credit rating on corporate financial 
decisions (financing and investment). Motivated by the credit rating-capital structure hypothesis 
and different discrete costs and benefits of firm’s credit rating we examine the capital structure 
adjustment and investment decisions conditional on credit rating. 
We constructed the panels based on the S&P credit rating levels and the frequency of 
changes in credit rating which we call it as credit rating stability. In financing section, we adopt 
the two most robust and appropriate methods suggested by literature namely LSDVC and BC to 
examine the SOA and implement the panel regression model for investment section. 
The results and foregoing discussion reiterates our primary message that there is 
heterogeneity in SOA with respect to the credit rating and the credit rating is an important 
determinant of corporate investment. Beyond this, our analysis produces additional insights. For 
example, at first the results show that the firms with high credit rating have slower SOA while the 
firms with worsen credit rating converge to target level with higher speed. Second, the results 
indicate that the firms with higher credit stability are able to remove the variation from target 
leverage with faster speed relative to the panel of instable firms. Third, we demonstrate that the 
role of credit rating on investment decision is negatively in GFC and positively in short-sell ban 
duration. Moreover, we find that the performance of investment model is superior in the panel of 
firms with moderate and low credit rating. Finally, we show that the SOA has negative effect on 
corporate investment and the influence is more remarkable for the firms with high and moderate 
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credit rating. The results are robust to the range of alternative estimation methods, variable 
definition and various slices of data set. 
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3 CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS AND CORPORATE 
INVESTMENT 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The credit default swap (CDS) is an important type of credit derivative, because it adds liquidity 
to the financial system. CDS contracts provide flexibility and opportunity for banks to transfer 
credit risk and enhance relationships with borrowers. This innovation prompted other participants, 
such as mutual funds and hedge funds, to join the CDS market. As a result, the notional value of 
the CDS market increased dramatically from its introduction in 1997 until 2007, but fell during 
and after GFC.25 CDS, like any other innovation, is a double-edged sword with pros and cons. On 
one hand, it is a financial derivative that has several beneficial functions, like enabling risk sharing, 
mitigating credit exposure, and revealing new information about referenced credit risk. On the 
other hand, CDS is blamed for credit crises. The CDS market facilitates unregulated speculative 
activity and spreads negative views about the financial strength of firms (Stulz, 2010). In addition 
to the opaqueness of the CDS market, critics point to the negative effect of CDS on bank 
monitoring incentives and a reduction in the tendency of lenders to support borrowers in times of 
distress (Arping, 2014). 
Since the emergence of the CDS market, a considerable number of studies have analyzed 
its impact from multiple viewpoints. One strand of the literature examines the consequences of 
CDS trading on a firm’s financial outcomes, such as the cost of issuing or trading bonds, efficiency 
                                                          
 25 ISDA reported that at the end of 2007, total credit default swaps outstanding were $62.2 trillion. However, this 
fell sharply to $38.5 trillion by the end of 2008. 
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of equity prices and capital structure (see, for example, Ashcraft and Santos, 2009; Boehmer et al., 
2012; Das et al., 2014; Saretto and Tookes, 2013). The findings of this strand of literature provide 
insight regarding the effect of this market on the financial behavior of firms with traded CDS. The 
impact of CDS trading on corporate investment is an area that has been ignored in the literature. 
This chapter attempts to test the hypothesis that CDS trading affects corporate investment. The 
motivation for this hypothesis is as follows. 
We know that corporate investment is funded mainly by capital self-generated by firms 
and capital from external funders, raised by issuing debt and equity. The literature provides 
evidence about how CDS trading has unfavorable effects on corporate equity, debt, capital 
structure, and liquidity management activities. For example, Ashcraft and Santos (2009) examine 
the hypothesis that CDS trading lowers the cost of bond or loan funding. These authors find no 
reduction in bond and loan spreads for average borrowers with a CDS. Further, Das et al., (2014) 
find that the CDS market has a detrimental effect on a firm’s underlying bond market. These 
authors argue that the bond market became inefficient as the CDS market matured and that it did 
not improve the liquidity of this market. 
Another group of studies (see, for example, Arping, 2014; Hirtle, 2009; Norden et al., 
2011; Norden and Wagner, 2008) investigate the role of CDS on the loan market. The findings 
reveal that banks’ use of CDS to hedge risk did not necessarily increase the credit supply. These 
authors also argue that since the CDS market insulates creditors against losses from default, the 
bargaining power of lenders increases. As a result, creditors become tougher during debt 
renegotiation, which leads to a strict credit constraint. Apart from the adverse effect of the CDS 
market on the corporate debt market, Boehmer et al. (2012) show that the equity market for firms 
with CDS trading is less liquid and less efficient. 
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Moreover, several studies show that corporate financing and investment are related in the 
absence of perfect markets (see, for example, Chava and Roberts, 2008; McCabe, 1979; Peterson 
and Benesh, 1983; Whited, 1992). Modigliani and Miller (1958) demonstrate that, in perfect 
capital markets, financing and investment are separable. In regards to the violation of this theory 
in the presence of market imperfections such as taxes, bankruptcy costs, and agency costs, several 
studies support the existence of a relationship between firm investment and decision-making. With 
respect to the dependency of investment decisions and a firm’s financing policy based on the MM 
theory, all of these findings in the literature provide support for the impact of the CDS market on 
corporate investment through the external financing channel. 
Aside from the negative effect of CDS trading on firm external funding, some studies 
provide evidence for an unfavorable effect of CDS on internal funding. For example, 
Subrahmanyam et al., (2015) examine cash holding and liquidity management activities of firms 
with traded CDS and find that these firms hold more cash in comparison to non-CDS firms. These 
authors argue that firms do this as a precaution to ensure survival in the event of possible 
renegotiation with creditors. As a result, we can infer that this leads to a reduction in internal funds 
available for investment. 
Above, we discuss the potential impact of CDS trading on a firm’s external and internal 
financing, and we test whether CDS trading affects investment activities of firms with CDS 
trading. Our study fills this research gap by specifically investigating how, if at all, (1) CDS trading 
influences corporate investment, and (2) whether the effect of CDS trading on corporate 
investment is firm-characteristic driven. With respect to (2), we specifically test whether the effect 
of CDS trading depends on firm size, leverage position, or whether it is an investment- or 
speculative-grade CDS firm. 
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We test our hypothesis by employing a fixed effects panel data regression model. 
Endogeneity in the timing of CDS trading and the selection bias problem for firms with traded 
CDS are concerns that we consider and address. Besides controlling for fixed effects, we consider 
two alternative approaches to examine the influence of CDS trading on corporate investment, PSM 
analysis and a DID estimation. 
The main findings of this essay are as follows. First, we find that introduction of CDS 
negatively impacts corporate investment. We show that the rate of firm investment decreases one 
year after that firm’s CDS begins to trade. Second, we document that the detrimental effect of CDS 
trading on corporate investment is firm-characteristic driven. Our results indicate that (a) small 
firms are more affected compared to large firms, (b) risky firms (high leverage and speculative 
grade) are not affected at all, and (c) less risky firms (high leverage and investment grade) are most 
affected. 
The findings of this essay contribute to the emerging literature on the corporate finance 
implications of credit derivatives. This essay adds to the strand of literature that documents that 
CDS trading has detrimental effects on a firm’s financial outcome, such as the cost of issuing or 
trading bonds, efficiency of equity prices, and capital structure (see, for example, Ashcraft and 
Santos, 2009; Das et al., 2014). Founded from empty creditor and tougher creditor hypotheses, the 
MM theory and existing empirical evidence for a negative effect of CDS trading on internal and 
external financing, we contribute to this strand of literature by showing that CDS trading has 
unfavorable effects on corporate investment as well.26 More specifically, we add to this literature 
by showing that the impact of CDS trading on corporate investment varies by firm characteristics. 
                                                          
26 The “empty creditor” problem is related to a situation whereby creditors buy more credit protection than they need 
to hedge their credit exposure. This term was coined by Hu and Black (2008) to describe this problem. 
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In particular, we show that the detrimental effect of CDS trading on a firm’s investment is less for 
bigger firms, firms with higher leverage ratio, and speculative-grade firms. These findings are 
consistent with the view that larger firms have easier access to external financing with lower cost 
of capital. Additionally, the diversification and information channels likely benefit riskier firms 
more due to greater information flows and efficient distribution of risk bearing for informationally 
opaque firms. 
Further, we contribute to the literature that investigates the relationship between financing 
and investment in the absence of a perfect market (see, for example, Chava and Roberts, 2008; 
McCabe, 1979; Peterson and Benesh, 1983; Whited, 1992). These studies confirm that a firm’s 
financing and investment are related in the absence of a perfect market. We add to these studies 
by showing that investment activities of CDS-issuer firms are influenced by CDS trading through 
the financing channel. With respect to the negative impact of CDS trading on a firm’s external 
financing (underlying firm debt and equity markets) and internal financing (liquidity management 
and cash holding), we find that corporate investment of CDS-issuer firms declined after the CDS 
commenced trading. 
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 3.2, we provide a review of 
the related literature and develop our main hypothesis. In Section 3.3, we discuss the implemented 
methodology and data. Section 3.4 describes the results, and the robustness of our results is 
investigated in Section 3.5. Concluding remarks are set forth in Section 3.6.  
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3.2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
The association of financing and investment decisions in the absence of perfect markets is based 
on the MM theory. We investigate the role of CDS trading on corporate investment through the 
financing channel. 
3.2.1 Potential Impact of CDS Trading on External Financing (Bond, Loan, and Equity 
Markets) 
There are two main channels that may affect the debt market. First, based on the diversification or 
hedging hypothesis, firms with CDS offer creditors the opportunity to diversify their credit risk. 
Ashcraft and Santos (2009) argue that with respect to the fact that CDSs create new hedging 
opportunities, they can contribute to a reduction in the cost of corporate debt. Moreover, since the 
bond and loan markets are illiquid, the development of CDS markets provides banks and investors 
a new and less expensive way to hedge their risk exposures. Therefore, the insurance provided by 
a CDS gives creditors added opportunities to diversify their credit exposures. Consequently, there 
is an expectation that some of the savings arising from this diversification is passed on to 
borrowers, therefore, borrowers can take loans and issue bonds at lower cost. Moreover, Saretto 
and Tookes (2013) claim that the ability of capital suppliers to hedge their risk exposure by CDS 
contracts can reduce friction. As a result, capital suppliers may increase the supply of credit to the 
underlying firm. 
Second, CDS has an informational role, because CDS prices show a clean measure of 
spread that investors demand to bear a firm’s default. Bond markets are characterized by illiquidity, 
variety of coupon structures, and embedded options. These characteristics hamper the information 
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content of the bond market. Alternatively, CDS provides an important source of new information 
on firms, which can be beneficial to mitigate the agency problem (Ashcraft and Santos, 2009).27 
Most studies that investigate the impact of CDS trading on the bond market in the US reject 
the hypothesis that CDS trading benefits investors in terms of providing new hedging opportunities 
and information transparency. For example, Ashcraft and Santos (2009) examine the potential 
beneficial impacts of CDS trading on corporate financing. These authors conclude that CDS 
trading is not beneficial for average non-financial firms in terms of loan funding and the cost of 
corporate debt. They also show that risky and informationally opaque borrowers with CDS are 
adversely affected by the CDS market in terms of bond cost. 
Moreover, Das et al. (2014) claim that the CDS market is largely detrimental to the bond 
market. These authors evaluate trade size and turnover of the bond market during the years 
surrounding CDS trading. They find that trade size and turnover of the bond market for firms with 
traded CDS declined after inception of the CDS market. Moreover, they conclude that after CDS 
trading, the firm’s bonds entered into a less efficient market with no improvement in liquidity or 
reduction in pricing errors. Besides the US market, Shim and Zhu (2014) document an unfavorable 
effect of CDS trading on Asian bond markets following the collapse of Lehman in 2008. Hirtle 
(2009) tests the hypothesis that the greater use of credit protection through credit derivatives is 
associated with greater credit supply and finds limited evidence to supports this idea. 
Further, some studies (see, for example, Arping, 2014; Hirtle, 2009; Norden et al., 2011; 
Norden and Wagner, 2008) investigate the impact of the CDS market on the loan market. The CDS 
                                                          
27 With regard to the informational role of the CDS market, Hull et al. (2004) show that the CDS market anticipates 
credit rating events. 
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market acts like a yardstick between a bank’s loan departments as if they were internal transfer 
prices (Norden and Wagner, 2008). Banks, as one of the main participants in the CDS market, 
actively trade in CDS market. Hirtle (2009), for example, examines the relationship between 
banks’ use of credit derivatives and their credit supply. This author finds limited evidence in 
support of the hypothesis that greater use of credit protection through credit derivatives is 
associated with greater credit supply. 
Moreover, Norden and Wagner (2008) examine the impact of CDS on pricing of syndicated 
loans and find that CDS holds substantial relevant information for bank lending. These authors 
show that approximately 25% of the total variation in aggregate loan spread changes can be 
explained by CDS spread changes. They find that the role of CDS spread in loan pricing is more 
remarkable in comparison to the traditional factor, bond spread.28 Some studies argue that the CDS 
market alters the relation between creditors and debtors, which may result in the “empty creditor” 
problem. Hu and Black (2008) describe a situation in which creditors buy more credit protection 
than they needs to hedge their credit exposure as an “empty creditor.” This situation leads to an 
increase in the bargaining power of creditors. Consequently, the creditors become tougher during 
renegotiations with debtors and they may impose more constraints or require additional returns on 
provided funds. 
With respect to the tougher creditor hypothesis, Arping (2014) studies the impact of CDS 
on the lending relationship. This author shows that creditors becoming tougher due to use of CDS 
tightens credit constraints, which is detrimental for welfare. Moreover, Bolton and Oehmke (2011) 
discuss the conflict between the costs and benefits of CDS. These authors claim that lenders who 
                                                          
28 When Norden and Wagner (2008) control for a variety of traditional loan pricing factors, the CDS spread keeps its 
significance and emerges as the most important determinant of loan prices. In a model where both CDS and bond 
spreads are included, the bond spread becomes insignificant, and when only the bond spread is considered, this adds 
very little explanatory power. 
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hedge their credit risk by using CDS are less incentivized to maintain the debtor as a going concern 
when debtors experience distress situations. This can lead to bankruptcy or liquidation rather than 
efficient recapitalization. 
Alongside the impact of CDS trading on the corporate debt market, Boehmer et al. (2012) 
present results on the detrimental impacts of CDS trading on equity markets. These authors 
investigate the impact of CDS trading on equity market quality along two dimensions, liquidity 
and price efficiency. The results show that firms with traded CDS contracts have less liquid and 
less efficient stock markets. 
The adverse impacts of CDS market on the bond and equity markets can affect the external 
financing activities of firms negatively. With respect to the association of financing and investment 
activities in absence of perfect market based on the MM theory, it can lead to a negative effect on 
corporate investment as well. 
 
3.2.2 Potential Impact of CDS Trading on Internal Financing 
Besides the potential negative impact of CDS trading on external financing, some studies provide 
evidence on the effect of CDS on internal financing activities. For example, Subrahmanyam et al. 
(2014, 2015) investigate corporate cash holding and liquidity management with respect to CDS 
trading. These authors argue that in regard to the consequences of the empty creditor problem, 
debtors maintain more cash as a precautionary activity after inception of CDS to avoid imposition 
of constraints in case of renegotiation during distress situations. 
Moreover, Subrahmanyam, Tang and Wang (2016) find that the probability of downgrade 
and bankruptcy for the reference firms increases after the CDS commences trading. These authors 
show that the ability of creditors to hedge their risk by CDS may lead creditors to monitor 
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borrowers less. Consequently, firms, in turn, undertake more risky projects and the possibility of 
bankruptcy or downgrade in distress situations is increased due to the dominant bargaining power 
of tough debtors. This is consistent with the theory that hedging may reduce monitoring incentives 
(see, for example, Morrison, 2005). Together, these papers imply that CDS trading negatively 
affects firm external and internal funding required for investment. 
Further, Saretto and Tookes (2013) investigate how the ability of firms to hedge their credit 
risk by CDS contracts affects the corporate capital structure. These authors find that firms with 
traded CDS have higher leverage ratio and longer debt maturity, because borrowers benefit from 
relaxation of credit constraints given suppliers ability to hedge their risk. With regard to the 
documented negative relation between leverage and corporate investment (see, for example, Ahn 
et al., 2006; Aivazian et al., 2005; Lang, Ofek and Stulz, 1996), and the finding of Saretto and 
Tookes (2013) on keeping a higher leverage ratio after CDS starts to trade, we expect a reduction 
in corporate investment by inception of CDS. 
The effect of CDS trading on corporate investment behavior is a gap in the literature worth 
investigating. With respect to the empty creditor and tougher creditor hypothesis, the detrimental 
effects of CDS trading on external funding (bond, loan, and equity markets) and internal funding 
(cash and liquidity management), and the association between firm financing and investment 
activity in the absence of a perfect market based on MM theory, we test the following hypothesis: 
The investment activities of firms with traded CDS are adversely affected by CDS trading. 
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3.3 RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.3.1 Methodology 
The aim of this essay is to identify the impact of CDS trading on corporate investment. Following 
Ashcraft and Santos (2009), Saretto and Tookes (2013), and Das et al. (2014), we consider an 
indicator variable to find the effect of CDS trading. Trading is the dummy variable, which takes a 
value 1 from the year in which the firm started CDS trading and a value of zero otherwise. This 
variable shows whether corporate investment is different after a firm’s CDS starts trading in 
comparison to the pre-CDS trade period. Moreover, we follow Chava and Roberts (2008), An et 
al. (2016), and Julio and Yook (2012) to include our control variables in an augmented corporate 
investment model. Detailed descriptions of the variables are presented in Table 3.1. 
 
3.3.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
We follow Saretto and Tookes (2013) and focus on the components of the S&P 500 Index. We 
begin with the sample of firms from the S&P 500 Index that have traded CDS in the Bloomberg 
database. Following this, we obtain the trade data for 5-year CDS from Bloomberg Generic 
Average Price (mnemonic CBGN) and assume that the onset of a firm’s CDS trading is the first 
quoted CDS spread in the Bloomberg. The Trading variable takes 1 for the years after this date 
and 0 for the years before the trading start year in Bloomberg. Our final data set consists of 5,908 
firm–year observations (165 firms). Moreover, we distinguish 180 firms as non-CDS issuers 
among the components of the S&P 500 Index. We consider these firms as part of a control group 
in the DID estimation and PSM technique, which constitute our robustness checks (see 
Section 3.5). Subsequently, we collect annual financial data from WRDS for firms from 1950 to 
2015, conditional on data availability. In the next step, we merge the CDS data and firm data and 
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then winsorize the data at the 1% and 99% levels to remove the effect of outliers. Table 3.2 reports 
descriptive statistics for the main variables used in the study.  
Table 3.1: Definition of variables 
This table provides details about the description of considered variables in our model. Third column indicates how we 
create the variables based on the WRDS codes and the last column shows the paper that we followed to include related 
variables. 
Variable Name Definition Variable creation based on WRDS codes Source 
CI 
Corporate investment-Firm's capital 
expenditure in year t divided by its net 
property, plant, and equipment at the 
beginning of year t. 
CAPX/lag(PPENT) Chava and Roberts (2008) 
Trading 
The dummy variable that equals one when 
the corporate’s investment decision has been 
made after onset of firm’s CDS trading 
 Ashcraft and 
Santos (2009) 
Q 
Tobin’s Q: The sum of firm's book debt and 
market equity less total inventories in year 𝑡, 
divided by its capital stock measured by net 
property, plant, and equipment at the 
beginning of year. 
(DLTT+DLC+(CSHO*PRC
C_F))-INVT) / lag(PPENT) 
Chava and 
Roberts (2008) 
CF 
Cash flow: The sum of firm's income before 
extraordinary items and depreciation and 
amortization in year t, divided by its capital 
stock measured by net property, plant, and 
equipment at the beginning of year t. 
(IB+DPC) / lag(PPENT) Chava and Roberts (2008) 
%∆𝐺𝐷𝑃 Annual GDP growth, measured as the percentage change  
Julio and Yook 
(2012) 
Growth Sales Growth (𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒௜,௧ିଵ − 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒௜,௧ିଶ)/ 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒௜,௧ିଶ 
An et al. (2016) 
Size Log (total asset) log(AT) An et al. (2016) 
Age The range of the available accounting data in WRDS  An et al. (2016) 
Leverage Leverage: total debt scaled by total assets  (DLTT+DLC) / AT An et al. (2016) 
 
Some interesting features can be inferred from this table. For example, the data show that 
the investment rate for firms with traded CDS decreases from 25% of total assets to 17% after 
CDS trading.29 Moreover, Q, CF, and Size all rise in value after CDS trading. These factors have 
                                                          
29 There are several definitions for corporate investment in the literature. We follow Chava and Roberts (2008) and 
define CI by firm capital expenditure in year t divided by its net property, plant, and equipment at the beginning of 
year t. Following Julio and Yook (2012), we consider three alternative definitions in the robustness check, namely, 
CI-1 defined by the ratio of capital expenditures to beginning-of-year total assets, CI-2 as growth in capital 
expenditure, and CI-3 by growth in capital stock. The value for the mean of CI in Chava and Roberts (2008) is 0.08, 
but the frequency of data is quarterly. Gul, Zhao and Zhou (2011) use a definition of corporate investment identical 
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a positive effect on CI. As a result, this finding confirms that the reduction in CI is not due to the 
reduction in the two core variables (CF and Q) and it provides cursory support for our hypothesis 
that CDS trading negatively affects corporate investment. Regarding financial characteristics, the 
data reveal that after CDS trading, firms maintain a higher rate of leverage, consistent with the 
findings of Saretto and Tookes (2013). The literature (see, for example, Ahn et al., 2006; Aivazian 
et al., 2005; Lang et al., 1996) shows that leverage has a negative relationship with corporate 
investment. In contrast, the growth in sales decreases significantly after CDS trading is introduced; 
this can adversely influence corporate investment. With respect to economic conditions, economic 
growth in the post-CDS trading period is lower compared to the period prior to trading of CDS 
contracts. The prospect of lower economic growth leads to a decline in corporate investment. 
Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics, before and after CDS trading 
This table reports the descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation (SD), minimum (min.) and maximum (max.) for 
variables. The left side of the table is related to duration prior CDS trading and the right side reports the details after 
CDS trading. N is the number of observations before and after CDS trading. CI is corporate investment, Q is Tobin’s 
Q, CF is cash flow, and %∆𝐺𝐷𝑃 is the growth in gross domestic product. Size is the log of total asset and Leverage 
calculated by total debt scaled by total assets. Age is considered by the range of the available accountant data in WRDS 
and Growth is the change in firm’s sales. 
Variable Before CDS trading (N = 3,599) Post-CDS trading (N = 1,912) Mean SD Min. Max. Mean SD Min. Max. 
CI (%) 25 16 0 92 17 9 0 78 
Q 5.04 5.7 0.01 25.25 7.31 6.83 0.01 25.25 
CF 0.44 0.51 -0.11 4.71 0.58 0.67 -0.11 4.71 
%∆𝐺𝐷𝑃  0.07 0.03 0.03 0.13 0.04 0.02 -0.02 0.07 
Size 8.2 1.56 1.91 13.11 10.1 1.07 7.89 14.63 
Leverage 0.27 0.15 0.02 0.7 0.29 0.14 0.02 0.7 
Age 28.34 13.37 1 55 43.55 16.84 4 64 
Growth 0.15 2.07 -1 122.36 0.08 0.43 -0.93 11.06 
 
Moreover, we examine a firm’s investment surrounding the year that firms introduced CDS 
contracts on their debt. In our sample, 73% of CDS-issuer firms began CDS trading in either 2002 
or 2003, while the rest commenced trading in the period 2004 to 2008. Figure 3.1 illustrates the 
                                                          
to CI and based on annual data. The mean of CI in that paper is 21%, similar to the mean of CI in our paper. Moreover, 
the mean of CI-1 is 8% and is similar to the mean of corporate investment provided by Julio and Yook (2012). 
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trend with respect to changes in corporate investment five years prior and five years subsequent to 
the start of CDS trading. 
As Figure 3.1 depicts, firms experienced a fall in investment in the first year of CDS 
trading. Although the trend in corporate investment reverses two years after CDS trading, generally 
the level of corporate investment in the post-CDS trading period is considerably lower compared 
to the pre-CDS trading period. The key message emanating from Figure 3.1 is that there is support 
for our hypothesis that CDS trading negatively influences corporate investment. 
Figure 3.1: Corporate investment surrounding the year of firm’s CDS trading 
This figure demonstrates the ratio of corporate investment five years before and five years after CDS trading. The start 
year of CDS trading is based on the first quoted CDS price in Bloomberg and it represents by 0 in figure. The years -
5 to -1 refer to five years prior CDS trading and the years 1-5 denote five years after inception of CDS. 
 
3.4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
3.4.1 Main Results 
The main result of our analysis is presented in Table 3.3. We begin with the univariate analysis 
(see Column 1) and continue with multiple regression models that control for firm characteristics 
0.240 0.233
0.221 0.211
0.187
0.166 0.161
0.176 0.184
0.193
0.189
0.000
0.050
0.100
0.150
0.200
0.250
0.300
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Co
rp
or
at
e 
In
ve
stm
en
t
Year
91 
 
and economic conditions (see Columns 2–8). Our main interest is the coefficient of the CDS 
trading variables. The result from our univariate analysis in Column 1 shows that CDS trading has 
a negative effect on corporate investment. Next, we investigate whether this result holds in 
multivariate analysis. The results in Columns 2–8 indicate that this variable is strongly significant 
in all regression models and the coefficient is consistently negative. In all the analysis, we control 
for firm-fixed effects and we cluster by firm. The coefficients are statistically significant, with t-
statistics in the 3.37 to 13.05 range. The slope coefficient associated with the CDS trading variable 
is in the 0.01 and 0.09 range, suggesting that following the onset of CDS trading, corporate 
investment declines by between 1% and 9%. Since the mean of CI is 22% of a firm’s net property, 
plant, and equipment ($1,084 million), these coefficients mean that after CDS trading, corporate 
investment reaches the 20.02–21.78% range (986–1,073 million $). These results support our 
hypothesis that CDS trading negatively influences corporate investment. 
The results for the control variables are generally consistent with expectations. 
Specifically, CI is positively associated with CF, Q, Growth, Size, and %∆𝐺𝐷𝑃, but negatively 
related to Age and Leverage. Except for Growth, all included control variables are statistically 
different from zero. 
 
3.4.2 Which Borrowers Are More Affected? 
The effect of CDS trading on corporate investment can vary considerably even among CDS firms. 
To investigate which kind of borrowers are affected more, we study the impact of CDS trading on 
corporate investment based on firm characteristics. 
We begin by focusing on firm risk. The CDS market enables investors to share credit risk and 
transfer risk exposure. According to the hedging or diversification hypothesis, riskier firms are 
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likely to benefit more from development of the CDS market. To investigate the effect of CDS 
trading on corporate investment for firms with different levels of risk, we consider two proxies, 
leverage ratio and credit rating. 
For credit rating-based analysis, we focus on S&P long-term credit rating. The long-term 
S&P rating scale uses upper-case letters and pluses or minuses. The best ranking is AAA and the 
worst is D. We extract monthly data and convert the alphabetic rate to a numerical value. We 
assign the AAA ranking the value 24 and down to 1 for the lowest credit rating. Following this, 
we compute the average monthly value in each year. We then divide our sample of firms into two 
panels, representing firm groups with speculative and investment grade categories. Those firms 
with credit rating lower (higher) than BBB are considered speculative (investment) grade. 
Moreover, leverage-based panels are constructed by sorting firms based on their leverage ratio. 
We divide our sample into two equal firm-based panels, high-leveraged and low-leveraged firm 
panels. Further, we examine whether the impact of CDS trading on corporate investment varies 
with firm size. To achieve this, we construct two panels based on the sorted firm’s size (log of 
total assets). We then investigate whether the impact of CDS trading on issuer investment activities 
differs for small firms vis-a-vis large firms. 
The results are shown in Table 3.4. The results of leverage-based and credit rating-based 
analysis confirm that the impact of CDS trading on corporate investment is negative. The 
coefficients on CDS trading are statistically significant for high-leveraged and speculative-grade 
firms. The slope coefficients relating to CDS trading for low-leverage firms and investment grade 
firms indicate that following CDS trading, corporate investment of these two categories of firms 
declined by 3.5% and 3.7%, respectively. In a comparative sense, corporate investment of high 
leveraged and speculative-grade firms is unaffected by CDS trading. This finding implies that the 
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detrimental effect of CDS trading on risky firms is less severe than on safer firms. This finding is 
consistent with the diversification and hedging channels discussed in the literature (see, for 
example, Ashcraft and Santos, 2009; Saretto and Tookes, 2013). Since the CDS market provides 
an alternative avenue for investors to transfer and hedge credit risk, this suggests that risky firms 
benefit more in comparison to safer firms as a result of the development of the CDS market 
(Ashcraft and Santos, 2009). 
Likewise, the results from size-based analysis reveal that the detrimental effect of CDS 
trading on corporate investment is less for large firms compared to small firms. The coefficient on 
CDS trading from Column 1 of Table 3.4  suggests that corporate investment of small firms 
declined by 3.1%, which is 55% more in comparison to large firms (2%). This result is consistent 
with the view that small firms are financially more constrained than large firms and have less 
access to external financing (see, for example, Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006; Berger and Udell, 
1998; Cull, Davis, Lamoreaux, and Rosenthal, 2006). Moreover, the possibility of equity 
financing, size of equity issuance, and the corresponding cost of equity issuance are lower for large 
firms (see, for example, Alberts and Archer, 1973; Archer and Faerber, 1966). This finding is also 
consistent with Arping (2014) and Hirtle (2009), who argue that the benefit of CDS trading could 
be restricted to relatively large firms, since debt renegotiation is more difficult due to the 
complexity and dispersed financial structures of large firms. 
All of these results support our hypothesis that CDS trading negatively affects corporate 
investment. A feature of this finding is that the impact of CDS on firm investment is firm-
characteristic dependent. 
Additionally, we investigate the impact of CDS trading on corporate investment in the 
years after CDS started to trade. This analysis reveals the extent to which the effect of CDS trading 
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on corporate investment persisted. The results are presented in Table 3.5. Panel A reports the 
results for whole-sample and size-based analysis, and Panel B presents the results for leverage and 
credit rating–based analysis. Observe that for large firms and low-leverage firms, the effect of CDS 
trading persists up to one year after the introduction of CDS trading, while for speculative-grade 
firms for which CDS trading has no effect in the year of its contribution, there is now a positive 
effect two years after trading began. The overall message that emerges from these results is that, 
at best, the introduction of CDS trading impacts corporate investment up to one year after it is 
introduced. 
 
3.5 ROBUSTNESS CHECK 
This section undertakes robustness tests. Our first two tests consider alternative definitions for 
corporate investment and an alternative (augmented) investment model to examine whether the 
effect of CDS trading on corporate investment is sensitive to the measure of corporate investment 
and model specification. Our third test addresses endogeneity. We employ two alternative 
methodologies, the PSM and DID techniques, to investigate whether our results are robust. 
 
3.5.1 Results Based on Alternative Measures of Corporate Investment 
Following Julio and Yook (2012), we define CI-1 as the ratio of capital expenditures to beginning-
of-year total assets, CI-2 as growth in capital expenditure, and CI-3 as growth in capital stock. We 
consider these three variables as alternative dependent variables and estimate the corporate 
investment model. The definition of variables and related descriptive statistics before and after 
CDS trading are presented in  Tables 3.6 and 3.7, respectively.
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Table 3.3: Results for the effect of CDS introduction on corporate investment 
This table presents the results for the impact of CDS trading on corporate’s investment. Our model is 𝐶𝐼௜௧ =  𝛼଴ + 𝛼ଵ. 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔௜,௧ + 𝛼ଶ. 𝑄௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛼ଷ. 𝐶𝐹௜,௧ +
𝛼ସ. 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛼ହ. 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛼଺. 𝐴𝑔𝑒௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛼଻. 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛼଼. %∆𝐺𝐷𝑃௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛾௜ + 𝜀௜,௧. The CI is corporate investment and it is calculated by firm's 
capital expenditure in year 𝑡 divided by its net property, plant, and equipment at the beginning of year 𝑡. The control variables are Tobin’s Q ratio (Q), cash flow 
(CF), change in GDP growth (%∆𝐺𝐷𝑃), firm size (Size) and age (Age), sales growth (Growth) and Leverage. Our interest is Trading variable, which is the dummy 
variable that takes 1 when firms have traded CDS. We adopt panel regression and use the cluster robust standard error and fixed effect estimator to estimate the 
model. In Columns 1-8 we estimate the model step by step. In the last row, we report number of observation (N) and 𝑅ଶ  for each regression model. *, ** and *** 
denote that the results are significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Intercept 0.249*** 0.209*** 0.189*** 0.106*** 0.468*** 0.472*** 0.473*** 0.526*** 
 (100.50) (36.26) (29.24) (11.89) (13.08) (13.17) (13.14) (13.78) 
Trading -0.076*** -0.088*** -0.091*** -0.056*** -0.010* -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.026*** 
 (-10.67) (-12.59) (-13.05) (-8.89) (-1.70) (-3.38) (-3.37) (-3.72) 
Q  0.008*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
  (6.98) (3.06) (4.23) (5.89) (5.87) (5.87) (4.67) 
CF   0.087*** 0.082*** 0.070*** 0.069*** 0.068*** 0.062*** 
   (6.74) (6.55) (5.51) (5.25) (5.24) (4.67) 
%∆𝐺𝐷𝑃    1.08*** 0.362*** 0.526*** 0.526*** 0.488** 
    (11.78) (4.13) (7.34) (7.33) (6.98) 
Size     -0.038*** -0.045*** -0.045*** -0.047*** 
     (-9.62) (-8.19) (-8.18) (-8.61) 
Growth      0.0003 0.0003 0.0006 
      (0.24) (0.25) (0.46) 
Age       0.002*** 0.002*** 
       (2.76) (3.37) 
Leverage        -0.153*** 
        (-5.35) 
Firm effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 5,511 5,511 5,511 5,511 5,511 5,511 5,511 5,511 
Overall-𝑅ଶ  0.06 0.19 0.25 0.27 0.32 0.32 0.29 0.30 
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The descriptive statistics show that the rate of corporate investment based on these three 
variables decreases after CDS begins trading. This trend is consistent with our original measure of 
corporate investment (CI) in Table 3.2.The results for the effect of CDS trading on corporate 
investment are summarized in Table 3.8. Consistent with the findings in Section 3.4, CDS trading 
has a statistically significant negative effect on corporate investment. Testing different 
definitions/measures of corporate investment, we note that the magnitude of the effect of CDS 
trading differs, which is expected given different measures. 
Table 3.4: Effect of CDS trading on corporate investment by firm characteristics 
This table reports the results of additional analysis to find which kind of borrowers are more affected by CDS trading. 
We categorize the data sample based on the firm’s size (log of total asset), leverage ratio (total debt scaled by total 
assets) and credit rating. Our model is 𝐶𝐼௜௧ =  𝛼଴ + 𝛼ଵ. 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔௜,௧ + 𝛼ଶ. 𝑄௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛼ଷ. 𝐶𝐹௜,௧ + 𝛼ସ. 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ௜,௧ିଵ +
𝛼ହ. 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛼଺. 𝐴𝑔𝑒௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛼଻. 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛼଼. %∆𝐺𝐷𝑃௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛾௜ + 𝜀௜,௧. The CI is corporate investment and it 
is calculated by firm's capital expenditure in year t divided by its net property, plant, and equipment at the beginning 
of year 𝑡. The control variables are Tobin’s Q ratio (Q), cash flow (CF), change in GDP growth (%∆𝐺𝐷𝑃), firm size 
(Size) and age (Age), sales growth (Growth) and Leverage. Our interest is Trading variable, which is the dummy 
variable that takes 1 when firms have traded CDS. Column 1-2 present the results for leverage-based analysis. The 
next two columns related to the credit rating-base analysis and the results for size-based analysis are presented in last 
two columns. Last two rows report the number of observation (N) and overall-𝑅ଶ. *, **, *** denote the results are 
statistically significance at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
 Leverage-based analysis 
Credit rating-based 
 analysis 
Size-based 
 analysis 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
  Low leverage High leverage 
Investment 
grade 
Speculative 
grade Small Big 
Trading -0.035*** -0.013 -0.037*** -0.015 -0.031** -0.020** 
 (-3.40) (-1.54) (-3.59) (-1.52) (-2.15) (-2.51) 
Q 0.006*** 0.009*** 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.005*** 
 (6.15) (4.01) (3.69) (5.48) (5.76) (4.34) 
CF 0.068*** 0.059*** 0.071** 0.061*** 0.097*** 0.037*** 
 (3.92) (3.74) (2.19) (4.22) (6.75) (2.84) 
%∆𝐺𝐷𝑃 0.297*** 0.667*** 0.436*** 0.494*** 0.659*** 0.423** 
 (2.87) (7.79) (4.35) (5.21) (5.19) (5.67) 
Size -0.053*** -0.038*** -0.052*** -0.045*** -0.048*** -0.040*** 
 (-6.74) (-6.48) (-6.38) (-6.58) (-5.82) (-3.01) 
Growth -0.0001 -0.012* -0.047** 0.0002 -0.0009 0.012 
 (-0.19) (1.74) (2.60) (0.18) (-0.78) (1.60) 
Age 0.002* 0.002* 0.003*** 0.002** 0.003** 0.0009 
 (1.96) (2.65) (3.19) (2.11) (2.57) (0.94) 
Leverage -0.154*** -0.149*** -0.155*** -0.149*** -0.192*** -0.094* 
 (-3.74) (-3.97) (-3.76) (-3.97) (-6.50) (-1.68) 
Intercept 0.591*** 0.436*** 0.545*** 0.436*** 0.482*** 0.521*** 
 (11.33) (11.51) (9.54) (11.51) (9.53) (5.02) 
Firm effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 2,755 2,756 2,234 3,277 2,755 2,756 
Overall-𝑅ଶ  0.30 0.27 0.29 0.30 0.30 0.20 
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Table 3.5: Impact of CDS introduction on subsequent years after CDS introduction 
This table reports the results related to the impact of CDS trading on corporate investment in subsequent years after CDS introduction to find when the impact of 
CDS introduction on corporate investment is disappeared. Our model is 𝐶𝐼௜௧ =  𝛼଴ + 𝛼ଵ. 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔௜,௧ + 𝛼ଶ. 𝑄௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛼ଷ. 𝐶𝐹௜,௧ + 𝛼ସ. 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ௜,௧ିଵ +
𝛼ହ. 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛼଺. 𝐴𝑔𝑒௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛼଻. 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛼଼. %∆𝐺𝐷𝑃௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛾௜ + 𝜀௜,௧. The CI is corporate investment and it is calculated by firm's capital expenditure in 
year t divided by its net property, plant, and equipment at the beginning of year t. The control variables are Tobin’s Q ratio (Q), cash flow (CF), change in GDP 
growth (%∆𝐺𝐷𝑃), firm size (Size) and age (Age), sales growth (Growth) and Leverage. Panel A reports the results related to whole sample and size-based analysis 
(small/big)) and Panel B presents the results for leverage-based (high-leverage, / low-leverage) and credit rating-based analysis (investment grade/speculative 
grade) for two years after CDS started to trade. Our interest is Trading variable, which is the dummy variable that takes 1 when firms have traded CDS. We adopt 
panel regression and use the cluster robust standard error and fixed effect estimator to estimate the model. Last two rows report the number of observation (N) and 
overall-𝑅ଶ. *, **, *** denote the results are statistically significance at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
Panel A: Whole sample and size-based analysis 
 Whole Sample Size-based analysis Small Big 
  CI (i, t+1) CI (i, t+2) CI (i, t+1) CI (i, t+2) CI (i, t+1) CI (i, t+2) 
Trading -0.008 0.003 -0.003 0.007 -0.007* 0.004 
 (-1.26) (0.56) (-0.30) (0.69) (-1.67) (1.00) 
Q 0.004*** 0.002 0.004*** 0.000 0.002*** 0.001*** 
 (3.73) (1.57) (5.54) (0.52) (5.08) (2.90) 
CF 0.066*** 0.057*** 0.089*** 0.082*** 0.052*** 0.038*** 
 (5.34) (4.00) (12.26) (10.94) (11.49) (8.20) 
%∆𝐺𝐷𝑃 0.121* -0.144* 0.053 -0.226** 0.231*** -0.047 (1.73) (-1.85) (0.52) (-2.18) (3.25) (-0.67) 
Size -0.046*** -0.048*** -0.044*** -0.048*** -0.029*** -0.031*** 
 (-10.00) (-10.87) (-12.80) (-13.31) (-9.49) (-10.37) 
Growth 0.002*** 0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.005 0.000 
 (2.77)) (1.22) (0.68) (-0.21) (1.35) (0.14) 
Age 0.001** 0.0007* 0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.0000 
 (2.41) (1.84) (1.34) (1.47) (-0.11) (-1.19) 
Leverage -0.098*** -0.029 -0.117*** -0.021 -0.095*** -0.065*** 
 (-3.49) (-1.05) (-5.75) (-0.98) (-5.56) (-3.84) 
Intercept 0.564*** 0.599*** 0.558*** 0.597*** 0.450*** 0.495*** 
 (14.96) (16.45) (20.68) (21.40) (16.08) (17.78) 
Firm effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 5,353 5,195 2,753 2,717 2,618 2,478 
Overall-𝑅ଶ  0.28 0.24 0.29 0.25 0.20 0.11 
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Table 3.5 Continued 
Panel B: Credit risk-based analysis 
                                                
Leverage-based analysis                      Credit rating-based analysis 
 High leverage Low leverage Investment grade Speculative grade 
 CI (i, t+1) CI (i, t+2) CI (i, t+1) CI (i, t+2) CI (i, t+1) CI (i, t+2) CI (i, t+1) CI (i, t+2) 
Trading -0.012** -0.003 0.000 0.008 -0.005 0.002 -0.001 0.012** 
 (-1.86) (-0.56) (0.06) (1.40) (-0.89) (0.30) (-0.16) (1.96) 
Q 0.004*** 0.000 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 
 (7.24) (0.39) (2.92) (2.84) (5.86) (3.89) (7.17) (4.5) 
CF 0.053*** 0.062*** 0.076*** 0.051*** 0.056*** 0.042*** 0.064*** 0.052*** 
 (7.94) (9.11) (13.18) (8.38) (5.93) (4.47) (12.72) (9.92) 
%∆𝐺𝐷𝑃 0.054 -0.109 0.284*** -0.071 0.149* -0.058 0.080 -0.252*** 
 (0.57) (-1.16) (3.27) (-0.78) (1.72) (-0.69) (0.88) (-2.76) 
Size -0.053*** -0.05*** -0.034*** -0.038*** -0.051*** -0.05*** -0.042*** -0.046*** 
 (-19.12) (-18.21) (-13.47) (-14.64) (-16.48) (-16.45) (-15.95) (-17.11) 
Growth 0.002** 0.000 0.008** 0.013*** 0.009 0.003 0.002** 0.001** 
 (2.34) (0.35) (2.01) (3.19) (1.11) (0.36) (2.46) (0.81) 
Age 0.001* 0.000 0.001*** 0.001* 0.001* 0.001 0.001* 0.000 
 (1.68) (0.90) (3.00) (1.80) (1.67) (1.41) (1.67) (0.55) 
Leverage -0.077*** -0.012 -0.017 0.037* -0.123*** -0.075*** -0.079*** -0.006 
 (-3.23) (-0.42) (-0.93) (1.93) (-6.10) (-3.75) (-4.27) (-0.32) 
Intercept 0.659*** 0.642*** 0.410*** 0.476*** 0.621*** 0.625*** 0.544*** 0.599*** 
 (27.49) (26.98) (17.70) (19.77) (23.77) (24.38) (22.12) (23.97) 
Firm effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 2,680 2,588 2,673 2,607 1,922 1,863 2,812 2,713 
Overall-𝑅ଶ  0.28 0.25 0.24 0.22 0.27 0.23 0.29 0.24 
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3.5.2 Results Based on Alternative Estimation Model 
To test whether the effect of CDS trading varies with firm risk, following Ashcraft and Santos 
(2009), we provide additional analysis by expanding our baseline model using interaction of the 
CDS trading variable with proxies for firm characteristics, namely, credit rating, leverage, and 
size. The results are presented in Table 3.9. This table shows that the interaction of CDS trading 
with the two proxies for firm risk is positive. This means that firms with higher leverage ratio and 
low credit rating when exposed to CDS trading have higher levels of investment. These statistical 
relations are economically meaningful as well. The coefficient on size in Column 3 suggests that 
a one-standard-deviation (1.63) decrease in Size is associated with a 9.6% reduction in CI. That is, 
as size increases, CDS trading improves corporate investment. The role of CDS trading itself 
remains negative and strongly significant (t-statistics = 3.62 at least) in both models. Moreover, 
the size-based results confirm that the detrimental effect of CDS introduction on corporate 
investment is less for larger firms, in conformity with our result in Table 3.4. 
Table 3.6: Alternative variables for corporate investment 
This table provides information about the alternative variables that we used as corporate investment. The first two 
rows show the definition and the way we construct the variables based on the WRDS codes. The descriptive statistics 
for these variables before CDS introduction and after that are presented in the last two rows. 
Variable Name CI-1 CI-2 CI-3 
Definition 
Investment rate measured 
by the ratio of capital 
expenditures to beginning-
of year total assets 
Growth in capital 
expenditures Growth in capital stock 
Variable creation 
based on WRDS 
codes 
CAPX/ lag(AT) CAPX-lag(CAPX) / lag(CAPX) 
PPENT-lag(PPENT)/ 
lag(PPENT) 
Before CDS trading  8.95% 15.91% 12.31% 
After CDS trading  5.11% 7.99% 4.29% 
 
Table 3.7: Descriptive statistics for alternative corporate investment variables 
This table provides descriptive statistics number of observation (N), mean, standard deviation (SD), minimum (Min.) 
and maximum (Max.) for alternative measures of corporate investment.  
Variable N Mean SD Min. Max. 
CI1  5,511 8% 5% 1% 21% 
CI2  5,509 13% 33% -39% 95% 
CI3  5,511 9% 14% -10% 48% 
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Moreover, a one standard deviation deterioration (a firm becomes risky) in Credit Rating 
(4.43) and Leverage (0.15) is related to a 1.3% and 1.2% decline in CI, respectively. This implies 
that given the benefits from the information and hedging channels, the detrimental effect of CDS 
trading on corporate investment is less remarkable for more risky firms. It seems that the hedging 
opportunities that the CDS market creates for banks and investors to diversify their credit exposure 
and its information role as a source of new information on firms benefit risky firms. 
Table 3.8: Effect of CDS trading on alternative measures of corporate investment 
This table provides results for the effect of CDS Introduction on corporate investment based on the two alternative 
definitions for corporate investment. The CI-1 is the ratio of capital expenditures to beginning-of year total assets CI-
2 is the growth in capital expenditure and CI-3 is defined by the growth in capital Stock. Our model is 𝐶𝐼௜௧ =  𝛼଴ +
𝛼ଵ. 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔௜,௧ + 𝛼ଶ. 𝑄௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛼ଷ. 𝐶𝐹௜,௧ + 𝛼ସ. 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛼ହ. 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛼଺. 𝐴𝑔𝑒௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛼଻. 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒௜,௧ିଵ +
𝛼଼. %∆𝐺𝐷𝑃௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛾௜ + 𝜀௜,௧. The control variables are Tobin’s Q ratio (Q), cash flow (CF), change in GDP growth 
(%∆𝐺𝐷𝑃), firm size (Size) and age (Age), sales growth (Growth) and Leverage. Our interest is the Trading variable, 
which is the dummy variable that takes 1 when firms have traded CDS. We adopt panel regression and use the cluster 
robust standard error and fixed effect estimator to estimate the model. Last two rows report the number of observation 
(N) and overall-𝑅ଶ. *, **, *** denote the results are statistically significance at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
  CI-1 CI-2 CI-3 
Trading -0.007** -0.028* -0.050*** 
 (-1.98) (-1.82) (3.31) 
Q 0.001** 0.009*** 0.005*** 
 (2.29) (3.51) (3.31) 
CF -0.002*** 0.167*** 0.098*** 
 (-1.02) (-8.62) (4.5) 
%∆𝐺𝐷𝑃 0.139** 1.462*** 0.236 
 (4.60) (4.96) (1.63) 
Size -0.016*** -0.120*** -0.076*** 
 (-6.28) (-8.62) (-9.06) 
Growth 0.0004 0.001 0.001 
 (0.80) (0.70) (0.47) 
Age -0.0002 0.008*** 0.003*** 
 (-0.67) (4.95) (3.92) 
Leverage 0.098*** 0.332*** -0.251*** 
 (-8.99) (-4.38) (-6.34) 
Intercept 0.244*** 0.821*** 0.657*** 
 (15.53) (8.37) (10.94) 
Firm effect Yes Yes Yes 
N 5511 5511 5511 
Overall-𝑅ଶ  0.14 0.04 0.10 
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Table 3.9: Effect of CDS trading on corporate investment by firm characteristics 
(robustness check) 
In this table, we provide additional analysis for check the robustness of results to know which borrowers are more 
affected by CDS trading. Following by Ashcraft and Santos (2009) we expand our baseline model with interaction 
variables. Our baseline model is 𝐶𝐼௜௧ =  𝛼଴ + 𝛼ଵ. 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔௜,௧ + 𝛼ଶ. 𝑄௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛼ଷ. 𝐶𝐹௜,௧ + 𝛼ସ. 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ௜,௧ିଵ +
𝛼ହ. 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛼଺. 𝐴𝑔𝑒௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛼଻. 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛼଼. %∆𝐺𝐷𝑃௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛾௜ + 𝜀௜,௧ . In Columns 1 and 2 we consider 
leverage ratio and credit ratings as the proxies for firm’s credit risk and in the last column the firm’s size is investigated. 
The CI is corporate investment and it is calculated by firm's capital expenditure in year 𝑡 divided by its net property, 
plant, and equipment at the beginning of year 𝑡. The control variables are Tobin’s Q ratio (Q), cash flow (CF), change 
in GDP growth (%∆𝐺𝐷𝑃), firm size (Size) and age (Age), sales growth (Growth) and Leverage. Our interest is Trading 
variable, which is the dummy variable that takes 1 when firms have traded CDS. We adopt panel regression and use 
the cluster robust standard error and fixed effect estimator to estimate the model. Last two rows report the number of 
observation (N) and overall-𝑅ଶ. *, **, *** denote the results are statistically significance at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
  1 2 3 
Trading -0.049*** -0.052*** -0.008 
 (-3.80) (-3.62) (-1.14) 
Trading* Leverage 0.083**   
 (2.15)   
 Trading* Credit Rating  0.003***  
  (2.65)  
 Trading* size   0.590*** 
   (5.30) 
Q 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 
 (6.26) (5.86) (6.46) 
CF 0.063*** 0.063*** 0.052*** (3.73) 
 (4.76) (4.19) 0.506*** 
%∆𝐺𝐷𝑃 0.483*** 0.402*** (7.49) 
 (6.88) (5.89) -0.124*** 
Size -0.046*** -0.047*** (7.49) 
 (-8.31) (-7.75) -0.123 
Growth 0.0005 0.0002 (-8.47) 
 (0.43) (0.25) 0.0005 
Age 0.002*** 0.001* (0.48) 
 (3.11) (1.72) 0.002*** 
Leverage -0.171*** -0.142*** (4.11) 
 (-5.68) (-4.81) -0.132*** (-4.03) 
Intercept 0.524*** 0.552*** -0.095 
 (13.71) (12.66) (-0.75) 
Firm effect Yes Yes Yes 
N 5511 5511 5511 
Overall-𝑅ଶ  0.30 0.31 0.28 
 
3.5.3 Results Based on PSM  
We address the potential endogeneity and selection bias problem in establishing the causal effect 
of CDS trading on corporate investment. The main methodology that we adopt in previous sections 
is panel data regression analysis, which is consistent with the bulk of the literature. There is a 
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possibility that an unobserved factor affects the CDS trading and corporate investment relation. In 
other words, the observed effect on corporate investment might not be a result of CDS trading. To 
account for this potential issue, we use two alternative methods, the PSM and DID techniques. The 
PSM technique is a probable solution to addressing the selection problem. The idea is to find a 
group of non-participants among a large population that have attributes similar to the participants. 
We follow the guidelines of Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) to implement this methodology. We 
consider the population average treatment effect on the treated sample (ATT) as one of the most 
prominent and frequently estimated parameters in this technique. ATT is the difference between 
expected outcomes with and without treatment after participation in a treatment. The first step is 
to select the model. Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) state that in a binary treatment, logit and probit 
models usually provide similar results. Following Ashcraft and Santos (2009), Saretto and Tookes 
(2013) and Subrahmanyam et al. (2014), we consider a set of observable covariates and a probit 
model to identify the matched sample. The dependent variable in a probit model is equal to 1 if the 
firm starts trading and zero otherwise, and the explanatory variables are firm-specific variables 
like equity analyst coverage, log stock market volatility, dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has 
a credit rating, log sales, debt-to-assets, book-to-market, and log equity market trading volume. 
The coefficients from this model are used to create the untraded firm sample. 
We focus on the firms included in the S&P 500 Index and choose a matched sample of 
S&P 500 non-CDS firms for each CDS firm in our initial sample. For the sample of CDS issuers, 
pre- and post-CDS trading is based on the actual date in Bloomberg. For non-issuer firms, we 
consider 2003 as the starting year derived from the uniform random distribution following the 
work of Das, Kalimipalli and Nayak (2014). Our control group has 3,238 firm–year observations. 
Of those, 1,565 observations are considered as the baseline (before CDS introduction) model and 
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1,673 as the follow-up (after CDS introduction) sample. In this data sample, firms with traded 
CDS are older, bigger, and highly leveraged. In contrast, the CI, CF, Q, and Growth for these types 
of firm are smaller as opposed to the firms that do not issue CDS. 
Table 3.10 reports the average treatment effect of CDS trading on corporate investment by 
comparing firms with traded CDS to matched non-CDS firms. Consistent with our main results, 
the coefficient of treatment variable (Trading) on corporate investment is negative and the 
magnitude is close to the average of the reported coefficient for Trading variable reported in Table 
3.3. 
Table 3.10: Average treatment effect of CDS trading on corporate investment based on the 
PSM 
This table reports the result for the effect of CDS trading (treatment effect) on corporate investment (outcome variable) 
based on the PSM technique. We matched the non-issuer firms included in S&P 500 to S&P 500 CDS issuers with 
probit estimation model and by considering some firm’s characteristics with replacement in sampling. The forth 
column shows the coefficient of Trading on CI. The next two columns present the standard error and t-statistics. *** 
denotes our result is significant at 1%.  
Method of ATT estimation 
Number 
of treated 
group 
Number 
of control 
group 
Coefficient. Standard Error T 
Stratification method 3208 4874 -0.033*** 0.003 -10.501 
Radius matching method 1521 2070 -0.040*** 0.005 -8.165 
 
3.5.4 Results Based on the DID Estimation 
In this analysis, we use the DID estimation approach, which is beneficial since it focuses on how 
corporate investment changes following CDS introduction by comparing firms with traded CDS 
to firms that are ex-ante similar but with no CDS contracts. In this approach, CDS introduction is 
the treatment, and it captures the change in corporate investment. Matched non-CDS firms are 
selected based on propensity scores obtained by estimating a probit model, as described above. 
The results from the DID analysis are presented in Table 3.11 . In baseline duration (before 
CDS introduction) corporate investment of CDS firms is higher than non-CDS firms and this 
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difference is statistically significant. In contrast, in the follow-up duration (after CDS introduction) 
corporate investment of firms with traded CDS is less than the investment for non-CDS firms and 
is statistically significant at 1%. The results show that there is not a notable difference in 
investment ratio before and after CDS introduction for non-CDS firms as our control group based 
on the selected arbitrary treatment date (0.220 vs. 0.219). In contrast, we observe a considerable 
reduction in investment ratio for CDS-issuer firms after CDS introduction (0.247 vs. 0.175). The 
DID analysis shows that CDS introduction reduces corporate investment by approximately 7% (t-
statistics = 12.10). 
Table 3.11: The effect of CDS trading on corporate investment based on the DID 
estimation 
This table reports the result of DID analysis. The treated group consists of S&P firms with traded CDS. The matched 
non-CDS firms are selected based on propensity scores obtained by estimating a probit model to build the control 
group. After that we implement Kernel propensity score DID analysis. The baseline duration indicates the years before 
CDS started to trade and follow up period is related to years after CDS introduction. The outcome variable is corporate 
investment (CI). *** shows the results are significant at 1%. 
Outcome variable  CI Standard Error. t P > |t| 
Baseline     
Control 0.220    
Treated 0.247    
Diff (T-C) 0.027 0.003 7.68 0.000*** 
Follow-up     
Control 0.219    
Treated 0.175    
Diff (T-C) -0.044 0.005 -9.38 0.000*** 
Diff-in-Diff -0.071 0.006 -12.10 0.000*** 
N of Control group 3,238 
N of Treated group 5,511 
 
In summary, from all additional tests, it is clear that our main results are robust with respect 
to measures of corporate investment, model specification, and approach. Therefore, we confirm 
that introduction of CDS trading has a negative effect on corporate investment for firms with traded 
CDS contracts. 
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3.6 CONCLUSION 
This essay assesses whether the inception of CDS trading affects corporate investment decisions. 
The sources of corporate investment are mainly self-generated funds and resources raised through 
external sources, such as debt and equity. This study is motivated by the detrimental effects of 
CDS trading on corporate bonds, equity prices, and liquidity management documented in the 
literature. To address the impact of CDS trading on corporate investment, we adopt a panel 
regression framework with robust standard error clustered by firm as our main methodology. We 
document a tendency for firms to reduce investment after firms have traded CDS. This finding is 
consistent with the empty creditor hypothesis and its consequences on the creditors becoming 
tougher. 
Further, we focus on several firm characteristics, such as size and risk, and investigate 
which categories of firm are more affected by CDS introduction. We consider two proxies for firm 
risk, credit rating and leverage ratio, and find that the detrimental effect of CDS trading is less for 
firms with higher leverage ratio and lower credit rating. This finding is consistent with the hedging 
opportunity and information hypothesis. Moreover, the size-based analysis shows that the 
detrimental effect is higher for small firms, which most likely have more constraints to external 
funds and face higher costs. 
We explore alternative definitions for corporate investment and variations in specifications 
such as DID and PSM estimation to control for endogeneity, as robustness tests. The results of 
these additional analyses show that the main findings on decline in corporate investment after CDS 
trading still stand. 
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4 REACTION OF THE CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS 
MARKET TO THE RELEASE OF PERIODIC 
FINANCIAL REPORTS 
 
 
4.1  INTRODUCTION 
Numerous studies investigate the behaviour of the CDS market, one of the most prominent of 
financial markets. We examine the reaction of the CDS market following release of periodic 
financial reports. 
Three features of the literature motivate this study. First, a strand of CDS literature focusses 
on the importance of accounting variables in CDS pricing. For example, Dasa et al. (2009) find 
that accounting-based variables explain more than 60% of CDS variation. Moreover, Batta (2011) 
and Correia et al. (2012) provide evidence for the role of accounting information in CDS market. 
Furthermore, Greatrex (2009) and Zhang and Zhang (2013) examine the response of CDS market 
after release of earnings announcement and earnings surprise, respectively, and show that CDS 
market reacts to this public information. The key message emanating from these studies is that 
financial disclosure is value-relevant for the CDS market. 
The second feature is related to the content of financial reports. Financial disclosure plays 
an influential role in reducing information asymmetry and agency problems (Healy and Palepu 
(2001). Moreover, studies (see, for example, Dainelli et al., 2013; Morris, 1987; Watson et al., 
2002) show that consistent with the signalling and agency theories, managers have incentives to 
disclose information voluntarily to benefit their firms. Regulated quarterly and annual financial 
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reports have some specific sections, such as “Risk Factors”, “Defaults upon Senior Securities”, 
“Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations 
(MD&A),” and “Quantitative and Qualitative Disclosures about Market Risk” that contain details 
and comprehensive information on the firm which is valuable for credit market participants to 
evaluate counterparty and default risk of the firm. With regards to a broad literature in finance that 
focus on textual analysis, showing that positive and negative words in financial reports, newspaper 
articles and investor message boards can affect financial markets (see, for example, Loughran and 
McDonald, 2011; Tetlock et al., 2008), we expect, beside accounting-based information in 
periodic financial reports, the contents of the above-mentioned sections tocontain valuable 
information for CDS market participants. 
Third, according to the option pricing theory of Merton (1974), we know that equity and 
credit markets are theoretically associated. Several studies have also empirically investigated the 
relation between these two markets (see, for example, Forte and Lovreta, 2009; Longstaff et al., 
2005; Narayan et al., 2014; Norden and Weber, 2004). Moreover, there is numerous studies that 
examine the reaction of the equity market from the release of financial reports (see, for example, 
Asthana and Balsam, 2002; Balsam et al., 2002; Griffin, 2003; Asthana et al., 2004; Li and 
Ramesh, 2009) and confirm that periodic financial reports contain information for the equity 
market. Taking into account the close relation between stock and CDS markets based on the option 
pricing theory and the importance of financial reports for equity market, we expect that the CDS 
market will respond to the release of periodic financial reports as well. Thus, our main research 
question is to investigate whether periodic financial reports are value-relevant for the CDS market. 
We follow the following approaches to address our research question. We adopt a panel 
data regression model and include two indicator variables to determine the effect of periodic 
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financial reports on the CDS market. With a panel data setup, our analysis is based on a unique 
data set covering the period 2004–2015. More specifically, we construct 28 panels sorted by sector, 
size, leverage level, credit rating, and economic situation (pre-GFC, during the GFC, and post-
GFC) to examine whether the CDS spreads of 196 US firms change after release of quarterly and 
annual financial reports. We evaluate the behaviour of the CDS market from 1 day up to 10 days 
after release of reports. 
We generate four main findings. First, we show that periodic financial reports contain 
valuable information for the CDS market. More specifically, the results show that the indicator 
variables, which signify the effect of periodic reports on the CDS market, are statistically 
significant. Second, we find that the reaction of the CDS market to release of reports is delayed, 
because our indicator variables are not significant on filing dates and the day after filing. Third, 
we demonstrate that the behaviour of the CDS market to the release of financial reports differs 
across sectors, size groups, and portfolios constructed based on leverage levels, credit ratings, and 
economic conditions. Fourth, our results reveal that there is a distinction in the response of the 
CDS market between the releases of annual versus quarterly financial reports. This finding points 
to the possibility of “window dressing” in the preparation of annual financial reports to impress 
debt holders or lenders.30 
Our findings contribute to several strands of literature. First, we enhance the branch of CDS 
literature that shows that accounting information contributes to CDS pricing (see, for example, 
Batta, 2011; Das et al., 2009; Demirovic and Thomas, 2007; Demirovic et al., 2015). Our results 
confirm that financial reports contain valuable information for CDS market participants because 
                                                          
30 Window dressing denotes actions taken or not taken preceding the release of financial statements with the purpose 
of improving the appearance of reports, such as to postpone cash payments after issuing reports to make the book 
amount of cash temporarily positive. 
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we document that CDS market reacts to release of periodic financial reports. Second, this study 
moves forward the CDS literature (see, for example, Callen, Livnat, and Segal, 2009; Finnerty, 
Miller, and  Chen, 2013;  Hull et al., 2004; Jenkins, Kimbrough, and Wang, 2016; Norden and 
Weber, 2004) that investigates the behaviour of CDS market after release of public information. 
We confirm that credit rating and earnings announcement both influence CDS spread. Our results 
demonstrate that release of periodic financial reports affects CDS market even after controlling for 
earnings announcement and credit rating announcement.  
Third, our results add to the studies that examine the efficiency of CDS market. While there 
is no consensus in the literature with regard to the efficiency of CDS market, our findings provide 
support for inefficiency of this market because we find that the reaction of CDS market to release 
of periodic financial reports persists on subsequent days after reports are publicized. Fourth, the 
results demonstrate that the limited attention phenomenon exists in CDS market since we find a 
delayed response from this market after release of periodic financial reports. Finally, our study 
contributes to the strand of accounting literature that examines the consequence of financial 
disclosure on cost of equity, bond rating and cost of debt (see, for example, Bonsall and Miller, 
2017; Botosan, 2000; Healy and Palepu, 2001; Sengupta, 1998). We contribute by showing that 
corporate disclosure affect CDS markets as well. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 reviews existing studies and develops our 
hypotheses. In Section 4.3 we discuss data, variables, and methodology. Section 4.4 sets forth the 
results, while the robustness of the results is presented in Section 4.5. We discuss our findings in 
Section 4.6. Finally, in Section 4.7, we set forth concluding remarks. 
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4.2  LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
4.2.1 Literature Related to the Role of Accounting Information in Credit Markets 
Studies on the role of financial disclosure in credit markets can be divided into two groups. One 
group attempts to incorporate accounting information for pricing the CDS. The starting point of 
these studies is marked by numerous empirical models that utilize financial ratios to predict 
financial distress (see, for example, Altman, 1968; Beaver, 1966; Ohlson, 1980). Demirovic and 
Thomas (2007) investigate the relevance of accounting information for credit markets by 
considering credit rating as a proxy for credit risk. 
More importantly, Das et al. (2009) are among the first to study the relevance of accounting 
information in the CDS market. These authors follow the Moody’s private debt manual and 
construct 10 variables representing liquidity, sales growth, capital structure, size, trading activity, 
and profitability. Their results show that accounting-based models are comparable with market-
based models and have a complementary role in CDS pricing. Batta (2011) provides more detail 
on the role of accounting information in CDS pricing. This author documents a decline in 
explanatory power of accounting information in explaining CDS variation when additional 
information, such as bond price, credit rating, and stock return, is included in the regression model. 
Accordingly, Batta claims that the role of this information in CDS pricing through related markets, 
such as stock and bond markets, is more significant than the direct role. Moreover, Correia et al. 
(2012) utilize market variables and accounting information, such as total assets, net income, and 
total liabilities, to construct variables to forecast corporate default. Using CDS and bond spreads 
as alternative variables for default risk, these authors provide evidence on the usefulness of 
accounting information in explaining credit spread. 
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More recently, Demirovic et al. (2015) assess the usefulness of accounting information for 
bond spreads. Adopting a panel data regression with fixed (firm/time) effect, these authors show 
that adding accounting variables improves the explanatory power of the market-based model. They 
confirm that a Merton-based measure of distance to default does not incorporate all credit-relevant 
information and that accounting data holds incremental information in conjunction with that 
information. 
The second category of literature focuses on disclosure of separated accounting 
information. The aim of these studies is to investigate the reaction of the CDS market centered on 
the event day, and to test the informational efficiency of this market. For example, Greatrex (2009) 
and Callen et al. (2009) analyse the reaction of the CDS market to earnings announcements. 
Greatrex (2009) adopts event study methodology based on data from 2001 to 2006 and finds that 
the impact of earnings announcement on the CDS market is statistically and economically 
significant. This author claims that the market is inefficient based on this finding. Likewise, Callen 
et al. (2009) observe a negative relation between CDS spread and earnings for reference entities 
with low credit rating and short tenor over the period 2002–2005. These authors also provide 
evidence showing inefficiency in the market. 
 Shivakumar, Urcan, Vasvari, and Zhang (2011) evaluate change in CDS price in response 
to release of management earnings forecasts and find that the market reacts significantly to forecast 
news even more strongly than actual earnings. These authors also document that this reaction is 
more severe during GFC. 
Further, Zhang and Zhang (2013) examine the response of the CDS market in the US 
through an event study around earnings news during the period 2001–2005. These authors show 
an increase in CDS spread for negative announcements one month prior to the events and reveal 
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that this reaction is stronger for speculative-grade firms. In contrast to previous studies, they show 
market efficiency. 
All the papers mentioned above in this section provide evidence toward the value relevancy 
and incremental role of financial disclosure for the CDS market. The main research gap is that the 
reaction of the CDS market after release of periodic financial reports is unknown. 
 
4.2.2  Hypothesis Development 
According to the studies mentioned in the preceding subsection, we know that accounting 
information is value-relevant for the CDS market and contains incremental information for this 
market. Moreover, financial reports play a critical role in risk assessment of reference entities or 
counterparties and are useful for both sides of CDS contracts. CDS sellers may employ this 
information to determine whether counterparties are financially stable. On the other hand, CDS 
buyers can utilize financial reports to assess the default risk of reference entities and CDS sellers 
simultaneously, known as double risk. Moreover, we know that, in addition to the financial data 
detailed in periodic financial reports, specific sections of periodic financial reports, namely, “Risk 
Factors,” “MD&A” and “Quantitative and Qualitative Disclosures about Market Risk,” may hold 
credit-relevant information for the CDS market. All of these sections provide evidence about the 
value relevance of periodic financial reports for the CDS market. In this way, we construct our 
first hypothesis. We cannot predict the sign of the reactions because the sign is related to the 
content of the reports, and our main concern is to distinguish whether the CDS market reacts to 
the release of periodic financial reports. 
Hypothesis 4.1: The CDS market reacts to release of quarterly and annual reports. 
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Annual and quarterly financial reports have some differences. Annual reports are more 
comprehensive in comparison to quarterly reports and are more detailed. Knutson (1992) states 
that annual reports are recognized as one of the most essential reports for analysts. Moreover, in 
contrast to quarterly reports, annual reports are audited documents. Consequently, quarterly reports 
may be perceived as less reliable than annual reports, and investors pay more attention to the 
release of annual reports to update their beliefs. On the other hand, annual reports are summaries 
of previous quarterly information, and may be considered less interesting to investors who have 
already analysed previous quarterly information. Therefore, the CDS market may react differently 
to the release of 10-Qs and 10-Ks. Hence, our second hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 4.2: The CDS market reacts differently to the release of quarterly 
versus annual financial reports. 
Several theoretical studies (see, for example, Epstein and Schneider, 2008; Lang, 1991; 
Veronesi, 1999) claim that market reaction to release of information depends upon information 
uncertainty. Applying this argument to the CDS market, we predict that release of financial reports 
is probably more informative during GFC with greater information uncertainty. Moreover, 
Shivakumar et al. (2011) show that CDS reaction to some accounting information was stronger 
during GFC. As a result, motivated by these findings, this study provides results for CDS market 
behaviour toward the release of accounting information during GFC and non-GFC periods. 
Therefore, our third hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 4.3: The US CDS market reacts differently in GFC and non-GFC 
situations regarding the release of periodic financial reports. 
Numerous studies examine corporate disclosure practices in several countries and attempt 
to relate the extent of financial disclosure to firm characteristics, such as size, industry, and profits 
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(see, for example, Ahmed and Courtis, 1999; Cooke, 1989, 1992). The findings from these studies 
suggest that there are systematic differences in corporate financial reporting by corporate 
characteristic. Large firms are much more in the public eye and these firms are followed by more 
analysts (Lang and Lundholm, 1993) compared to small firms. Large firms are under pressure from 
investors, their agents, and other users to engage in acceptable levels of disclosure. Moreover, Firth 
(1979) suggests that information propagation is a costly exercise and such expenses are likely more 
affordable for large firms. Meek, Roberts, and Gray (1995) find that large firms generally disclose 
more information than small firms due to lower information production costs, or lower costs of 
competitive disadvantage associated with their disclosures. Furthermore, agency theory suggests 
that large firms have higher agency costs, therefore, the probability of disclosing more information 
is higher for these types of firm.31 
These findings imply that large firms provide more information to the public in comparison 
to small and medium-size firms. There are, therefore, size effects and we hypothesize that there is 
a greater reaction by the CDS market for large firms compared to small- and medium-size firms. 
Apart from firm size-based reactions to release of periodic financial reports, there is also 
evidence suggesting heterogeneity of industries from financial exposure (see, for example, Cooke, 
1992; Stanga, 1976). Demirovic and Thomas (2007), for instance, demonstrate that the incremental 
informativeness of accounting information differs not only by firm size but also by industry. Meek 
et al. (1995) solidifies this message by highlighting that proprietary costs, such as competitive 
disadvantage and political costs, vary across industries. Competitive disadvantage and political 
costs, it is argued, may change the incentive of firms to disclose financial information. For 
                                                          
31 Moreover, a survey by Buzby (1974) confirms that many items of information that financial analysts believe to be 
important are not being adequately disclosed by small and medium firms.  
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example, because of the nature of financial firms’ activities, they are likely to be more sensitive to 
disclosure than other firms. Furthermore, Choi and Hiramatsu (1987) discuss how accounting in 
certain industries is highly regulated. The utility and financial industries are known to be highly 
regulated. A priori, we expect a significant response from the utility and financial sectors after 
release of periodic financial reports compared to other sectors. Accordingly, our next hypothesis 
is as follows: 
Hypothesis 4.4: Reactions of the CDS market to release of financial reports vary 
across sectors and size groups. 
 
4.3  RESEARCH DESIGN 
4.3.1  Variable Selection 
Several studies in the CDS literature attempt to find the determinants of CDS spread based on 
reduced-form and structural variables. Galil et al. (2014) propose a parsimonious model to explain 
CDS spread changes; three of our control variables are based on the findings of this study. Galil et 
al. (2014) consider several groups of variables as contributing factors for CDS spread, and finally 
specify three variables that outperform the other considered variables in explaining CDS spread 
variation. Based on availability of data, we include three of these variables in our model, namely, 
stock return, change in stock return volatility, and change in spot rate (5-year treasury constant 
maturity rate). Moreover, we control for the effect of earnings announcements and credit ratings. 
The list of included variables is presented in Table 4.1, and a discussion of the selected variables 
follows below. 
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4.3.1.1 Stock Return (SR) 
Merton (1974) argues that the increase in a firm’s market value of equity decreases the probability 
of default. In this study, we use stock return as an indicator of firm value, because an increase in 
firm return can decrease the CDS spread, theoretically. Numerous studies empirically confirm this 
reverse relationship (see, for example, Aunon-Nerin, Cossin, and Hricko, 2002; Blanco, Brennan, 
and  Marsh, 2005; Galil et al., 2014); thus, we expect a negative sign for this variable in our results 
as well. 
 
4.3.1.2 Stock return volatility (∆𝑽𝑶𝑳) 
Based on option pricing theory, firm debt is considered a short position of a put option on the 
firm’s assets accompanied by a risk-free loan. Therefore, higher uncertainty on the market value 
of firm assets increases the probability of default, and consequently an increase in the CDS spread 
is expected. Prior research provides empirical results on a positive relationship between equity 
volatility and CDS spread (see, for example, Abid and Naifar, 2006; Aunon-Nerin et al., 2002; 
Blanco et al., 2005; Ericsson, Jacobs, and Oviedo, 2004). To calculate volatility, we use a 
methodology like Galil et al. (2014), Campbell and Taksler (2002), and; Ericsson, Jacobs, and 
Oviedo (2009), and compute the annualized variance of each stock’s return based on its preceding 
250 trading days. We predict a positive relation between this variable and change in CDS return. 
 
4.3.1.3 Changes in spot rate (∆𝑺𝒑𝒐𝒕) 
We follow Galil et al. (2014) and include a variable that measures change in spot rate to control 
for macroeconomic factors. They mention that higher spot rates can increase the reinvestment rate, 
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and this causes a surge in future value of cash flows. Consequently, the probability of default is 
reduced and a reduction in CDS spread is expected. Consistent with 5-year tenor CDS contracts, 
we add the variable for 5-year maturity spot rate to our model. We predict a negative association 
between change in spot rate and CDS return. 
Table 4.1: Definition of variables 
This table lists the name and description of all variables that we consider in our model. In third column, we provide 
the description for each of variable and in the last column we show how we create the variables. The expected sign 
for each variable is provided in the last column. 
Variable Description Variable Measurement 
Expected 
Sign 
(Significant: 
Yes or No?) 
Spread variable ∆𝐶𝐷𝑆௜,௧ା் 
Change in CDS 
spread for 196 firms 
of S&P 500 index 
 
∆ 𝐶𝐷𝑆௜,௧ା் = 
log( 𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖,𝑡+𝑇/ 𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖,𝑡) ∗ 100 
 
 
Firm-specific variables 
  𝑆𝑅௜,௧  Daily stock return 
  𝑆𝑅௜,௧ = 
log( 𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡/ 𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1) ∗ 100 
- 
(yes) 
∆𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 
Equal-weighted 
250 days variance of 
individual stock 
return 
  𝑉𝑜𝑙௜,௧ = 
𝑆𝑇𝐷[𝑆𝑅 ௜,௧
−  𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 (𝑆&𝑃 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥) 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛௜,
+ 
(yes) 
Market factors ∆𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑖,𝑡 
Change in 5-year 
Treasury bill rate 
  ∆𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡௜,௧ = 𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡௜,௧ −  𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡௜,௧ିଵ - 
(yes) 
Dummy variable for 
controlling the effect of 
prior earnings 
announcement 
𝐸𝐴i𝑡 
1  if credit rating of 
firm i was announced 
in the day 𝑡, and 0 
otherwise 
 
 
? 
(yes) 
Dummy variable for 
controlling the effect of 
prior credit announcement 
𝐶𝑅i𝑡 
1  if quarterly 
earnings of firm i 
was announced in the 
day 𝑡, and 0 
otherwise 
 
 
? 
(yes) 
Dummy variable for the 
impact of annual financial 
reports 
𝐴𝑅i𝑡 
1  if annual financial 
reports of firm i 
release on day 𝑡, and 
0 otherwise 
 
 
? 
(yes) 
Dummy variable for the 
impact of quarterly 
financial reports 
𝑄𝑅i𝑡 
1  if quarterly 
financial reports of 
firm i release on day 
𝑡, and 0 otherwise 
 
 
? 
(yes) 
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4.3.1.4 Effect of earnings announcement (ER) 
Many studies confirm that earnings announcements contain information relevant to the 
stock market. Along this line, some studies in the CDS literature empirically show that earnings 
announcements convey information for the CDS market as well (see, for example, Callen et al., 
2009; Greatrex, 2009; Jenkins et al., 2016; Zhang and Zhang, 2013). Therefore, we control for the 
effect of earnings announcement by considering an indicator variable, and we expect this variable 
to be significant in our model. We cannot predict the expected sign because the earnings news may 
contain good news or bad news for investors based on dispersion in analyst earnings forecasts. 
 
4.3.1.5 Effect of credit rating announcement (CR) 
Hull et al. (2004) and Norden and Weber (2004) are among the first studies to examine the 
reaction of the CDS market to credit rating announcements. These authors show that credit ratings 
contain information relevant to the CDS market. Moreover, Aunon-Nerin et al. (2002) investigate 
the determinants of CDS spread and verify that credit rating is the single most important source of 
information on credit risk. Further, Micu, Remolona, and Wooldridge (2006) note that credit rating 
announcements hold relevant pricing information for the CDS market. As a result, we control for 
this effect in our model via an indicator variable, and we predict this variable to be strongly 
significant in our results. The sign of this variable is not clear and depends on the downgrading or 
upgrading in credit rating, which can be negative or positive.32 
                                                          
32 We do not differentiate between downgrade and upgrade events since credit rating announcement is not our main 
interest. 
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4.3.1.6 Variables related to periodic financial reports (QR, AR) 
The focus throughout this study is to examine the reaction of the CDS market after release 
of periodic financial reports. We add two indicator variables to recognize the effect of quarterly 
reports and annual reports for the CDS market. We predict these variables to be significant, but 
the expected signs are not clear because the direction of change in the CDS spread depends on the 
content of reports. 
 
4.3.2  Data 
We obtain the release dates of annual and quarterly reports from the DataStream Professional 
database. Note that, in addition to the date of a periodic report’s filing, we also consider the dates 
of amended report releases, because the contents of these reports may contain useful information 
for market participants as well. 
The data related to CDS spread for modified structuring type are extracted from 
Bloomberg, and the S&P 500 Index constituents are from DataStream. Data are daily for the period 
May 7, 2004 to April 30, 2015. We focus on the CDS price with 5-year tenor because it is the most 
liquid type in the market.33 Of the 500 constituents of the S&P 500 Index, only 196 stocks with 
corresponding CDS spread have sufficient time series data. As a result, we exclude the remaining 
stocks and our final data set consists of 196 firms. This sample has 505,037 observations. 
Moreover, the corresponding equity prices for available CDS data, dates of announcement for 
earnings, and credit ratings are acquired from DataStream, Bloomberg, and Compustat, 
respectively. A list of data sources is presented in Table 4.2. 
                                                          
33 We employ the same data set used by Narayan et al. (2014). However, we update this data set to cover the April 
30, 2015 period. The data set used by Narayan et al. (2014) contains 212 firms; after updating, we were forced to 
remove 16 firms because they did not have sufficient data series. 
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After obtaining the required data, we winsorize them at 1% and 99% to remove the effect 
of outliers. Following this, we divide our data sample into sectors based on the GICS. In addition, 
we split our sample into three size groups based on firm market capitalization. Specifically, our 
approach is to sort the data by the contemporaneous daily market capitalization and then consider 
two breakpoints to create three equal groups (low, medium, and large) of rims. Our sample covers 
approximately 53% of the US market. Moreover, the sector-based panels indicate that the 
consumer staples, financial, and industrial sectors comprise more than 50% of our data sample. 
Our initial data set contains 2,375, 6,312, and 6,311 observations for release dates of annual 
reports, quarterly reports, and earnings announcements, respectively. In 47 annual reports, and 
2,044 quarterly reports, filing of reports and earnings disclosures occurred concurrently. 
According to the literature, the CDS market reacts to earnings announcements on the release day.  
Therefore, regarding controlling for contamination, we remove these coincident dates from our 
sample. In addition to earnings announcements, we consider the effect of coincident credit rating 
announcements. For this purpose, we eliminate 497 (280 for quarterly and 217 for annual reports) 
concurrent releases of periodic reports and announcements of earnings or credit ratings. The 
number of observations for each type of event in our data sample is provided in Table B.1. 
Table 4.2: Data sources 
This table provides the list of required data and the corresponded databases that used to obtain data.  
Data Type Used Databases 
CDS price DataStream-Bloomberg 
Equity price DataStream 
SEC filing dates DataStream Professional 
Earnings announcement dates Bloomberg 
5-year treasury rate  FRED 
Historical monthly S&P long-term corporate 
issuer-level debt rating and credit rating announcement date Compustat 
Quarterly financial data Compustat 
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4.3.3  Methodology 
Although the effects of periodic financial reports have been studied in the stock market literature, 
the present study is quite new to the CDS literature. The methodology used in the stock market 
literature is mostly the event study, but as Peterson (1989) argues, application of this methodology 
to debt securities has some obstacles due to inadequate quoted price data, infrequent trading, and 
the influence of the term structure. Moreover, there are many variations in the application of this 
methodology (Peterson, 1989), which impacts the results. For instance, the event study 
methodology is highly sensitive to the techniques used to estimate expected return or the choice 
of significance test (Armitage, 1995). In the CDS market, there is not an aggregate index for the 
whole market.34 Therefore, the few studies that use an event study methodology in the CDS 
literature mostly create a credit-based index from their data samples and consider this as the market 
index. We believe that this constructed sample-based index does not indicate the market return, 
and the results obtained via this methodology may not be reliable. Furthermore, heteroscedasticity 
is a significant problem in the event study literature (Froot, 1989). Therefore, as an alternative 
methodology, we use a panel data regression model to determine the response of the CDS market 
to release of financial information. 
We use heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors and a fixed effect estimator to 
generate more reliable results.35 Our regression model for evaluating the response of the CDS 
market to release of financial reports is as follows: 
                                                          
34 There are two main indices in the CDS market, one is CDX, which contains North American and emerging market 
companies and the other is the iTraxx index, which contain companies from the rest of the world. CDX and iTraxx 
indices are of different types and there is no aggregate index that represents the whole market. 
35 We initially include time fixed effects as well; however, since the change in daily CDS price is infrequent, we 
consider only the fixed effects estimator. 
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∆𝐶𝐷𝑆௜,௧ା் = 𝛽଴ + 𝛽ଵ. 𝑄𝑅௜,௧ + 𝛽ଶ. 𝐴𝑅௜,௧  + 𝛽ଷ. 𝐸𝑅௜,௧ + 𝛽ସ. 𝐶𝑅௜,௧ + 𝛽ହ 𝑆𝑅௜,௧ + 𝛽଺∆𝑉𝑜𝑙௜,௧ +
𝛽଻∆ 𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡௜,௧ + 𝛼௜ + 𝜀௜,௧ା்                                                                                                                 (4.1) 
 In this regression model, 𝑄𝑅௜,௧ and 𝐴𝑅௜,௧ (𝐸𝑅௜,௧ and 𝐶𝑅௜,௧) are dummy variables that take 
value 1 when quarterly reports and annual reports (earnings and credit rating announcements) are 
released and zero otherwise. 𝑆𝑅௜,௧ is daily stock return, ∆𝑉𝑜𝑙௜,௧ is the variance of stock return, and 
∆ 𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡௜,௧ shows the change in 5-year treasury rate. 
We study the response of the CDS market over a 10-day period following the filing of 
periodic compulsory financial reports.36 This approach is inspired by Griffin (2003), who evaluates 
the value relevance of quarterly and annual financial reports for stock market investors surrounding 
the filing date and measures investor response by unsigned excess stock returns 10 days around 
the filing date. Moreover, You and Zhang (2009) and You and Zhang (2011) conduct their analysis 
over a 21-day period centred on the filing date. In view of this, we run the panel regression model 
from 𝑡 + 1 to 𝑡 + 10. 
 
4.3.4  Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics of control variables are presented in Table 4.3. We also provide summary 
statistics for the average change in CDS return for different categories of firm size, sectors, and 
economic conditions in Table 4.5 through Table 4.7. The descriptive statistics reveal several 
interesting features of the data. The first feature is that the signs of CDS spread change, stock 
return, and volatility are consistent with the literature. According to Table 4.3, the mean CDS 
                                                          
36 We did a preliminary analysis for the period (-10, 0) to investigate the reaction of the CDS market to the release of 
periodic reports before the release of reports. Our analysis shows no response from the CDS market over this (-10, 0) 
window. Therefore, we limit our analysis to the post-release of periodic financial reports period. 
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spread is negative, while the corresponding signs for stock return and change in volatility are 
positive and negative, respectively. 
The second feature of the data is that, as Table 4.5 reveals, the average CDS return during 
𝑡 + 2 to 𝑡 + 10 for periodic financial reports differs in sign and magnitude compared to the 
duration without the release of the periodic financial reports. Moreover, note that the standard 
deviation of average return is higher after the release of reports, from 𝑡 + 2 to 𝑡 + 10. Therefore, 
this implies that there is not an immediate response from the CDS market after the release of 
reports. The third feature of the data relates to average change in CDS return across different size 
groups and sectors. Tables 4.6 through 4.8 provide details about CDS return after the release of 
quarterly and annual reports across sectors and size groups of firms. The evidence here implies at 
least four findings: (1) the majority of sectors respond negatively after release of annual reports, 
while these reactions are mostly positive after release of quarterly reports; (2) there is variation in 
magnitude and sign of the change in CDS return across sectors: for example, the CDS changes 
after release of annual reports are larger and negative for financial, energy, health care, info tech, 
and industrial sectors compared to the other sectors; (3) the size-based tables indicate that CDS  
return after release of quarterly reports is positive for small and large firms but negative for 
medium-size firms; and (4) the CDS change after release of annual reports is negative for medium 
and large firms and positive for small firms. The fourth feature of the data derives from Table 4.9. 
This table illustrates that CDS change after release of reports is different during the pre-GFC, GFC, 
and post-GFC periods. Moreover, it provides support for the changing behaviour of the market 
after release of quarterly versus annual reports. These features of the data help to determine 
whether release of financial reports is value-relevant for the CDS market and, if it is, how exactly 
the reaction of the market differs between the two types of report. Moreover, it provides support 
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for hypotheses 4.3 and 4.4 described in Section 4.2, about the heterogeneity of CDS response after 
release of reports across size, sector, and economic factors. 
Table 4.3: Descriptive statistics 
This table reports the mean, median and standard deviation (SD) for daily change in volatility, daily change in spot 
rate (5-year treasury rate) and daily stock return in Panel A. We calculate the volatility of stock return based on the 
previous 250 trading days. We compute the stock return by 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛௜,௧ = log( 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒௜,௧/
 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒௜,௧ିଵ) ∗ 100. Similarly, Panel B reports the detailed statistics for dependent variables (Daily CDS Return). 
We compute the daily CDS return according to this formula: ∆𝐶𝐷𝑆௜,௧ା் = 𝑙𝑜𝑔( 𝐶𝐷𝑆௜,௧ା்/ 𝐶𝐷𝑆௜,௧) ∗ 100 for 𝑡 + 1 to 
𝑡 + 10.  
Panel A: Control variables 
Day Mean Median SD  
SR (daily) 1.64*10-2 0 6.73*10-1 
∆ 𝑉𝑜𝑙 (daily) -7.29 *10-5 0 2.56*10-3 
∆ 𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡 (daily) -2.77*10-4 0 5.2*10-2 
Panel B: Dependent variable - Daily CDS Return (bps) 
Day Mean Median SD  
𝑡 + 1 -0.044 0 2.244 
𝑡 + 2 -0.073 0 3.432 
𝑡 + 3 -0.11 0 4.443 
𝑡 + 4 -0.129 0 5.347 
𝑡 + 5 -0.146 0 6.133 
𝑡 + 6 -0.17 0 6.878 
𝑡 + 7 -0.186 0 7.569 
𝑡 + 8 -0.211 -0.012 8.194 
𝑡 + 9 -0.231 -0.022 8.795 
𝑡 + 10 -0.252 -0.037 9.369 
 
Table 4.4: Average of change in CDS return on event days and normal days 
This table provides details about the number of observations (N), mean, standard deviation (SD)) for change of CDS 
returns during 10 days after release of quarterly and annual reports. The first three columns are related to the change 
in CDS return during 10 days in normal days without financial exposure and the rest of tables signify the behaviour 
of market after release of periodic financial reports.  
  Normal Durations  After Release of Quarterly Reports 
After Release of Annual 
Reports 
Days N Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD 
𝑡 + 1 511,716 -0.03 3.73 3,625 -0.02 3.92 1,892 -0.14 3.09 
𝑡 + 2 511,531 -0.04 5.08 3,621 0.08 5.38 1,892 -0.22 6.05 
𝑡 + 3 511,344 -0.06 6.17 3,618 0.13 6.46 1,891 -0.17 6.48 
𝑡 + 4 511,154 -0.07 7.17 3,617 0.34 7.23 1,891 -0.15 7.77 
𝑡 + 5 510,972 -0.07 8.07 3,611 0.42 8.18 1,890 0.05 8.7 
𝑡 + 6 510,781 -0.08 8.91 3,609 0.69 8.91 1,890 0.26 11.3 
𝑡 + 7 510,592 -0.08 9.73 3,606 0.89 9.8 1,890 0.19 9.80 
𝑡 + 8 510,401 -0.1 10.43 3,605 1.09 10.53 1,890 0.05 9.91 
𝑡 + 9 510,209 -0.11 11.11 3,605 1.35 11.33 1,889 0.11 10.65 
𝑡 + 10 510,018 -0.12 11.78 3,605 1.35 11.61 1,889 0.17 11.45 
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Table 4.5: Average of change in CDS return after release of periodic financial report by 
size 
We split data into three groups based on the firm’s market capitalization as the proxy for firm size. This table provides 
details about mean, standard deviation (SD) and average in number of observations (N) for change in CDS return after 
release of quarterly (Panel A) and annual reports (Panel B) for each size group. 
Day Small  Medium  Large Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Panel A: After Release of Quarterly Report  
𝑡 + 1 -0.001 4.728 -0.151 3.446 0.101 3.468 
𝑡 + 2 0.206 6.281 -0.195 4.966 0.240 4.787 
𝑡 + 3 0.355 7.193 -0.189 6.104 0.254 6.021 
𝑡 + 4 0.619 8.086 -0.009 6.848 0.427 6.706 
𝑡 + 5 0.788 9.008 0.012 7.976 0.492 7.472 
𝑡 + 6 1.080 9.853 0.222 8.712 0.792 8.066 
𝑡 + 7 1.384 10.864 0.410 9.621 0.889 8.818 
𝑡 + 8 1.530 11.399 0.688 10.534 1.077 9.581 
𝑡 + 9 1.723 12.330 0.948 11.236 1.409 10.346 
𝑡 + 10 1.787 12.695 0.974 11.408 1.308 10.662 
N 1,181 1,247 1,197 
Panel B: After Release of Annual Report  
𝑡 + 1 0.004 3.631 -0.067 2.532 -0.351 2.991 
𝑡 + 2 0.140 5.755 -0.078 5.360 -0.721 6.911 
𝑡 + 3 0.248 6.267 -0.176 5.885 -0.585 7.209 
𝑡 + 4 0.284 8.118 -0.021 6.753 -0.726 8.311 
𝑡 + 5 0.369 8.961 0.150 8.120 -0.361 8.968 
𝑡 + 6 0.944 14.403 0.372 8.979 -0.539 9.601 
𝑡 + 7 0.522 10.241 0.610 9.171 -0.571 9.912 
𝑡 + 8 0.288 10.568 0.541 8.957 -0.669 10.097 
𝑡 + 9 0.284 11.153 0.649 9.939 -0.606 10.772 
𝑡 + 10 0.255 11.834 0.705 10.970 -0.442 11.521 
N 640 621 631 
 
Table 4.6: Average of change in CDS return after release of annual reports by sectors 
This table provides descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation (SD) and average in number of observations (N)) 
for the change in CDS return after release of annual reports by different sectors. We divide our data into 10 sectors 
based on the GICS. 
Sectors Consumer Discretionary 
 Consumer 
Staple Energy Financial Health Care 
Days Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
𝑡 + 1 0.03 2.61 0.37 4.86 -0.32 2.29 -0.32 2.29 -0.4 2.44 
𝑡 + 2 0.03 4.77 0.48 6.13 -0.41 3.29 -0.41 3.29 -1.18 11.23 
𝑡 + 3 0.38 6.07 0.99 6.85 -0.64 3.95 -0.64 3.95 -1.16 11.61 
𝑡 + 4 0.65 8.11 1.27 7.32 -0.71 4.63 -0.71 4.63 -1.34 12.53 
𝑡 + 5 0.89 9.44 1.06 8.04 -0.5 5.84 -0.5 5.84 -1.06 12.34 
𝑡 + 6 0.85 9.99 0.94 9.2 -0.79 7.68 -0.79 7.68 -0.98 13.32 
𝑡 + 7 0.85 9.68 0.87 9.17 -0.71 7.6 -0.71 7.6 -1.06 13.54 
𝑡 + 8 0.38 8.99 0.96 9.8 -0.93 7.59 -0.93 7.59 -1.3 14.01 
𝑡 + 9 0.17 9.56 1.01 10.4 -0.85 7.88 -0.85 7.88 -1.12 14.71 
𝑡 + 10 0.03 10.56 0.86 10.7 -0.7 8.58 -0.7 8.58 -0.82 15.04 
N 350 220 152 152 172 
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Table 4.6 Continued 
Sectors Industrial Info Tech Material Telecom Utilities 
Days Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
𝑡 + 1 -0.29 3.38 -0.38 2.69 -0.18 3.19 0.11 2.09 0 2.67 
𝑡 + 2 0.02 7.11 0.01 4.34 -0.5 4.46 0.92 5.6 -0.02 4.15 
𝑡 + 3 -0.17 6.59 -0.56 5.41 -0.66 4.79 0.63 6.08 -0.09 4.46 
𝑡 + 4 -0.76 7.84 -1.14 5.83 -0.18 7.04 -0.02 9.99 0.14 5.3 
𝑡 + 5 -0.73 8.53 -1.04 6.39 0.15 8.81 0.55 10.85 0.42 6.07 
𝑡 + 6 0.66 18.74 -1.38 7.35 0.13 9.69 1.52 6.7 0.77 7.41 
𝑡 + 7 -0.36 9.85 -0.83 7.79 0.49 10.31 0.79 11.42 1.08 7.78 
𝑡 + 8 -0.55 9.53 -1.34 8.15 0.27 10.51 1.15 10.8 1.22 8.4 
𝑡 + 9 -0.23 10.64 -1.48 8.58 0.58 11.18 0.79 11.42 0.76 9.41 
𝑡 + 10 -0.12 12.1 -1.95 9.26 1.17 12.71 1.63 11.87 0.61 9.98 
N 264 89 140 29 188 
  
Table 4.7: Average of change in CDS return after release of quarterly reports by sectors 
This table provides descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation (SD) and average in number of observations (N)) 
for change in CDS return after release of quarterly reports by different sectors. We divide our data into 10 sectors 
based on the GICS. 
Sectors Consumer Discretionary  Consumer Staple Energy Financial Health Care 
Days Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
𝑡 + 1 -0.01 3.46 0.19 3.92 0.18 2.96 -0.2 6.12 0.01 4.05 
𝑡 + 2 0.14 4.47 -0.18 5.02 0.09 4.83 0.37 7.83 0.44 5.66 
𝑡 + 3 0.13 5.35 0.15 5.92 0.21 6.14 0.73 8.39 0.74 6.92 
𝑡 + 4 0.21 6.39 0.33 6.42 0.79 6.84 1.12 9.08 1.15 7.87 
𝑡 + 5 0.15 7.09 0.09 6.59 1.19 8.47 1.67 10.11 1.5 8.46 
𝑡 + 6 0.19 7.75 0.35 7.52 1.6 9.37 1.92 10.83 1.71 8.98 
𝑡 + 7 0.25 8.59 0.38 8.97 2.02 9.76 2.41 12.14 1.74 9.32 
𝑡 + 8 0.35 9.13 0.31 9.04 2.54 10.49 2.42 13.07 1.96 9.79 
𝑡 + 9 0.52 9.77 0.42 9.7 3.01 11.03 3.17 14.56 1.89 10.19 
𝑡 + 10 0.38 10.28 0.31 9.95 2.96 11.35 3.04 14.36 2.1 10.73 
N 548 441 362 508 348 
Sectors Industrial Info Tech Material Telecom Utilities 
Days Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
𝑡 + 1 -0.13 3.46 -0.27 2.9 -0.19 3.09 0.16 2.67 0.09 3.02 
𝑡 + 2 -0.29 4.41 0.21 6.95 -0.5 5.33 0.41 3.39 0.28 3.88 
𝑡 + 3 -0.55 6.08 -0.31 8.88 -0.53 6.14 0.86 4.94 0.16 4.9 
𝑡 + 4 -0.37 7.07 -0.73 8.93 -0.63 6.59 0.99 6.42 0.26 5.93 
𝑡 + 5 -0.49 7.82 -1.45 11.28 -0.97 7.59 1.17 6.76 0.64 6.86 
𝑡 + 6 -0.34 8.63 -0.85 11.21 -0.29 8.93 1.29 8.01 0.98 7.63 
𝑡 + 7 -0.29 9.47 -0.89 11.61 0.13 10.66 1 8.39 1.38 8.31 
𝑡 + 8 -0.14 10.43 -0.16 12.42 0.38 12.47 1.12 8.66 1.84 8.93 
𝑡 + 9 0.17 11.36 -0.46 13.82 0.33 12.63 1.85 8.97 2.11 9.35 
𝑡 + 10 0.11 11.93 -0.19 13.09 0.64 14.09 1.7 9.61 2.25 9.28 
N 566 169 201 63 407 
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4.4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.4.1  Empirical Analysis 
Empirical results based on the panel data regression models are shown in Table 4.9. The results 
illustrating stock return, change in volatility, and change in spot rate are strongly significant for all 
considered days. As explained in Section 4.3, the signs of these variables are consistent with 
expectations, and they are statistically significant. Stock return and change in spot rate have 
negative relations with CDS spread, and change in volatility is positively related to CDS spread 
variation. In addition, as the literature documents, we confirm that earnings announcement and 
credit announcement are value-relevant for the CDS market. More importantly, the results indicate 
that the CDS market responds to the information content of financial reports. The response of CDS 
to issuance of quarterly reports occurs after two days. In the same vein, the results show that the 
reaction of this market to release of annual reports occurs with delay as well. Moreover, our 
analysis demonstrates that the speed of CDS market adjustment to release of information is greater 
for annual reports relative to quarterly reports, because the coefficients of dummy variables related  
to 10-Q reports are statistically significant from 𝑡 + 2 to 𝑡 + 10, while the corresponding 
coefficients for 10-K reports are statistically significant only at 𝑡 + 2 and 𝑡 + 3. 
To provide more detailed findings, we continue our investigation based on the various 
panels of firms by size and sector.  Table 4.10 displays results of the CDS market’s reaction to the 
release of financial reports based on size. Note that the release of quarterly reports is more value-
relevant for small and large firms. Moreover, the level of significance decreases for large firms 
compared to small firms. The results show that annual reports contain information sufficient to 
move CDS of large firms. The coefficients of AR are mostly negative, and the response to annual 
reports is faster in comparison to quarterly reports for large firms. This evidence is in conformity 
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with the findings of the preceding table and confirms the faster adjustment to information 
contained in annual reports by the CDS market compared to quarterly reports. 
Moreover, the results of sector-based analysis presented in Table 4.11 indicate that SEC 
filings are not value-relevant for all sectors. The most responsive sector to release of quarterly 
reports is financial firms, followed by the healthcare, energy, telecom, and utility sectors. Other 
sectors, namely, info tech, materials, and consumer staples, react to release of reports, but not as 
consistently as the former sectors. The sector response to annual reports is not as significant as the 
response to quarterly reports. The energy sector reacts faster, that is, one day after release date, 
while the financial, healthcare, and materials sectors respond on the second day, and firms in the 
utility sector react only after five days. Although the telecom sector reacts to release of quarterly 
reports, we document no response from this sector to release of annual reports. 
Regarding testing the efficiency of the CDS market, our results support the hypothesis of 
inefficiency because we observe movements in price for several days after release of financial 
information. 
 Table 4.8: Average of change in CDS return after release of periodic financial reports in 
different economic situations 
This tables provides information about the mean, standard deviation (SD) and average in number of observation (N) 
for change in CDS return after release of periodic reports in three economic situations. We divide the data sample into 
three various durations based on the GFC. Panel A, provides details about the change in CDS return after release of 
quarterly reports during three economic situations. Similarly, Panel B illustrates this information after release of annual 
reports. 
Days 
Panel A: After Release of Quarterly Reports Panel B: After Release of Annual Reports 
 Pre-GFC  GFC   Post-GFC   Pre-GFC  GFC   Post-GFC  
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
𝑡 + 1 -0.05 4.26 0.03 3.88 -0.04 3.71 -0.11 3.99 -0.1 3.89 -0.17 1.73 
𝑡 + 2 -0.18 5.47 0.35 6.09 0 4.56 0.26 5.27 0.07 7.72 -0.64 5.27 
𝑡 + 3 -0.06 6.35 0.31 7.66 0.1 5.2 0.42 6.63 0.28 8.01 -0.74 5.26 
𝑡 + 4 0.15 6.94 0.62 8.47 0.21 6.1 0.79 8.79 0.34 9.28 -0.94 5.95 
𝑡 + 5 0.09 7.86 0.76 9.68 0.33 6.74 1.47 10.4 0.69 10.51 -1.07 5.98 
𝑡 + 6 0.25 8.69 1.14 10.28 0.56 7.57 1.66 11.29 1.49 16.37 -1.2 6.5 
𝑡 + 7 0.36 9.6 1.55 11.53 0.62 8.02 1.85 11.3 1.18 12.25 -1.27 6.61 
𝑡 + 8 0.31 10.02 2.06 12.58 0.71 8.54 1.97 11.04 0.69 12.55 -1.34 6.88 
𝑡 + 9 0.27 10.3 2.63 13.93 0.88 8.95 1.87 12.32 1 13.42 -1.35 7.07 
𝑡 + 10 -0.18 10.12 2.83 14.21 0.98 9.52 1.95 13.67 1.22 14.27 -1.39 7.41 
N 911 1,292 1,414 475 521 895 
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Table 4.9: Result of panel regression model for the full sample 
This table reports the results of the panel regression model from 𝑡 + 1 up to 𝑡 + 10 after filing date of periodic financial reports. Our regression model is: 
∆𝐶𝐷𝑆௜,௧ା் = 𝛽଴ + 𝛽ଵ. 𝑄𝑅௜,௧ + 𝛽ଶ. 𝐴𝑅௜,௧  + 𝛽ଷ. 𝐸𝑅௜,௧ + 𝛽ସ. 𝐶𝑅௜,௧ + 𝛽ହ 𝑆𝑅௜,௧ + 𝛽଺∆𝑉𝑜𝑙௜,௧ + 𝛽଻∆ 𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡௜,௧ + 𝛼௜ + 𝜀௜,௧ା் .  𝑄𝑅௜,௧ and 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 are indicator variables for the 
release of quarterly report and annual reports. Moreover 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 and 𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑡 are indicator variables for controlling the effect of prior earnings announcement and credit 
ratings. The other control variables are stock return, change in volatility of stock return and change in 5-year treasury rate, which are represented by 𝑆𝑅௜,௧, ∆𝑉𝑜𝑙௜,௧ 
and  ∆ 𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑖,𝑡, respectively. We use robust standard error and fixed effect estimators. *, **, and *** denote results are significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
The last two columns report the number of observation (N) and 𝑅ଶ of the regression. 
Days 𝛽0 QA AR EA CR SR ∆𝑉𝑂𝐿            ∆𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡 N 𝑅
ଶ 
𝑡 + 1 -0.002*** 0.013 -0.066  -0.013 -0.097*** -0.420*** 4.313*** -2.207*** 505,037 0.021 
(-2.57) (0.34) (-1.39) (-0.32) (-5.8) (-30.66) (2.96) (-27.41)   
𝑡 + 2 -0.019*** 0.104* -0.306*** 0.019 -0.215*** -0.652*** 10.003*** -3.977*** 504,850 0.023 (13.61) (1.72) (-4.03) (0.34) (-8.58) (-33.33) (4.2) (-31.09)   
𝑡 + 3 -0.012*** 0.217** -0.197** 0.034 -0.416*** -0.779*** 13.201*** -5.28*** 504,662 0.021 (-5.92) (2.51) (-1.97) (0.43) (-13.54) (-34.41) (4.08) (-35.17)   
𝑡 + 4 0.065*** 0.325*** -0.186 0.154 -0.599*** -0.876*** 14.674*** -6.287*** 504,473 0.019 (25.73) (2.95) (-1.59) (1.54) (-17.81) (-34.04) (3.45) (-34.49)   
𝑡 + 5 0.102*** 0.368*** -0.070 0.310*** -0.775*** -0.928*** 18.741*** -7.262*** 504,285 0.018 (34.67) (2.69) (-0.52) (2.66) (-19.75) (-35.14) (3.83) (-35.67)   
𝑡 + 6 0.115*** 0.615*** -0.110 0.474*** -0.918*** -0.987*** 21.865*** -7.544*** 504,097 0.016 (34.01) (4.04) (-0.74) (3.32) (-21.08) (-35.37) (3.95) (-33.76)   
𝑡 + 7 0.115*** 0.758*** 0.110 0.630*** -0.980*** -0.995*** 27.512*** -7.544*** 503,909 0.014 (28.54) (4.24) (0.73) (3.95) (-21.28) (-34.79) (4.38) (-31.65)   
𝑡 + 8 0.144*** 0.895*** 0.078 0.803*** -1.033*** -1.025*** 34.383*** -8.024*** 503,721 0.013 (34.85) (4.88) (0.5) (4.62) (-20.49) (-34.23) (5.02) (-31.13)   
𝑡 + 9 0.117*** 1.175*** 0.155 0.989*** -0.950*** -1.072*** 40.055*** -7.438*** 503,533 0.012 (26.66) (5.86) (0.89) (5.4) (-17.92) (-34.65) (5.27) (-26.99)   
𝑡 + 10 0.077*** 1.202*** 0.182 1.211*** -0.901*** -1.071*** 42.51*** -7.492*** 503,345 0.011 (17.02) (5.80) (0.93) (6.12) (-16.86) (-34.42) (5.23) (-26.7)   
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Table 4.10: The reaction of the CDS market to release of periodic financial reports by size 
This table presents the reaction of the CDS market to the release of quarterly and annual financial reports based on 
the three size groups (small, medium and large) by firm’s market capitalization. Our regression model is: ∆𝐶𝐷𝑆௜,௧ା் =
𝛽଴ + 𝛽ଵ. 𝑄𝑅௜,௧ . 𝑙𝑜𝑤 + 𝛽ଶ. 𝐴𝑅௜,௧ . 𝑙𝑜𝑤 + 𝛽ଷ. 𝐸𝑅௜,௧ . 𝑙𝑜𝑤 + 𝛽ସ. 𝐶𝑅௜,௧ . 𝑙𝑜𝑤 + 𝛽ହ 𝑆𝑅௜,௧ . 𝑙𝑜𝑤 + 𝛽଺. ∆𝑉𝑜𝑙௜,௧ . 𝑙𝑜𝑤 +
𝛽଻. ∆ 𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡௜,௧ . 𝑙𝑜𝑤 + 𝛽଼. 𝑄𝑅௜,௧ . 𝑚𝑖𝑑 + 𝛽ଽ. 𝐴𝑅௜,௧ . 𝑚𝑖𝑑 + 𝛽ଵ଴. 𝐸𝑅௜,௧ . 𝑚𝑖𝑑 + 𝛽ଵଵ. 𝐶𝑅௜,௧ . 𝑚𝑖𝑑 + 𝛽ଵଶ 𝑆𝑅௜,௧ . 𝑚𝑖𝑑 +
𝛽ଵଷ∆𝑉𝑜𝑙௜,௧ . 𝑚𝑖𝑑 + 𝛽ଵସ∆ 𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡௜,௧ . 𝑚𝑖𝑑+𝛽ଵହ. 𝑄𝑅௜,௧ . ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ + 𝛽ଵ଺. 𝐴𝑅௜,௧ . ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ + 𝛽ଵ଻. 𝐸𝑅௜,௧ . ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ + 𝛽ଵ଼. 𝐶𝑅௜,௧ . ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ +
𝛽ଵଽ. 𝑆𝑅௜,௧ . ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ + 𝛽ଶ଴.∆𝑉𝑜𝑙௜,௧ . ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ + 𝛽ଶଵ. ∆ 𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡௜,௧ . ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ + 𝛼௜ + 𝜀௜,௧ା் .  𝑄𝑅௜,௧ and 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 are indicator variables for the 
release of quarterly report and annual reports. Moreover 𝐸𝑅i,t and 𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑡 are indicator variables for controlling the effect 
of prior earnings announcement and credit ratings. The other control variables are stock return, change in volatility of 
stock return and change in 5-year treasury rate, which are represented by 𝑆𝑅௜,௧, ∆𝑉𝑜𝑙௜,௧ and∆ 𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑖,𝑡, respectively. We 
use robust standard error and fixed effect estimators and we just report the coefficient related to QR and AR.  
*, **, and *** denote results are significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
 
  Small Size Medium Size Big Size 
 Day QR AR QR AR QR AR 
𝑡 + 1 0.03 -0.018 -0.268* -0.046 -0.150 -0.304** 
 (0.28) (-0.12) (-1.78) (-0.31) (-1.40) (-2.05) 
𝑡 + 2 0.255* 0.099 -0.456** -0.049 -0.307** -0.659*** 
 (1.73) (0.49) (-2.23) (-0.24) (-2.10) (-3.28) 
𝑡 + 3 0.411** 0.197 -0.464* -0.130 -0.342* -0.500** 
 (2.30) (0.81) (-1.82) (-0.53) (-1.92) (-2.05) 
𝑡 + 4 0.677*** 0.214 -0.456 0.023 -0.515** -0.644** 
 (3.25) (0.76) (-1.58) (0.08) (-2.49) (-2.27) 
𝑡 + 5 0.837*** 0.275 -0.502 0.188 -0.585** -0.282 
 (3.57) (0.87) (-1.54) (0.59) (-2.51) (-0.88) 
𝑡 + 6 1.128*** 0.843** -0.600* 0.417 0.891*** -0.454 
 (4.36) (2.40) (-1.67) (1.17) (-3.46) (-1.29) 
𝑡 + 7 1.441*** 0.430 -0.503 0.661* -0.986*** -0.483 
 (5.09) (1.12) (-1.28) (1.70) (-3.5) (-1.25) 
𝑡 + 8 1.618*** 0.212 -0.408 0.617 -1.197*** -0.560 
 (5.33) (0.52) (-0.97) (1.48) (-3.96) (-1.35) 
𝑡 + 9 1.822*** 0.216 -0.483 0.746* -1.548*** -0.480 
 (5.63) (0.49) (-1.07) (1.68) (-4.80) (-1.29) 
𝑡 + 10 1.904*** 0.201 -0.357 0.822* -1.463*** -0.299 
 (5.55) (0.43) (-0.75) (1.75) (-4.28) (-0.64) 
 
 
 
 
4.4.2 Does reaction of the CDS market differ by economic situation? 
This study provides results for CDS market behavior in various economic situations. We 
categorize the data into three subsample periods based on GFC. According to the Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis, the GFC began on February 27, 2007. Therefore, the pre-GFC period in our 
data set is from May 7, 2004 to February 26, 2007. The second subsample, which we refer to as 
the GFC period, is from February 27, 2007 to December 31, 2010, and the post-GFC period is  
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from January 1, 2011 to April 20, 2015. The statistical results presented in Table 4.12 show that 
the mean of CDS prices in the GFC period is higher relative to the pre-GFC period (53.8 vs 135.9 
bps); it then decreases to 112 bps in the post-GFC era. Results related to the reaction of the CDS 
market in different economic situations are reported in Table 4.13. 
We summarize our main findings below. First, the response of the CDS market to release 
of quarterly reports during the GFC period is faster relative to non-GFC periods (in 𝑡 + 1 for the 
GFC period vs 𝑡 + 2 and 𝑡 + 3 for the pre-GFC and post-GFC periods, respectively), which 
implies that the CDS market incorporates new information more quickly during the GFC period. 
Second, the sector-based analysis shows that the financial, energy, health care, telecommunication, 
and utility sectors are more responsive to release of financial reports. Finally, the CDS market is 
inefficient during the non-GFC period but acts less inefficiently during the GFC period. 
 
4.5  ROBUSTNESS CHECK (ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS) 
4.5.1  Leverage-Based Analysis 
Leverage is a widely used determinant of credit spread (see, for example, Collin-Dufresne, 
Goldstein and Martin, 2001; Ericsson et al., 2004; Galil et al. 2014). The descriptive statistics are 
reported in Table B.2 confirm that there is the leverage-based heterogeneity with respect to CDS 
spread. Therefore, we split our data set into 10 different levels of the leverage ratio.37  
                                                          
37 We follow Galil et al. (2014) and define the leverage ratio as book value of debt (sum of long-term debt and current 
debt) divided by the sum of book value of debt and equity value (number of outstanding shares multiplied by the share 
price). We obtain quarterly data for long-term debt and current debt in liabilities as representative of short-term debt. 
Then, we follow previous studies (see, for example, Collin-Dufresne et al., 2001; Ericsson et al., 2009; Galil et al., 
2014) and use linear interpolation to estimate the daily data for components of debt value. Daily data for equity value 
are extracted from DataStream.  
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Table 4.11: The reaction of the CDS market to release of periodic financial reports by sector 
This table presents the reaction of the CDS market to release of quarterly and annual financial reports based on the 10 different sectors. We provide the results of 
the panel regression model from 𝑡 + 1 up to 𝑡 + 10 after filing date of periodic financial reports. Our regression model is: ∆𝐶𝐷𝑆௜,௧ା் = 𝛽଴ + 𝛽ଵ . 𝑄𝑅௜,௧ +
𝛽ଶ. 𝐴𝑅௜,௧  + 𝛽ଷ. 𝐸𝑅௜,௧ + 𝛽ସ. 𝐶𝑅௜,௧ + 𝛽ହ 𝑆𝑅௜,௧ + 𝛽଺∆𝑉𝑜𝑙௜,௧ + 𝛽଻∆ 𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡௜,௧ + 𝛼௜ + 𝜀௜,௧ା் . 𝑄𝑅௜,௧ and 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 are indicator variables for the release of quarterly report and annual 
reports. Moreover 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 and 𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑡 are indicator variables for controlling the effect of prior earnings announcement and credit ratings. The other control variables 
are stock return, change in volatility of stock return and change in 5-year treasury rate, which are represented by 𝑆𝑅௜,௧, ∆𝑉𝑜𝑙௜,௧ and ∆ 𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡௜,௧, respectively. We use 
robust standard error and fixed effect estimators. For save the space we report the R2 and number of observation (N) only for the first regression model in 𝑡 +1 on 
the last two rows. The number of observations decrease for later days. *, **, and *** denote results are significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Panel A: Reaction of the CDS Market to Release of Quarterly Reports by Sector 
Day Con. Discretionary 
Con. 
Staple Energy Financial Healthcare Industrial InfoTech Material Telecom Utility 
𝑡 + 1 -0.09 0.07 0.12 0.09 -0.03 -0.07 -0.021 -0.10 -0.04 0.13 
 (-1.59) (0.59) (1.00) (1.11) (-0.25) (-0.65) (-0.11) (-0.69) (-0.24) (1.18) 
𝑡 + 2 0.02 0.03 0.20 0.40** 0.02 -0.13 -0.18 -0.08 0.35 0.38** 
 (0.17) (0.14) (1.03) (2.42) (0.15) (-0.8) (-0.98) (-0.37) (0.88) (2.2) 
𝑡 + 3 0.08 0.45** 0.44* 0.67*** 0.41* -0.27 -0.36 -0.65*** 1.17*** 0.39 
 (0.36) (2.15) (1.84) (3.34) (1.89) (-1.11) (-1.16) (-2.58) (2.8) (1.6) 
𝑡 + 4 0.03 0.38* 0.59* 1.00*** 0.80** -0.30 -0.61 -0.32 1.30*** 0.59** 
 (0.09) (1.67) (1.85) (3.68) (2.49) (-1.03) (-1.25) (-1.19) (2.74) (1.99) 
𝑡 + 5 0.23 0.16 0.99** 1.32*** 0.84** -0.41 -1.01* -0.65 1.35*** 0.62* 
 (0.65) (0.45) (2.36) (4.28) (2.56) (-1.24) (-1.84) (-1.46) (3.23) (1.82) 
𝑡 + 6 0.14 0.35 1.41*** 1.50*** 1.14*** -0.13 -0.89 -0.35 1.55*** 1.27*** 
 (0.35) (0.83) (3.32) (4.52) (2.82) (-0.41) (-1.51) (-0.63) (2.71) (2.9) 
𝑡 + 7 0.20 0.18 1.86*** 1.96*** 1.35*** -0.09 -0.82 -0.00 0.24 1.41*** 
 (0.48) (0.39) (3.22) (5.11) (3.23) (-0.25) (-1.31) (0.00) (0.65) (2.6) 
𝑡 + 8 0.07 0.26 2.19*** 1.98*** 1.69*** 0.10 -0.45 0.02 0.42 1.69*** 
 (0.13) (0.57) (3.61) (4.65) (3.56) (0.25) (-0.68) (0.03) (1.03) (3.88) 
𝑡 + 9 2.08 0.30 2.74*** 2.65*** 1.71*** 0.21 -0.46 0.41 1.23** 2.08*** 
 (5.00) (0.66) (4.33) (6.17) (2.95) (0.48) (-0.6) (0.60) (2.11) (5.00) 
𝑡 + 10 022 0.23 2.57*** 2.51*** 1.94*** 0.27 -0.32 0.42 1.57 2.36*** 
  (0.37) (0.52) (4.48) (5.8) (3.23) (0.6) (-0.35) (0.46) (1.49) (5.14) 
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Table 4.11 Continued 
Panel B: Reaction of the CDS Market to Release of Annual Reports by Sector 
Day Con. Discretionary 
Con. 
Staple Energy Financial Healthcare Industrial InfoTech Material Telecom Utility 
𝑡 + 1 0.14 -0.02 -0.42*** -0.14 -0.19 -0.01 -0.04 -0.27* -0.12 0.06 
 (1.30) (-0.17) (-3.02) (-1.21) (-1.39) (-0.06) (-0.18) (-1.67) (0.21) (0.49) 
𝑡 + 2 -0.08 -0.19 -0.57** -0.73*** -0.43* -0.10 0.01 -0.56** -0.06 -0.16 
 (-0.45) (-0.89) (-2.49) (-4.12) (-1.79) (-0.46) (0.02) (-2.22) (-0.22) (-0.68) 
𝑡 + 3 0.36 0.46* -0.82*** -0.49** -0.32 -0.34 -0.51 -0.64* -0.37 -0.19 
 (1.35) (1.83) (-2.59) (-2.2) (-1.42) (-1.35) (-1.02) (-1.71) (-1.32) (-0.69) 
𝑡 + 4 0.19 0.73** -0.78* -0.54* -0.38* -0.43 -0.80 -0.51 0.41 0.06 
 (0.66) (2.13) (-1.77) (-1.69) (-1.67) (-1.54) (-1.38) (-1.6) (0.47) (0.21) 
𝑡 + 5 0.25 0.60* -0.61 -0.33 -0.19 -0.52 -0.78 -0.33 1.85 0.36 
 (0.76) (1.76) (-1.12) (-0.86) (-0.85) (-1.46) (-1.41) (-0.89) (0.95) (1.17) 
𝑡 + 6 0.32 0.28 -1.44*** -0.26 -0.01 -0.53 -1.07 -0.36 1.33 0.82** 
 (1.00) (0.64) (-3.42) (-0.62) (-0.02) (-1.34) (-1.35) (-0.63) (0.82) (2.09) 
𝑡 + 7 0.27 0.72* -0.92 -0.21 -0.08 -0.13 -0.50 -0.26 2.19 1.19*** 
 (0.7) (1.780 (-1.46) (-0.51) (-0.26) (-0.42) (-0.69) (-0.76) (1.31) (3.51) 
𝑡 + 8 0.02 0.97*** -1.17** 0.11 -0.21 -0.15 -0.98 -0.48* 2.57 1.26*** 
 (0.04) (2.61) (-2.2) (0.26) (-0.58) (-0.47) (-1.16) (-1.86) (1.43) (3.74) 
𝑡 + 9 1.23 0.73 -1.12* 0.64 0.15 -0.09 -1.10 -0.23 2.17 1.23*** 
 (2.62) (1.6) (-1.95) (1.21) (0.41) (-0.27) (-1.19) (-0.82) (0.93) (2.62) 
𝑡 + 10 -0.19 0.80 -0.93 0.60 0.49 -0.03 -1.55 -0.05 3.07 0.99* 
  (-0.4) (1.51) (-1.43) (1.11) (1.15) (-0.07) (-1.27) (-0.15) (1.18) (1.74) 
N 92904 57973 41776 79280 44620 70363 23268 39164 7977 48212 
𝑅ଶ 0.029 0.009 0.02 0.033 0.011 0.017 0.026 0.03 0.022 0.015 
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Table 4.12: CDS price based on the three different economic situations 
This table reports the descriptive statistics such as represent the mean, the standard deviation (SD) and median of CDS 
price in basis points (bps) during pre-GFC, GFC and post-GFC periods.  
CDS Price (bps) 
Economic Condition Mean SD Median 
Pre-GFC  53.8 76.7 31.5 
GFC  135.9 225.4 72.6 
Post-GFC  111.9 122.3 71.5 
 
 
Table 4.13: Reaction of the CDS market in different economic situations 
This table represents the reaction of the CDS market to release of quarterly and annual financial reports during 
different economic situations. We provide the results of the panel regression model from 𝑡 + 1 up to 𝑡 + 10 after filing 
date of periodic financial reports. Our regression model is: ∆𝐶𝐷𝑆௜,௧ା் = 𝛽଴ + 𝛽ଵ. 𝑄𝑅௜,௧ + 𝛽ଶ. 𝐴𝑅௜,௧  + 𝛽ଷ. 𝐸𝑅௜,௧ +
𝛽ସ. 𝐶𝑅௜,௧ + 𝛽ହ 𝑆𝑅௜,௧ + 𝛽଺∆𝑉𝑜𝑙௜,௧ + 𝛽଻∆ 𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡௜,௧ + 𝛼௜ + 𝜀௜,௧ା் .  𝑄𝑅௜,௧ and 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 are indicator variables for the release of 
quarterly report and annual reports. Moreover, 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 and 𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑡 are indicator variables for controlling the effect of prior 
earnings announcement and credit ratings. The other control variables are stock return, change in volatility of stock 
return and change in 5-year treasury rate, which are represented by 𝑆𝑅௜,௧, ∆𝑉𝑜𝑙௜,௧ and ∆ 𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡௜,௧, respectively. We use 
robust standard error and fixed effect estimators. *, **, and *** denote results are significant at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
 Pre-GFC GFC Post-GFC 
Day QR AR QR AR QR AR 
𝑡 + 1 0.11 0.03 -0.11* -0.06 0.05 -0.10** 
 (1.17) (0.24) (-1.75) (-0.58) (1.11) (-2.18) 
𝑡 + 2 0.09 0.12 0.08 -0.54*** 0.12* -0.36*** 
 (0.73) (0.69) (0.66) (-3.23) (1.65) (-4.7) 
𝑡 + 3 0.37** 0.51** 0.05 -0.34 0.24** -0.44*** 
 (2.23) (2.14) (0.3) (-1.53) (2.42) (-4.43) 
𝑡 + 4 0.50** 0.78*** 0.13 -0.28 0.34*** -0.56*** 
 (2.53) (2.76) (0.64) (-1.1) (2.98) (-4.79) 
𝑡 + 5 0.40* 1.16*** 0.04 -0.06 0.59*** -0.64*** 
 (1.92) (3.48) (0.14) (-0.19) (4.15) (-4.58) 
𝑡 + 6 0.58** 1.12*** 0.32 -0.12 0.83*** -0.65*** 
 (2.42) (3.39) (1.77) (-0.34) (5.17) (-4.32) 
𝑡 + 7 0.78*** 1.87*** 0.50 0.08 0.90*** -0.68*** 
 (3.21) (4.75) (1.51) (0.25) (4.97) (-4.3) 
𝑡 + 8 0.84*** 2.24*** 0.68** -0.33 1.04*** -0.68*** 
 (3.29) (5.3) (2.09) (-0.92) (5.8) (-3.93) 
𝑡 + 9 0.78*** 2.34*** 1.18*** -0.12 1.33*** -0.67*** 
 (2.77) (5.09) (3.36) (-0.3) (6.74) (-3.81) 
𝑡 + 10 0.56* 2.38*** 1.33*** -0.07 1.40*** -0.65*** 
  (1.89) (4.72) (3.64) (-0.16) (6.81) (-3.31) 
 
We provide further evidence regarding the reaction of the CDS market to release of 
financial reports based on the different levels of leverage. The results in Table 4.14 confirm the 
value relevance of periodic financial reports for the CDS market and indicate that financial reports 
contain information more relevant to firms with higher leverage ratios. Consistent with previous 
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results, this shows that the CDS market reacts more to quarterly reports in comparison to annual 
reports. Moreover, the results illustrate that the reaction is mostly with delay. 
 
4.5.2 Credit Rating–Based Analysis 
We categorize our data sample based on long-term S&P credit rating. If the S&P credit rating of a 
firm is BBB- or higher, it is classified as investment grade (IG), and if it is rated BB or lower, it is 
perceived as speculative grade or high yield (HY). Information contained in Table 4.16 reveals 
that more than half (55%) of our sample of firms is HY and the rest belong to the IG group. As 
expected, the mean of CDS for speculative groups is significantly higher (almost 7.5 times) than 
the mean CDS price for IG firms, because the quality of credit rating of IG firms is better than HY 
firms. We run the regression model for each group separately. The results presented in Table 4.17 
demonstrate that financial reports are value-relevant for both IG and HY firms, but it   seems that 
IG firms are more responsive to annual reports, and HY firms react more to quarterly reports. It 
also confirms that the reaction of the CDS market to this information is not immediate, which 
constitutes evidence for the inefficiency of this market. 
 
4.5.3 Reaction of the CDS Market with Different Tenors 
To further analyse the response of the CDS market after release of financial reports, we repeat our 
analysis for CDS with different time maturities, namely, 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, and 10 years. We extract the 
related data from DataStream, which are available from December 14, 2007 to April 30, 2015. 
Table 4.17 shows that CDS contracts with longer maturities have higher CDS prices in comparison 
to short-tenor CDS contracts. The results presented in Table 4.18 indicate that, consistent with the 
CDS market with 5-year tenor (the most liquid type), CDS markets with short and long maturities  
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Table 4.14: Reaction of the CDS market to release of periodic financial reports by leverage 
This table presents the reaction of the CDS market to release of quarterly and annual financial reports based on the 10 different leverage groups (Lev1 to Lev10). 
We provide the results of the panel regression model for the reaction of CDS market to release of quarterly report (Panel A) and annual reports (Panel B) from 
𝑡 + 1 up to 𝑡 + 10 after filing date of periodic financial reports. Our regression model is: ∆𝐶𝐷𝑆௜,௧ା் = 𝛽଴ + 𝛽ଵ. 𝑄𝑅௜,௧ + 𝛽ଶ. 𝐴𝑅௜,௧  + 𝛽ଷ. 𝐸𝑅௜,௧ + 𝛽ସ. 𝐶𝑅௜,௧ +
𝛽ହ 𝑆𝑅௜,௧ + 𝛽଺∆𝑉𝑜𝑙௜,௧ + 𝛽଻∆ 𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡௜,௧ + 𝛼௜ + 𝜀௜,௧ା் . 𝑄𝑅௜,௧ and 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 are indicator variables for the release of quarterly report and annual reports. Moreover 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 and 
𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑡 are indicator variables for controlling the effect of prior earnings announcement and credit ratings. The other control variables are stock return, change in 
volatility of stock return and change in 5-year treasury rate, which are represented by 𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡, ∆𝑉𝑜𝑙௜,௧ and ∆ 𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑖,𝑡, respectively. We use robust standard error and 
fixed effect estimators. ***, ** and * denote results are significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. The leverage ratio is calculated by book value of debt divided 
by summation of book value of debt and equity value. We estimate daily book value of debt by using linear interpolation between monthly data. 
Panel A: Reaction of the CDS Market to Release of Quarterly Reports 
Day Lev 1 (Low) Lev 2 Lev 3 Lev 4 Lev 5 Lev 6 Lev 7 Lev8 Lev 9 Lev  10 (High) 
𝑡 + 1 -0.31 0.01 0.01 -0.43 0.41** 0.09 -0.21* 0.10 0.09 0.38** 
 (-1.46) (0.05) (0.8) (-1.08) (2.22) (0.59) (-1.82) (0.6) (0.72) (2.09) 
𝑡 + 2 -0.32** 0.03 -0.04 -0.03 0.39* 0.18 -0.07 0.24 0.22 0.56** 
 (-2.49) (0.13) (-0.25) (-0.2) (1.77) (0.84) (-0.6) (1.38) (1.25) (2.19) 
𝑡 + 3 -0.49*** 0.04 0.02 -0.07 0.66** 0.29 0.20 0.46** 0.25 0.81*** 
 (-2.59) (0.14) (0.1) (-0.24) (2.32) (1.14) (1.17) (2.17) (1.02) (2.63) 
𝑡 + 4 -0.40 -0.04 -0.14 0.16 0.76** 0.10 0.27 0.93*** -0.58 1.08** 
 (-1.6) (-0.12) (-0.46) (0.41) (2.29) (0.3) (1.22) (3.49) (-1.39) (2.49) 
𝑡 + 5 -0.54* -0.28 -0.21 0.06 0.67* 0.39 0.66** 1.11*** 0.27 1.27*** 
 (-1.77) (-0.71) (-0.58) (0.13) (1.72) (0.95) (2.18) (3.4) (0.84) (2.58) 
𝑡 + 6 -0.53 -0.26 0.17 0.15 1.31*** 0.64 0.97*** 1.27*** 0.73** 1.48** 
 (-1.38) (-0.61) (0.38) (0.33) (3.01) (1.35) (2.75) (3.23) (2.00) (2.54) 
𝑡 + 7 -0.38 -0.29 0.33 0.36 1.25** 0.87* 0.98** 1.52*** 1.15*** 1.74*** 
 (-0.96) (-0.72) (0.7) (0.78) (2.27) (1.76) (2.430 (3.28) (2.6) (2.88) 
𝑡 + 8 -0.62 0.19 0.58 0.24 1.28** 0.60 1.26*** 1.70*** 1.51*** 1.87*** 
 (-1.45) (0.43) (1.21) (0.5) (2.47) (1.12) (3.09) (3.69) (2.98) (3.3) 
𝑡 + 9 -0.26 0.24 0.87* 0.79 1.27** 0.67 1.52*** 1.85*** 2.25*** 2.16*** 
 (-0.46) (0.49) (1.67) (1.34) (2.2) (1.23) (3.22) (3.94) (3.95) (3.56) 
𝑡 + 10 -0.05 -0.05 0.71 0.70 1.58** 0.70 1.84*** 1.98*** 2.32*** 2.10*** 
 (-0.1) (-0.1) (1.34) (1.06) (2.48) (1.2) (3.41) (3.7) (3.86) (3.57) 
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Table 4.14 Continued 
Panel B: Reaction of the CDS Market to Release of Annual Reports by Sector 
Day Con. Discretionary 
Con. 
Staple Energy Financial Healthcare Industrial InfoTech Material Telecom Utility 
𝑡 + 1 0.14 -0.02 -0.42*** -0.14 -0.19 -0.01 -0.04 -0.27* -0.12 0.06 
 (1.30) (-0.17) (-3.02) (-1.21) (-1.39) (-0.06) (-0.18) (-1.67) (0.21) (0.49) 
𝑡 + 2 -0.08 -0.19 -0.57** -0.73*** -0.43* -0.10 0.01 -0.56** -0.06 -0.16 
 (-0.45) (-0.89) (-2.49) (-4.12) (-1.79) (-0.46) (0.02) (-2.22) (-0.22) (-0.68) 
𝑡 + 3 0.36 0.46* -0.82*** -0.49** -0.32 -0.34 -0.51 -0.64* -0.37 -0.19 
 (1.35) (1.83) (-2.59) (-2.2) (-1.42) (-1.35) (-1.02) (-1.71) (-1.32) (-0.69) 
𝑡 + 4 0.19 0.73** -0.78* -0.54* -0.38* -0.43 -0.80 -0.51 0.41 0.06 
 (0.66) (2.13) (-1.77) (-1.69) (-1.67) (-1.54) (-1.38) (-1.6) (0.47) (0.21) 
𝑡 + 5 0.25 0.60* -0.61 -0.33 -0.19 -0.52 -0.78 -0.33 1.85 0.36 
 (0.76) (1.76) (-1.12) (-0.86) (-0.85) (-1.46) (-1.41) (-0.89) (0.95) (1.17) 
𝑡 + 6 0.32 0.28 -1.44*** -0.26 -0.01 -0.53 -1.07 -0.36 1.33 0.82** 
 (1.00) (0.64) (-3.42) (-0.62) (-0.02) (-1.34) (-1.35) (-0.63) (0.82) (2.09) 
𝑡 + 7 0.27 0.72* -0.92 -0.21 -0.08 -0.13 -0.50 -0.26 2.19 1.19*** 
 (0.7) (1.780 (-1.46) (-0.51) (-0.26) (-0.42) (-0.69) (-0.76) (1.31) (3.51) 
𝑡 + 8 0.02 0.97*** -1.17** 0.11 -0.21 -0.15 -0.98 -0.48* 2.57 1.26*** 
 (0.04) (2.61) (-2.2) (0.26) (-0.58) (-0.47) (-1.16) (-1.86) (1.43) (3.74) 
𝑡 + 9 1.23 0.73 -1.12* 0.64 0.15 -0.09 -1.10 -0.23 2.17 1.23*** 
 (2.62) (1.6) (-1.95) (1.21) (0.41) (-0.27) (-1.19) (-0.82) (0.93) (2.62) 
𝑡 + 10 -0.19 0.80 -0.93 0.60 0.49 -0.03 -1.55 -0.05 3.07 0.99* 
  (-0.4) (1.51) (-1.43) (1.11) (1.15) (-0.07) (-1.27) (-0.15) (1.18) (1.74) 
N 92904 57973 41776 79280 44620 70363 23268 39164 7977 48212 
𝑅ଶ 0.029 0.009 0.02 0.033 0.011 0.017 0.026 0.03 0.022 0.015 
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Table 4.15: Credit rating breakdowns 
This table provides information about the credit rating of our observations. We classify our data sample into two 
groups, namely, IG and HY. The table reports number of observation in each rating group (N), the proportion of each 
rating group (percent), mean and median of CDS price in each category. 
S&P Credit Rating N Percent Mean of CDS Price (bps) 
Median of CDS 
Price (bps) 
IG 
AA 38,151 7.55 40.71 29.11 
A 80,639 15.95 42.90 31.67 
A+ 34,846 6.89 61.53 45.07 
A- 73,833 14.61 73.29 47.61 
Total (average) 227469 45% (54.61)  
HY 
BB 265,628 52.55 124.05 80.79 
B+ 5,630 1.11 407.94 349.50 
B 5,000 0.99 555.11 407.57 
B- 960 0.19 582.72 463.30 
CC 755 0.15 1474.02 1446.49 
Total (average) 277973 55% (417.45)  
 
Table 4.16: Reaction of the CDS market to the release of periodic financial reports based 
on the credit rating 
This table shows the reaction of the CDS market to release of periodic financial reports. We divide our data into two 
groups: investment grade (if credit rating is BBB or higher by S&P and speculative grade (if credit rating is BB+ or 
lower). Panel A illustrates the reaction of speculative grade firms and, Panel B is related to reactions of investment 
grade groups to the release of periodic financial reports. We provide the results of the panel regression model from 
𝑡 + 1 up to 𝑡 + 10 after filing date of periodic financial reports. Our regression model is: ∆𝐶𝐷𝑆௜,௧ା் = 𝛽଴ +
𝛽ଵ. 𝑄𝑅௜,௧ + 𝛽ଶ. 𝐴𝑅௜,௧  + 𝛽ଷ. 𝐸𝑅௜,௧ + 𝛽ସ. 𝐶𝑅௜,௧ + 𝛽ହ 𝑆𝑅௜,௧ + 𝛽଺∆𝑉𝑜𝑙௜,௧ + 𝛽଻∆ 𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡௜,௧ + 𝛼௜ + 𝜀௜,௧ା் .  𝑄𝑅௜,௧ and 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 are 
indicator variables for the release of quarterly report and annual reports. Moreover 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 and 𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑡 are indicator 
variables for controlling the effect of prior earnings announcement and credit ratings. The other control variables are 
stock return, change in volatility of stock return and change in 5-year treasury rate, which are represented 
by 𝑆𝑅௜,௧, ∆𝑉𝑜𝑙௜,௧ and ∆ 𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑖,𝑡, respectively. ***, ** and * denote results are significant at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
Credit type Panel A: Speculative grade Panel B: Investment grade 
Day QR AR R2 QR AR R2 
𝑡 + 1 0.07 0.07 0.0259 -0.05 -0.24* 0.017 
 (1.45) (1.14)  (-0.81) (-3.21)  
𝑡 + 2 0.14* -0.12 0.0279 0.06 -0.55*** 0.0193 
 (1.75) (-1.15)  (0.67) (-5.12)  
𝑡 + 3 0.22** -0.02 0.0256 0.21 -0.42*** 0.0173 
 (2.06) (-0.15)  (1.58) (-2.9)  
𝑡 + 4 0.38*** 0.04 0.0232 0.25 -0.47*** 0.0163 
 (2.76) (0.24)  (1.51) (-2.71)  
𝑡 + 5 0.59*** 0.18 0.0209 0.10 -0.38* 0.0154 
 (3.47) (0.97)  (0.49) (-1.88)  
𝑡 + 6 0.83*** 0.14 0.0192 0.35 -0.43* 0.0139 
 (4.28) (0.71)  (1.59) (-1.89)  
𝑡 + 7 1.04*** 0.45** 0.0167 -0.42* -0.32 0.0122 
 (4.46) (2.2)  (1.67) (-1.49)  
𝑡 + 8 1.14*** 0.39* 0.0157 0.60** -0.31 0.0117 
 (4.53) (1.75)  (2.41) (-1.45)  
𝑡 + 9 1.37*** 0.35 0.0147 0.93*** -0.10 0.0107 
 (5.06) (1.43)  (3.32) (-0.38)  
𝑡 + 10 1.42*** 0..29 0.0133 0.93*** 0.04 0.01 
 (5.11) (1.09)  (3.29) (0.13)  
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Table 4.17: Descriptive statistics for log (CDS) for different maturity 
This table provides descriptive statistics, namely, mean, median and standard deviation (SD) for log CDS price in 
basis points (bps) with various time maturities (1-, 2-, 3-, 4-, 7- and 10-year tenors).  
Log CDS price (bps) 
CDS Type Mean Median SD 
1- year 3.37 3.23 1.17 
2-year 3.73 3.61 0.99 
3-year 4.03 3.91 0.81 
4-year 4.26 4.15 0.83 
7-year 4.62 4.53 0.70 
10-year 4.65 4.50 0.77 
 
also react to the release of compulsory periodic financial reports, and these reactions are mostly 
with delay. According to Table 4.18, we find that the CDS market reacts faster to release of annual 
reports in comparison to release of quarterly reports. 
 
4.6 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
As mentioned in Sections 4.4 and 4.5 above, we investigate the reaction of the CDS market over 
a 10-day period following compulsory periodic SEC filings. The outcomes of the analysis are 
described as follows. 
 
4.6.1 The CDS Market Reacts to Release of Periodic Financial Reports 
The coefficients of dummy variables related to the effect of a financial report’s release on CDS 
spread are statistically significant. This clarifies that the CDS market reacts to release of financial 
information and confirms that periodic financial reports hold information relevant for the CDS 
market. Unlike previous studies that consider restricted accounting information, such as total 
assets, net income, and total liabilities, we examine financial reports beyond accounting ratios and 
consider the effect of the release of these detailed reports as a whole. As mentioned above (see 
Section 4.1), some sections of SEC mandatory reports, such as “Risk Factors,” “Defaults upon 
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Senior Securities,” “Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results 
of Operations,” and “Quantitative and Qualitative Disclosures about Market Risk” may contain 
valuable information for CDS market participants.  
 
4.6.2 Reaction of the CDS Market to Release of Periodic Financial Reports Occurs with 
Delay 
The response of the CDS market with 5-year tenor to release of annual reports is strongly 
significant on the second and third days after filings, and it shows no significant reaction on other 
days. In contrast to annual reports, the reaction of the CDS market to quarterly reports is persistent 
in our analysis, but only from 𝑡 + 2, and the magnitudes of the corresponding coefficients increase 
in later days. These findings show that the reaction of the CDS market to release of financial reports 
is not quick, and the response of this market is with some days’ delay. This evidence is explained 
as follows.  
First, we know that the stock market has a dominant role over the CDS market in price 
discovery (see, for example, Forte and Pena, 2009; Narayan et al., 2014; Norden and Weber, 2009). 
Moreover, previous studies regarding the response of the stock market to SEC filings show that 
the stock market reacts mostly to the release of accounting information on the day of filing or one 
or two days after the SEC filing date (see, for example, Griffin, 2003; You and Zhang, 2009). 
Therefore, the reaction of the CDS market is expected to occur after the response of the stock 
market, at least one day after the event day. Another important explanation for this finding has 
roots in the limited attention theory, originating from the work of Kahneman (1973). Hirshleifer 
and Teoh (2003, p.5) state, “Limited attention is a necessary consequence of the vast amount of 
information available in the environment, and of limits to information-processing power.” 
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The results shown in Table 4.9, 4.10, and 4.11 indicate that the magnitude of the 
coefficients related to impacts of periodic reports increase in the following days and are persistent 
over our study period. You and Zhang (2011) claim that when price drift is due to cognitive bias 
or risk, the magnitude of drift does not decrease over time. Thus, we can surmise that the behaviour  
of the CDS market toward release of this information can be explained by cognitive limitation of 
investors, or the limited attention phenomenon. To provide support for the existence of limited 
attention phenomenon in CDS market, we do additional analysis to check its existence.  
Some studies show that the stock market reaction is weaker on days with more SEC filings 
(see, Hirshleifer, Lim, and  Teoh, 2009) or at times when investors are distracted by other events 
such as weekend holidays or religious holidays (see, for example, DellaVigna and Pollet, 2009; 
Pantzalis and Ucar, 2014). Motivated by the study of DellaVigna and Pollet (2009), we investigate 
the reaction of CDS market when the release day is Friday vs the release of reports on the other 
weekdays. If inattention influences CDS price, we should observe less immediate response and 
more drift for Friday announcements.  
The results are provided on Table 4.19. The reaction of CDS market when the release of 
reports is on Fridays is not statistically significant until 𝑡 + 9 which is weakly significant at 10%. 
In contrast, when quarterly reports release on other days (non-Fridays), it is statistically from 𝑡 +
2. This situation also exists for the reaction of market after the disclosure of annual reports. The 
response of CDS market is significant at the 10% level at 𝑡 + 4 when annual reports become public 
on Friday while it is strongly significant at 𝑡 + 2 for other weekday releases.  
These findings support explanations of post-financial reports release drift based on 
underreaction to information caused by limited attention.  
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Table 4.18: Reaction of different types of CDS markets to the release of periodic financial reports 
This table presents the reaction of the CDS market with various time maturities (1-, 2-, 3-, 4-, 7- and 10-year tenor) from day 1 to 10 after filing of periodic financial 
reports. The time period is from 14/12/2007 to 30/4/2015. We provide the results of the panel regression model from 𝑡 + 1 up to 𝑡 + 10 after filing date of periodic 
financial reports. Our regression model is: ∆𝐶𝐷𝑆௜,௧ା் = 𝛽଴ + 𝛽ଵ. 𝑄𝑅௜,௧ + 𝛽ଶ. 𝐴𝑅௜,௧  + 𝛽ଷ. 𝐸𝑅௜,௧ + 𝛽ସ. 𝐶𝑅௜,௧ + 𝛽ହ 𝑆𝑅௜,௧ + 𝛽଺∆𝑉𝑜𝑙௜,௧ + 𝛽଻∆ 𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡௜,௧ + 𝛼௜ + 𝜀௜,௧ା் . 𝑄𝑅௜,௧ 
and 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 are indicator variables for the release of quarterly report and annual reports. Moreover 𝐸𝑅i,t and 𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑡 are indicator variables for controlling the effect of 
prior earnings announcement and credit ratings. The other control variables are stock return, change in volatility of stock return and change in 5-year treasury rate, 
which are represented by 𝑆𝑅௜,௧, ∆𝑉𝑜𝑙௜,௧ and ∆ 𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑖,𝑡, respectively. We use robust standard error and fixed effect estimators. ***, ** and * denote results are 
significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Day 1-Year Tenor 2-Year Tenor 3-Year Tenor 4-Year Tenor 7-Year Tenor 10-Year Tenor QR AR QR AR QR AR QR AR QR AR QR AR 
𝑡 + 1 -0.04 -0.17** -0.02 -0.29*** 0.12** 0.15** -0.04 -0.08 -0.01 -0.08 0.02 -0.13* 
 (-0.66) (-2.4) (-0.25) (-3.57) (2.04) (2.09) (-0.8) (-1.41) (-0.3) (-1.54) (0.54) (-3.14) 
𝑡 + 2 0.11 -0.34*** 0.14 -0.44*** 0.22** 0.21* -0.05 -0.17* 0.01 -0.18** 0.02 -0.24*** 
 (1.2) (-2.79) (1.29) (-3.69) (2.45) (1.96) (-0.06) (-1.71) (0.18) (-2.07) (0.3) (-3.51) 
𝑡 + 3 0.28** -0.10 0.43*** -0.53*** 0.56*** 0.25* 0.15 -0.22* 0.09 -0.12 0.14* -0.25*** 
 (2.01) (-0.58) (2.88) (-3.4) (4.8) (1.72) (1.41) (-1.72) (0.95) (-1.14) (1.67) (-2.66) 
𝑡 + 4 0.32* -0.17 0.42** -0.65*** 0.65*** 0.07* 0.18 -0.16 0.12 -0.08 0.20** -0.29*** 
 (1.9) (-0.84) (2.23) (-3.23) (4.81) (0.41) (1.27) (-0.97) (1.01) (-0.64) (2.15) (-2.85) 
𝑡 + 5 0.60*** -0.26 0.76*** -0.79*** 0.87*** -0.13 0.38** -0.17 0.31** -0.09 0.43*** -0.36*** 
 (3.01) (-1.17) (3.41) (-3.45) (5.87) (-0.67) (2.36) (-0.93) (2.21) (-0.59) (3.9) (-3.13) 
𝑡 + 6 0.87*** -0.38 1.29*** -1.05*** 1.18*** -0.10 0.644*** -0.27 0.58*** -0.13 0.58*** -0.45*** 
 (4.12) (-1.57) (5.00) (-4.02) (6.94) (-0.46) (3.2) (-1.33) (3.44) (-0.79) (4.56) (-3.48) 
𝑡 + 7 1.18*** -0.57** 1.67*** -1.14*** 1.51*** -0.05 1.048*** -0.44** 0.85*** -0.16 0.95*** -0.51*** 
 (5.08) (-2.04) (5.79) (-4.02) (7.81) (-0.21) (5.11) (-1.98) (4.91) (-0.84) (6.79) (-3.6) 
𝑡 + 8 1.36*** -0.61** 2.01*** -1.44*** 1.89*** 0.06 1.354*** -0.53** 1.23*** -0.18 1.03*** -0.54*** 
 (5.54) (-2.06) (6.31) (-4.6) (8.71) (0.02) (5.94) (-2.27) (5.97) (-0.87) (6.49) (-3.48) 
𝑡 + 9 1.66*** -0.58** 2.44*** -1.44*** 2.17*** -0.12 1.584*** -0.42* 1.36*** -0.09 1.28*** -0.57*** 
 (6.22) (0.04) (7.42) (-4.34) (8.95) (-0.41) (6.57) (-1.69) (6.13) (-0.42) (7.39) (-3.26) 
𝑡 + 10 1.95*** -0.62* 2.78*** -1.45*** 2.29*** -0.25 1.795*** -0.39 1.51*** -0.08 1.54*** -0.73*** 
 (7.07) (-1.89) (7.9) (-3.94) (9.53) (-0.78) (6.87) (-1.5) (6.3) (-0.36) (7.79) (-3.96) 
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Table 4.19: Reaction of CDS market on release of periodic financial reports (Friday vs non-
Fridays) 
This table reports the results of the panel regression model from 𝑡 + 1 up to 𝑡 + 10 after filing date of periodic financial 
reports when the release day is Friday vs other weekdays. Our regression model is:  ∆𝐶𝐷𝑆௜,௧ା் = 𝛽଴ + 𝛽ଵ. 𝑄𝑅௜,௧ +
𝛽ଶ. 𝐴𝑅௜,௧  + 𝛽ଷ. 𝐸𝑅௜,௧ + 𝛽ସ. 𝐶𝑅௜,௧ + 𝛽ହ 𝑆𝑅௜,௧ + 𝛽଺∆𝑉𝑜𝑙௜,௧ + 𝛽଻∆ 𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡௜,௧ + 𝛼௜ + 𝜀௜,௧ା் .   𝑄𝑅௜,௧  and 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡  are indicator 
variables for the release of quarterly report and annual reports. Moreover  𝐸𝑅௜,௧ and  𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑡 are indicator variables for 
controlling the effect of prior earnings announcement and credit ratings. The other control variables are stock return, 
change in volatility of stock return and change in 5-year treasury rate, which are represented by 𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡, ∆𝑉𝑜𝑙௜,௧ 
and ∆ 𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡௜,௧, respectively. We use robust standard error and fixed effect estimators. ***, ** and * denote results are 
significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
 Release Report on Fridays Release Report on non-Fridays 
Day QR AR QR AR 
𝑡 + 1 -0.089 0.028 0.030 -0.166* 
 (-0.636) (0.15) (0.45) (-1.84) 
𝑡 + 2 -0.223 0.023 0.226** -0.201*** 
 (-1.33) (0.10) (2.40) (-1.59) 
𝑡 + 3 -0.309 -0.079 0.316*** -0.163 
 (-1.46) (-0.27) (2.78) (-1.07) 
𝑡 + 4 -0.062 -0.604* 0.522*** -0.013 
 (-0.25) (-1.81) (3.94) (-0.08) 
𝑡 + 5 -0.014 -0.489 0.650*** 0.179 
 (-0.05) (-1.28) (4.38) (0.90) 
𝑡 + 6 0.100 0.173 0.952*** 0.329 
 (0.32) (0.40) (5.84) (1.51) 
𝑡 + 7 0.354 -0.499 1.12 0.342 
 (1.06) (-1.09) (6.24) (1.42) 
𝑡 + 8 0.357 -0.748 1.389*** 0.227 
 (0.90) (-1.49) (7.24) (0.88) 
𝑡 + 9 0.666* -0.692 1.667*** 0.347 
 (1.72) (-1.30) (8.14) (1.26) 
𝑡 + 10 0.775* -0.770 1.658*** 0.456 
 (1.870 (0.174) (7.46) (1.57) 
 
4.6.3 Reaction of the CDS Market to Release of Periodic Financial Reports Varies for 
Firms from Different Sectors, Sizes, Leverage Levels, and Credit Ratings 
Results of size-based and sector-based analysis offer more detailed evidence of the reaction of the 
CDS market to the information content of financial reports. The results of the sector-based analysis 
show that some sectors such as financial, utility, energy, and healthcare are more responsive to 
information disclosure. It seems that periodic accounting reports are more value-relevant for the 
financial sector in comparison to the other sectors. One reason for this finding is that the financial 
sector is the main participant in the CDS market. Further, as discussed in Section 4.1, financial 
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reports can provide opportunities for credit investors to evaluate counterparty risk as well as 
default risk for the reference entities. Moreover, we know that accounting in certain industries is 
heavily regulated (Choi and Hiramatsu, 1987, p. 34). The utility and financial sectors are known 
to be highly regulated; therefore, the content of released reports should be adequate. 
Furthermore, according to the descriptive statistics, we find that small firms have high 
levels of CDS price and high volatility. We also know that the utility sector encompasses the lowest 
proportion of market capitalization. Therefore, this implies that the utility sector is categorized as 
risky. 
Moreover, results of size-based analysis show that firms in large groups are more 
responsive to annual financial information release. This is consistent with our expectation due to 
the higher level of released information by large firms, since such firms are under pressure by 
investors and other users to provide information. Moreover, this is consistent with the Hirshleifer 
et al. (2009), who find that announcements by large firms have a weaker distraction effect than 
those of small firms; also, Basu (1997) documents that the stock market underreacts more to 
announcements by smaller firms. Moreover, comparison of the reaction of the CDS market toward 
quarterly and annual reports across different size groups reveals that large firms incorporate the 
received information from annual reports faster than quarterly reports. This situation is opposite 
for small firms, and we observe a stronger reaction to quarterly reports than annual reports. We 
conclude that for large firms, annual reports are more important than quarterly reports, and vice 
versa for small and medium firms. 
Moreover, we decompose the firms placed in larger size clusters and find that 
approximately half of the firms in these categories are classed as financial or healthcare sector 
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firms. Moreover, a larger fraction of firms in biggest size group belongs to the utility sector, which 
has the lowest market capitalization and high CDS price volatility. 
Our analysis based on firm leverage shows that high-leverage firms are more responsive to 
release of financial reports, and the reactions of this type of firm are significantly more frequent in 
comparison to firms with lower levels of leverage. 
In summary, we find that the size groups and sectors that respond to release of financial 
reports have at least one of the following characteristics: high mean of log CDS price, high 
volatility of log of CDS price, high leverage, or low/high market capitalization. 
In addition, credit rating–based analysis demonstrates that periodic financial reports are 
value-relevant for both HY and IG firms, but it seems that investors pay more attention to quarterly 
reports for HY firms and to annual reports for IG firms. This finding is consistent with expectations 
because in contrast to the HY firms, IG firms have mostly stable situations, and their financial 
positions do not change significantly in each financial quarter; thus, their annual reports might be 
more interesting as opposed to quarterly reports. 
 
4.6.4 Reaction of the CDS Market to Quarterly and Annual Financial Reports Differs 
The information contained in quarterly and annual reports has various characteristics. Both report 
types are lengthy and complex. Hirshleifer (2001) discusses that investors pay less attention to 
information that requires greater cognitive effort to understand. Our findings support this claim; 
the CDS market absorbs the information contained in annual reports faster because, in contrast to 
the quarterly reports dummy variable, the dummy variables related to annual reports are significant 
mainly two days following report release. This finding is robust in our analysis for CDS with 
different tenors. Moreover, it seems that the CDS market underreacts to the information content of 
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quarterly reports more than annual reports, because the coefficients of related variables are 
strongly significant for most days of our investigated window. These findings are consistent with 
You and Zhang (2009), who observe that investors in the equity market underreact to the content 
of periodic reports. These authors argue that disclosure of this kind of financial information is quite 
challenging for investors to digest, and subsequent evidence of price drift is observed. 
Our results indicate that the level of drift in investor reaction to release of quarterly reports 
is higher relative to annual reports. This finding is consistent with Brav and Heaton (2002), who 
claim that when uncertainty about the information structure is high among investors, a pattern of 
underreaction is plausible, because of rational learning and failure to incorporate information 
completely. This evidence is also compatible with several features of the reports. Quarterly reports 
are released three times per year, and this type of report is not audited; thus, uncertainty is higher 
compared to the content of officially audited annual reports. Consequently, it is expected that 
investors underestimate the significance of the information content of quarterly reports and do not 
absorb the information content fully. 
Moreover, Ahmed, Billings, Morton, and Stanford-Harris (2002) mention that most 
qualitative information, such as risk disclosure, which is more value-relevant for the CDS market, 
in quarterly reports is repetition from previous annual reports, possibly increasing the ignorance 
of investors toward the importance of quarterly reports. 
Another explanation stems from the activity of speculators in the CDS market. 
Dissemination of information can provide an incentive for market participants, especially 
speculators, to trade in markets. Norden and Radoeva (2013) argue that when uncertainty is higher, 
the probability of speculation is higher. Since uncertainty about the content of quarterly reports is 
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higher compared to annual reports, speculative activity is more probable, which can lead to more 
drift in the reaction of the CDS market. 
 
4.6.5 Reactions of the CDS Market to Release of Annual Reports versus Quarterly Reports 
Are in Opposite Directions 
Apart from the statistical significance of our results, the signs of the coefficients on the reaction of 
the CDS market to release of quarterly and annual reports differ. Our results indicate that the 
coefficient of the dummy variable which signify quarterly reports is mostly positive, which implies 
that after release of quarterly reports, credit risk increases due to information content. The reverse 
situation exists for annual reports. Based on the results obtained from our full sample (shown in 
Table 4.9), the coefficients related to annual reports are negative. The size-based panels also 
confirm this negative relationship. Moreover, the sector-based analysis shows that, except for 
utility and consumer staples, other sectors (energy, financial, health care, and materials sectors) 
react negatively to release of annual reports. This shows that annual reports in most cases contain 
positive news for CDS, and we observe a decline in CDS spread after release of annual reports. 
This observation can be perceived as evidence of “window dressing” actions to improve the 
appearance of a firm’s financial reports to impress shareholders or lenders. 
 
4.7 CONCLUSION 
We examine how the release of compulsory quarterly and annual financial reports influences CDS 
markets. The recent body of literature on the role of accounting information in CDS pricing 
motivates this study. Using daily data for various panels of sector and size, we identify that the 
148 
 
 
contents of these reports are value-relevant to the CDS market even after controlling prior 
announcements for earnings and credit ratings. We find that some sectors (specifically, financial, 
energy, health care, and utility) and large firms are more responsive to release of financial 
information. 
Another important finding is that the reaction of the CDS market to release of financial 
information is sluggish and delayed, which implies that investors in this market, like the stock 
market, have limited attention and processing power. This observation supports the notion of 
inefficiency in the CDS market. Moreover, the results illustrate that the reaction of the CDS market 
to release of quarterly and annual reports is dissimilar. CDS return usually increases after filings 
of quarterly reports, and decreases after disclosure of annual reports. These findings provide 
evidence of “window dressing” actions to improve the appearance of a firm’s financial reports to 
impress shareholders, credit holders, or credit providers. 
Moreover, we investigate whether the reaction of the CDS market varies during GFC and 
non-GFC periods. We find that the response of this market toward the release of financial 
information is faster in a GFC period relative to a non-GFC period. We implement additional 
analysis to confirm our results; that is, we construct panels based on credit rating, leverage ratio, 
and CDS with different tenors. The results confirm the robustness of our findings. 
Our study contributes mainly to the strand of literature that investigates the behaviour of 
CDS markets in response to public information. We demonstrate that the limited attention 
phenomenon is present in the CDS markets, and our results provide additional evidence in favour 
of inefficiency in the CDS markets. The outcomes from this study can benefit regulators, investors, 
and corporate managers. Investors, particularly speculators, hedgers, and arbitragers, can benefit 
from the findings of this study to construct portfolios of CDS contracts regarding the distinctions 
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among different size groups and sectors. They can also adopt profitable strategies around release 
of periodic financial reports. Corporate managers can become better informed as to what extent 
the information content of their periodic releases can affect the credit risk of their firms. Finally, 
regulators can redesign the structure of reports with the aim of facilitating an efficient market by 
compelling firms to release more transparent information requiring less cognitive effort. 
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5 CONCLUSION 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter summarizes the key findings and contributions of this dissertation. In the next section, 
we provide the main findings of the three empirical studies undertaken in this dissertation. In the 
last section, we recapitulate the contributions of this dissertation. 
 
5.2 MAIN FINDINGS 
The main findings from the three chapters of this dissertation are as follows. 
 
5.2.1  The Role of Credit Ratings in Corporate Financial Decisions 
The empirical study on the role of credit ratings in corporate financial decisions reveals the 
following: 
a) Our results in the financing section (Section 2.4.1) show heterogeneity in the SOA 
towards the leverage ratio with respect to a panel of firms with different credit rating 
levels and stability. This documented heterogeneity arises from the discrete costs and 
benefits associated with different credit rating levels. We specifically find that the SOA 
for firms with lower credit ratings is faster relative to firms in the higher credit rating 
groups. Moreover, the results of the SOA for the panels of firms of different credit 
rating stabilities reveal that firms with a lower (higher) stability index have a lower 
(higher) SOA. 
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b) The results in the investment section (Section 2.4.2)  confirm that credit ratings are a 
determinant of corporate investment. When we augment the classic corporate 
investment model with a variable that signifies the level of a firm’s credit rating, we 
find that the credit rating is statistically significant. Moreover, this significance holds 
in various subsamples (before, during, and after the GFC and during short-selling bans). 
We find that credit ratings and corporate investment are negatively associated during 
the GFC and positively associated during short-selling bans. Moreover, our results 
related to the performance of the corporate investment–credit rating model reveal that 
the role of credit ratings in influencing corporate investment is more remarkable for 
firms with moderate and low credit ratings. Furthermore, Q and CF, which represent 
investment opportunities, are greater for the firms of low and moderate credit risk. This 
finding implies that these two factors are considered perquisites for investors in risky 
markets. Furthermore, in case of a panel of high credit quality, only %∆𝐺𝐷𝑃 is 
statistically significant, while all the control variables (namely, Q, CF, and %∆𝐺𝐷𝑃) 
explain corporate investment only in the low-credit rating group. This result implies 
that fundamentals are more active in a market of declining credit quality. 
c) The results related to the role of the SOA on corporate investment reveal that higher 
speeds in correcting deviations from the target debt ratio negatively impact corporate 
investment. This result is robust for panels of firms with various credit rating levels. 
Moreover, the results related to the effect of the SOA on corporate investment based 
on a firm’s leverage position confirm that the SOA negatively influences corporate 
investment for overleveraged firms, whereas its effect is almost zero for 
underleveraged firms. 
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5.2.2 CDS and Corporate Investment 
The second empirical study on the impact of CDS trading on corporate investment reveals the 
following: 
a) Motivated by the detrimental effects of CDS trading on corporate bonds, equity prices, 
and liquidity management documented in the literature (see, for example, Ashcraft and 
Santos, 2009; Chava and Roberts, 2008; Das et al., 2014; Saretto and Tookes, 2013; 
Subrahmanyam et al., 2014), we examine the impact of CDS trading on corporate 
investment. Adopting a panel regression framework with robust standard errors 
clustered by firm, we find that corporate investments are reduced after a firm’s CDSs 
start to trade. This finding is consistent with the empty creditor hypothesis and its 
consequences making creditors tougher. 
b) Furthermore, we investigate which categories of firms are more affected by CDS 
trading. We focus on firm characteristics such as size and credit risk. We consider two 
proxies for firm risk, namely, the credit rating and the leverage ratio, and find that the 
detrimental effect of CDS trading is weaker for firms with a higher leverage ratio and 
a lower credit rating. This finding is consistent with the hedging opportunity and 
information hypotheses. Moreover, size-based analysis shows that the detrimental 
effect is more severe for small firms. 
 
5.2.3 Reaction of the CDS Market to the Release of Periodic Financial Reports 
The third empirical study, regarding the behaviour of the CDS market after the release of periodic 
financial reports, reveals the following: 
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a)  The CDS market reacts to the release of periodic financial reports. Our empirical 
results show that the dummy variables that capture the impacts of annual and quarterly 
financial reports, respectively, are statistically significant. This finding confirms that, 
as the stock market, periodic compulsory financial reports contain information for the 
CDS market as well. 
b) The response of the CDS market to the release of periodic financial reports is delayed. 
The response of the CDS market with a five-year tenor to the release of annual reports 
is statistically significant on the second and third days after filing and there is no 
significant reaction on other days. In contrast, the reaction of the CDS market to 
quarterly reports is statistically significant from days 𝑡 + 2 to 𝑡 + 10. Moreover, the 
magnitude of the corresponding coefficients increases in later days. These findings 
show that the reaction of the CDS market to the release of financial reports is delayed 
by a number of days. 
c) There is a distinction between the reactions of the CDS market to the release of periodic 
financial reports across sectors, size groups, leverage-based groups, and credit ratings–
based panels. The results of the sector-based analysis reveal that some sectors, such as 
finance, utilities, energy, and healthcare, react more strongly to information disclosure. 
Moreover, the results of the size-based analysis reveal that firms in large groups are 
more responsive to annual financial information releases. In addition, credit rating–
based analysis demonstrates that periodic financial reports are value relevant for both 
speculative- and investment-grade firms, but investors are likely to pay more attention 
to quarterly reports for speculative-grade firms and to annual reports for investment-
grade firms. 
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d) The reactions of the CDS market to the release of quarterly and annual financial reports 
differ. Our results reveal that the CDS market absorbs the information contained in 
annual reports faster because, in contrast to the quarterly reports dummy variable, the 
dummy variable that capture the impacts of annual reports are mostly significant two 
days after the reports are released. This finding is robust to the consideration of CDSs 
with other tenors. Moreover, the results indicate that the CDS market underreacts to 
the information content of quarterly reports more than to that of annual reports. The 
level of drift in investor reactions to the release of quarterly reports is greater relative 
to annual reports and investors seem to underestimate the significance of the 
information content of quarterly reports and do not fully absorb it. 
e) The reactions of the CDS market to the release of annual reports versus quarterly 
reports are found to be in opposite directions. Our results indicate different signs for 
the coefficients of the variables (namely, QR and AR) that represent the reactions of the 
CDS market to the release of quarterly and annual reports. The coefficients of the 
dummy variable that captures the impact of quarterly reports are mostly positive, which 
implies that, after the release of quarterly reports, credit risk increases due to the 
information content. The opposite situation exists for annual reports. Based on the 
results obtained for our full sample, the coefficients for annual reports are negative. 
This finding holds in our size-based analysis. Moreover, the sector-based analysis 
confirms that, except for utilities and consumer staples, other sectors, namely, energy, 
financial, healthcare, and materials, react negatively to the release of annual reports. 
This result signifies that annual reports are likely to contain positive news for CDSs. 
Consequently, we observe a decline in the CDS spread after the release of annual 
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reports. This observation can be perceived as evidence of window dressing, to improve 
the appearance of a firm’s financial reports to impress shareholders or lenders. 
 
5.3 CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE LITERATURE 
This section summarizes the contributions of this dissertation to several strands of the literature on 
the credit market. 
 
5.3.1 The Role of Credit Ratings in Corporate Financial Decisions 
Our approaches and findings make several significant contributions to the literature. First, this 
study contributes to the strand of literature that addresses the heterogeneity of the SOA (see, for 
example, Dang et al., 2012; Elsas and Florysiak, 2011). It finds that the SOA is heterogeneous 
with respect to firm characteristics such as deviation from target levels, financing deficits, and 
default risk and the SOA is asymmetric in terms of different regimes. We show that a firm’s SOA 
is heterogeneous with respect to its credit rating levels. Moreover, our study adds to those that 
investigate the role of credit ratings on capital structure (see, for example, Graham and Harvey, 
2001; Kisgen, 2006, 2007; Tang, 2009). Those studies show that credit ratings have an influential 
role on a firm’s capital structure decisions. We add to this research by providing more evidence 
on the role of credit ratings on firm capital structure by documenting the heterogeneous behaviours 
involving the SOA with respect to a firm’s credit rating and considering a new credit rating–based 
index, namely, credit rating stability. We show that the behaviour of the SOA is heterogeneous in 
terms of credit rating stability as well. 
Second, this study adds to the few that highlight the role of credit ratings on corporate 
investment (see, for example, Agha and Faff, 2014; Gul et al., 2011). These studies show that 
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firms are associated with more (less) capital investments in the period following credit rating 
upgrades (downgrades), especially financially flexible firms. Our study shows that credit ratings 
are a determinant of corporate investment. The credit rating variable with which we augment the 
classic model of investment turns out to be highly significant. Its significance persists when we 
consider different economic situations, namely, pre-GFC, during the GFC, post-GFC, and during 
short-selling bans. 
Third, this study extends the literature that investigates the association between firm 
financing and investment. Prior literature (see, for example, Bolton, et al., 2011; Chava and 
Roberts, 2008; McCabe, 1979; McDonald et al., 1975; Myers and Majluf, 1984; Peterson and 
Benesh, 1983) confirms that financing and investment are associated. This study provides new 
evidence on the relation between a firm’s leverage and investments and extends the prior literature 
by studying the role of the SOA on corporate investment. We generate data for the SOA by 
adopting a recursive rolling-window regression. Our results indicate that the SOA negatively 
influences corporate investment. 
 
5.3.2 CDS and Corporate Investment 
The findings of this essay contribute to the emerging literature on the corporate finance 
implications of credit derivatives. Since the inception of the CDS market, different studies have 
investigated the impact of these credit derivatives from various perspectives. A strand of literature 
documents that CDS trading has detrimental effects on corporate debt (see, for example, Arping, 
2014; Ashcraft and Santos, 2009; Das et al., 2014; Hirtle, 2009; Norden et al., 2011; Norden and 
Wagner, 2008), the equity market (Boehmer et al., 2012), and liquidity management 
(Subrahmanyam et al., 2014, 2015). The influence of CDSs on corporate investment has been 
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ignored in the literature. We add to this strand of the literature and examine how a firm’s 
investment activities are affected after trading CDSs. Based on empty creditor theory, the tougher 
creditor hypothesis, Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) theory, and evidence of the negative effects 
of CDS trading on internal and external financing, we find that corporate investment has been 
adversely influenced by the inception of CDSs. Moreover, we enhance the literature by showing 
that the detrimental effect of CDSs on corporate investment is more remarkable for smaller firms 
and firms with lower credit risk. 
Additionally, this essay contributes to the strand of literature that investigates the relation 
between financing and investment in the absence of a perfect market (see, for example, Chava and 
Roberts, 2008; McCabe, 1979; Peterson and Benesh, 1983; Whited, 1992). We enhance this strand 
of the literature by providing more evidence about the association of financing and investment by 
showing that the investment activities of firms with traded CDS are influenced by CDSs through 
the financing channel. With respect to the negative impact of CDS trading on a firm’s external 
financing (underlying firm debt and equity markets) and internal financing (liquidity management 
and cash holdings), we show that the corporate investments of CDS issuer firms are reduced in the 
year following the start of CDS trading. 
 
5.3.3 Reaction of the CDS Market to the Release of Periodic Financial Reports 
Our approach and findings contribute to several strands of the literature. First, we add to studies 
that show that accounting information contributes to CDS pricing (see, for example, Batta, 2011; 
Das et al., 2009; Demirovic and Thomas, 2007; Demirovic et al., 2015). Financial reports have 
not been previously considered by the literature, despite the richness of their information. Our 
viewpoint in this research is more comprehensive than the consideration of just accounting 
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information. We investigate the behaviour of the CDS market with respect to the release of 
mandatory reports. 
Second, this study contributes to the strand of literature that focuses on the reactions of the 
CDS market after the release of public information (see, for example, Greatrex, 2009; Zhang and 
Zhang, 2013). These studies show that the CDS market reacts to earnings announcements and 
earnings surprise. We find that, beside this segregated accounting information, financial reports 
contain valuable information on the CDS market as well. Moreover, our results add to a related 
body of literature (see, for example, Callen et al., 2009; Finnerty et al., 2013; Hull et al., 2004; 
Jenkins et al., 2016; Norden and Weber, 2004) that shows that credit ratings and earnings 
announcements both influence CDS spreads. We demonstrate that the release of periodic reports 
affects the CDS market, even after controlling for the release of this public information. 
Third, the results contribute to studies that examine the efficiency of the CDS market. 
Several studies investigate this issue regarding the release of public information and document 
mixed findings. Some indicate that the CDS market is efficient (see, for example, Hull et al., 2004; 
Norden and Weber, 2004; Zhang, 2009; Zhang and Zhang, 2013), while others show that it is 
inefficient (Batta, 2011; Greatrex, 2009). Jenkins et al. (2016) adopt a neutral position and suggest 
that the CDS market is efficient under normal conditions but acts inefficiently under unstable 
situations. Our findings point towards the inefficiency of the CDS market because we document 
that its reaction to the release of financial reports is statistically significant on subsequent days. 
However, we show that the CDS market behaved less inefficiently during the GFC because, in 
such periods, the market incorporates new information more quickly compared to non-GFC 
periods. 
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Fourth, our findings reveal a delayed response from the CDS market after release of 
financial reports which indicates that the limited attention phenomenon exists in the CDS market. 
This finding adds to the behavioural finance literature. 
Finally, our study adds to the accounting literature that investigates the consequences of 
financial disclosure (see, for example, Bonsall and Miller, 2017; Botosan, 2000; Healy and Palepu, 
2001; Sengupta, 1998). These studies find that accounting disclosure affects the cost of equity 
capital, bond ratings, and the cost of bonds. We complement these studies by showing that 
corporate disclosures influence the CDS market as well. 
 
5.4 POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The research conducted in this dissertation has three main implications. First, it provides evidence 
of the role of credit ratings in corporate financial decisions. Since we show that firms with lower 
credit ratings have a faster SOA and since risky firms in our sample have greater leverage 
compared to safer firms, low credit rating firms should assign more funds to buy back debt to 
decrease their leverage ratio and revert to their target level. Consequently, it affects the two main 
sources of corporate investment, namely, retained earnings and long-term debt. Moreover, it may affect 
the dividend policy of firms. This is consistent with our other finding that is higher SOA affect 
corporate investment negatively. These findings have implications for stock market investors 
specially the ones that look for share dividends. Furthermore, we find that credit rating is a 
determinant of corporate investment and the firms with higher credit rating have higher investment 
rate which might provide more profits for stakeholders. The implication of this is that firm’s credit 
rating can be perceived as one of the indicators for firm’s investment and prospected earnings for 
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equity investors. In addition, the findings of this study are useful for managers to know how credit 
rating has influential role on their corporate’s fundamental activities. 
The second implication is that the CDS trading negatively affects the corporate investment 
of CDS issuer firms. This finding has important implications for firm managers and policy makers. 
Managers should be aware of the consequences of new financial instruments on their firm’s 
outcomes. Moreover, policy makers can use this finding to regulate the CDS market to reduce the 
unfavourable impacts of CDS trading on firm financial outcomes. This finding also has 
implications for participants in the equity and bond markets. When a firm’s CDSs start to trade, a 
reduction in capital expenditures is expected the subsequent year. This fact can help investors 
make decisions about their portfolios. 
The third implication is related to the finding that CDS spreads increase after the release 
of quarterly reports and decreases following the release of annual reports. This finding is important 
as a matter of economic significance. The periodic payments that buyers of CDS contracts pay to 
sellers depend on the CDS spread, which is proportional to the underlying notional value, so a 
larger CDS spread incurs higher costs for buyers. As shown in Chapter 4, the coefficient related 
to quarterly reports is positive and the magnitudes of the coefficient follow an increasing function. 
Therefore, the days after the release of quarterly reports for a particular firm are considered 
profitable situations for sellers of CDS contracts, providing them greater profits from receiving 
higher amounts from buyers. In contrast, it would not be the right time for buyers to enter into 
CDS contracts for firms that have recently released quarterly reports. In contrast, regarding the 
positive coefficient of the effect of annual reports on CDS spread, if hedgers and speculators intend 
to buy a CDS contract for a specific reference entity, the day after the annual report’s release is a 
good time to do so; they can thus pay a lower amount as the CDS premium to CDS providers. 
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Moreover, our finding regarding the phenomenon of limited attention implies inefficiency 
in the CDS markets, because investors could fail to update their beliefs quickly and effectively. 
This finding is important for regulators in redesigning the structure of financial reporting and to 
push firms towards providing more transparent information with less required cognitive effort for 
investors. 
5.5 FUTURE RESEARCH 
In Chapter 2, we investigate the role of credit ratings on corporate financial decisions. The basis 
of financing section in this study is trade-off theory and we document that the SOA is 
heterogeneous in terms of the different levels of credit rating and credit stability. A further study 
could examine whether the role of credit ratings on firm capital structure is the same regarding 
other capital structure theories, such as the pecking order theory of Frank and Goyal (2003), the 
market timing theory of Baker and Wurgler (2002), and the inertia theory of Welch (2004). 
In Chapter 3, we investigate the impact of CDS trading on corporate investment and find 
that corporate investment for CDS issuer firms is negatively affected by CDS trading. Regarding 
the effort of policy makers in regulating this market after the GFC, the question is whether the 
detrimental effect of CDS trading on the corporate investment of firms with CDS trading after the 
GFC is weaker compared to that of firms with CDS trading prior to the GFC. This investigation 
can be considered future research in this strand of literature. 
In Chapter 4, we study the reactions of the CDS market after the release of periodic 
financial reports. This research can be further extended by considering a textual analysis. Since 
the literature related to textual analysis and measuring qualitative information in finance shows 
that positive and negative words in corporate periodic reports, newspaper articles, and investor 
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message boards can affect financial markets, it is worth investigating how the CDS market 
responds to the asymmetric content of quarterly and annual reports. 
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APPENDIX 
 
A. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2 
Table A.1: Definition of Variables 
This table provides details about the definition of the variables. Panel A is related to dependent variables in our 
financing and investment models. Panels B and C define the explanatory variables in financing and investment 
models, respectively. The third column shows how we created the variables based on the WRDS codes and the 
last column demonstrates the papers that we follow to consider the variables. 
Variable Name Definition 
Variable creation 
based (WRDS) 
codes 
Following paper 
Panel A: Dependent Variables 
 
MDR Market debt ratio  
(DLTT+DLC)/ 
(DLTT+DLC+ 
(CSHO*PRCC_F)) 
 
BDR Book debt ratio (DLTT+DLC) / AT (Flannery and Rangan, 2006) 
CI 
Corporate 
investment-Firm's 
capital expenditure 
in year t divided by 
its net property, 
plant, and equipment 
at the beginning of 
year t. 
CAPX/lag(PPENT) Chava and Roberts (2008) 
Panel B: Explanatory Variables for PAM  
EBIT-TA 
Earnings before 
interest and tax 
divided by total asset 
EBIT/AT (Flannery and Rangan, 2006) 
MB Market to book ratio of assets 
(DLTT+DLC+PSTK
L+ 
(CSHO*PRCC_F)) / 
AT 
(Flannery and 
Rangan, 2006) 
DEP-TA Depreciation scaled by total assets DP / AT 
(Flannery and 
Rangan, 2006) 
Size Log of total assets log(AT) (Flannery and Rangan, 2006) 
FA-TA Fixed asset proportion PPENT / AT 
(Flannery and 
Rangan, 2006) 
RD-TA 
Research and 
development 
expenses as a 
proportion of total 
assets.  
XRD / AT (Flannery and Rangan, 2006) 
IND-MED 
Median industry 
MDR calculated for 
each year based on 
 (Flannery and 
Rangan, 2006) 
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the GICS industry 
groups 
R&D-Dummy 
Dummy variable 
equal to one if a firm 
did not report R&D 
expenses 
  
SOA Speed of adjustment   
FD 
Firm’s financial 
deficit  
 
 Frank and Goyal (2003) 
EFWA 
External finance 
weighted average of 
a firm’s past market-
book ratios  
 
 Baker and Wurgler (2002) 
SPC 
Surprise impact of 
share price change  
 
 Flannery and Rangan (2006) 
Panel C: Explanatory Variables for Investment model  
Q 
Tobin’s Q: The sum 
of firm's book debt 
and market equity 
less total inventories 
in year 𝑡, divided by 
its capital stock 
measured by net 
property, plant, and 
equipment at the 
beginning of year. 
(DLTT+DLC+(CSH
O*PRCC_F))-
INVT) / lag(PPENT) 
Chava and Roberts 
(2008) 
CF 
Cash flow: The sum 
of firm's income 
before extraordinary 
items and 
depreciation and 
amortization in year 
𝑡, divided by its 
capital stock 
measured by net 
property, plant, and 
equipment at the 
beginning of year t. 
(IB+DPC) / 
lag(PPENT) 
Chava and Roberts 
(2008) 
CR 
Firm’s Standard & 
Poor’ credit rating 
level 
  
GD_CHANGE 
 
Annual GDP 
growth, measured as 
the percentage 
change  
 Julio and Yook 
(2012) 
D pre-crisis 
Dummy variable 
indicates the pre-
crisis period. If year 
<2007, it is equal to 
1, otherwise 0. 
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D crisis 
Dummy variable 
indicates the crisis 
period. If 2006 
<year < 2011, it is 
equal to 1, otherwise 
0. 
  
D post-Crisis 
Dummy variable 
indicates the post 
crisis period. If year 
> 2010, it is equal to 
1, otherwise 0. 
  
D short-sell-ban 
Dummy variable 
indicates the period 
that short-sell 
banned in US. If 
year = 2008, it is 
equal to 1, otherwise 
0. 
  
 
 
Table A.2: Distribution of firm credit rating  
This table indicates the way that we convert alphabetic scale to numeric scale to find the average of annual credit 
rating. Moreover, it provides information about the distribution of firm’s credit rating in each category. 
S&P 
long 
term 
Rating 
Scale 
Numeric scale 
Firm 
distribution in 
dataset 
S&P 
long 
term 
Rating 
Scale 
Numeric 
scale 
Firm 
distribution in 
dataset 
AAA 24 10 BB− 12 305 
AA+ 23 11 B+ 11 328 
AA 22 22 B 10 222 
AA− 21 31 B− 9 142 
A+ 20 59 CCC+ 8 51 
A 19 94 CCC 7 36 
A− 18 112 CCC− 6 17 
BBB+ 17 166 CC 5 10 
BBB 16 194 C 4 6 
BBB− 15 180 RD 3 4 
BB+ 14 169 SD 2 0 
BB 13 227 D 1 4 
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Table A.3: Credit rating stability 
This table presents details about the distribution of credit rating stability measure. Based on the monthly credit 
rating, when the score of a month is higher (lower) than the score of previous month we record a downgrade 
(upgrade). The overall score of credit stability is the summation of occurred monthly down grade and upgrade in 
whole available years for each firm. 
No of change 
in credit 
rating 
Frequency No of change in credit rating Frequency 
0 24 13 32 
1 154 14 16 
2 336 15 16 
3 367 16 19 
4 312 17 8 
5 276 18 6 
6 238 19 2 
7 160 20 1 
8 134 21 2 
9 99 22 4 
10 85 24 1 
11 56 25 1 
12 50 26 1 
Table A.4: Pecking order theory explanations (BC) 
This table reports the SOA based on the BC estimator. The reression model is ∆𝐵𝐷𝑅௜,௧ାଵ =  𝛾. 𝐵𝐷𝑅௜,௧ +
𝛿. 𝐹𝐷௜,௧ +  𝛽. 𝑋௜,௧ +  𝜀௜,௧ାଵ , where FD is a measure of the firm’s financial deficit defined in Frank and Goyal 
(2003). The coefficient and its t-statistic (in parentheses) for each variable are reported. ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Credit 
Groups 
Whole 
sample AAA/AA A BBB BB/B 
CCC and 
Lower 
Change 
BDR -0.055** 0.030 -0.025 0.006 -0.037 -0.071  
(-2.72) (1.10) (-1.03) (0.25) (-1.20) (-0.45) 
FD 0.326*** 0.359*** 0.330*** 0.356*** 0.320*** 0.052  
(19.23) (12.25) (17.86) (14.12) (11.03) (0.24) 
EBIT-TA 0.154*** 0.179*** 0.232*** 0.171*** 0.109** -2.028  
(5.25) (4.04) (5.83) (5.46) (2.01) (-1.31) 
MB 0.002 0.002 0.0007 0.003 0.0002 -0.379  
(0.66) (0.52) (0.24) (0.89) (0.03) (-1.29) 
DEP-TA 0.156 0.066 0.008 0.224 0.195 -1.706  
(1.17) (0.50) (0.06) (1.57) (0.79) (-0.65) 
Size 0.014*** 0.005** 0.007** 0.014*** 0.030*** 0.193  
(6.02) (2.04) (2.39) (3.65) (5.00) (0.76) 
FA-TA -0.037* -0.012 -0.009 0.020 -0.119** -1.205  
(-1.93) (-0.54) (-0.36) (0.80) (-2.41) (-0.92) 
R&D 
Dummy -0.010 0.048 -0.019 -0.020* -0.011 0.097  
(-0.92) (1.30) (-1.05) (-1.66) (-0.57) (0.36) 
R&D-TA -0.027 -0.234** -0.012 -0.084 -0.096 12.430  
(-0.29) (-2.08) (-0.09) (-0.90) (-0.48) (1.16) 
IND-MED -0.044** -0.011 -0.042** -0.068** -0.061 -0.598  
(-2.78) (-0.45) (-2.21) (-3.47) (-1.43) (-0.60) 
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Table A.5: Market timing explanations 
This table reports the SOA based on the BC estimator. The regression model is 𝐵𝐷𝑅௜,௧ାଵ =  𝛾. 𝐵𝐷𝑅௜,௧ +
𝛿. 𝐸𝐹𝑊𝐴௜,௧ +  𝛽. 𝑋௜,௧ +  𝜀௜,௧ାଵ, where EFWA  is the firm’s external finance weighted average book-market ratio 
defined in Baker and Wurgler (2002).The coefficient and its t-statistic (in parentheses) for each variable are 
reported. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Credit 
Groups 
Whole 
sample AAA/AA A BBB BB/B 
CCC and 
Lower 
BDR 0.779*** 0.720*** 0.862*** 0.823*** 0.841*** 0.117 
 (32.88) (10.72) (30.94) (25.22) (23.90) (0.48) 
EFWA 0.0002 -0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.001 0.006 
 (0.90) (-0.39) (1.41) (0.82) (0.04) (0.14) 
EBIT-TA 0.028 0.003 0.131*** 0.059 -0.014 -1.588 
 (0.96) (0.04) (3.82) (1.43) (-0.26) (0.35) 
MB 0.001 -0.002 -0.0008 0.005 0.001 0.052 
 (0.55) (-0.39) (-0.28) (1.51) (0.01) (0.35) 
DEP-TA 0.163 0.354* 0.045 0.542** -0.021 0.648 
 (1.21) (1.79) (0.32) (2.01) (-0.08) (0.24) 
Size 0.008*** 0.003 0.005** 0.011*** 0.010** 0.359 
 (4.64) (0.58) (2.15) (3.52) (2.45) (1.64) 
FA-TA -0.002 0.011 -0.023 0.022 -0.005 1.205 
 (-0.14) (0.28) (-0.99) (0.82) (-0.10) (1.34) 
R&D 
Dummy -0.007 0.040 -0.035** -0.014 0.001 0.446* 
 (-0.74) (0.86) (-2.37) (-1.03) (0.01) (1.98) 
R&D-TA -0.029 -0.090 -0.129 0.070 -0.067 -1.266 
 (-0.32) (-0.64) (-0.78) (0.61) (-0.31) (-0.18) 
IND-
MED 0.015 0.023 0.035 0.011 -0.032 -0.652 
 (0.92) (0.93) (1.53) (0.50) (-0.82) (-0.72) 
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Table A.6: Stock price mechanics explanations (BC) 
This table reports the SOA based on the BC estimator.  The regression model is 𝑴𝑫𝑹𝒊,𝒕ା𝟏 =  𝜸. 𝑴𝑫𝑹𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜹. 𝑺𝑷𝑪𝒊,𝒕ା𝟏 +  𝜷. 𝑿𝒊,𝒕 +  𝜺𝒊,𝒕ା𝟏  where SPC is the 
share price effect defined in Flannery and Rangan (2006). The coefficient and its t-statistic (in parentheses) for each variable are reported. ***, ** and * 
indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Credit Groups Whole sample AAA/AA A BBB BB/B CCC and Lower 
MDR 0.822*** 0.779*** 0.846*** 0.823*** 0.893*** 0.427 
 (41.05) (11.80) (35.22) (26.22) (24.19) (0.5) 
SPC 0.842*** 0.658*** 0.759*** 0.801*** 0.898*** 0.803 
 (32.55) (4.69) (17.10) (17.08) (23.71) (0.95) 
EBIT-TA 0.045* 0.078 0.121*** 0.037 0.037 -0.307 
 (1.83) (1.43) (3.31) (0.83) (0.536) (-0.16) 
MB -0.004** -0.013*** -0.008*** -0.003 0.011* -0.037 
 (-2.23) (-2.58) (-3.78) (-0.91) (1.70) (-0.29) 
DEP-TA -0.013 0.055 0.173 0.449** -0.280 1.951 
 (-0.11) (0.26) (0.91) (2.38) (-1.53) (0.39) 
Size 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.016 
 (1.57) (0.01) (1.01) (1.23) (0.46) (0.09) 
FA-TA 0.045** 0.022 -0.007 0.053* 0.066 -0.841 
 (2.29) (0.42) -0.28 (1.91) (1.56) (-1.08) 
R&D Dummy -0.011 0.043 -0.012 -0.031 -0.003  
 (-0.69) (1.74) (-0.34) (-1.61) (-0.11)  
R&D-TA -0.214** -0.002 -0.107 0.015 -0.431** -1.738 
 (-2.39) (-0.01) (-0.66) (0.11) (-2.51) (-0.16) 
IND-MED 0.069*** 0.054** 0.056** 0.032 0.086* 0.440 
 (3.75) (2.16) (2.50) (1.05) (1.72) (0.11) 
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Table A.7: SOA for panel of firms with different levels of credit stability based on the 
number of upgrades and downgrades 
This table provides the result for PAM based on the BC estimator for the panels of firms with three levels of credit 
stability. Credit stability is an index which represents the frequency of changes in firm’s S&P credit rating. We 
construct the credit stability-based panels by making difference between positive and negative stabilities. The 
positive (negative) stability means when the number of upgrades is more (less) than number of downgrades. Our 
model is  𝑀𝐷𝑅(𝐵𝐷𝑅)௜௧ାଵ = (1 − 𝛾)𝑀𝐷𝑅(𝐵𝐷𝑅)௜௧ + 𝛾𝛽𝑋௜௧ + 𝛾𝛼௜ + 𝜀௜௧ାଵ .𝑋௜௧ is a vector of control variables 
such as earnings before interest and tax divided by total asset (EBIT-TA), market to book ratio (MB), depreciation 
scaled by total assets (DEP-TA), size as the log of total asset, fixed asset proportion (FA-TA), research and 
development expenses as a proportion of total assets (R&A-TA), median industry market debt ratio (IND-MED), 
dummy variable for reported R&D expenses (R&D-Dummy).  
Credit 
stability 
Level 
No change in 
credit change 
Positive stability 
Upgrade > 
Downgrade 
Negative stability 
Upgrade < 
Downgrade 
Upgrade = 
Downgrade 
MDR 0.503*** 0.676*** 0.623*** 0.636*** 
 (16.42) (29.20) (31.36) (11.84) 
EBIT-TA 0.150* -0.071* -0.078 -0.037 
 (1.79) (-1.66) (-1.07) (-0.32) 
MB -0.004 0.005* 0.007 0.032*** 
 (-0.72) (1.70) (1.07) (3.48) 
DEP-TA 0.328 -0.071 -0.298 -0.134 
 (1.00) (-0.33) (-1.37) (-0.48) 
Size 0.010 0..012** 0.026** 0.010 
 (1.38) (2.76) (2.96) (0.76) 
FA-TA 0.176*** 0.119** 0.088* 0.034 
 (3.30) (1.46) (1.65) (0.40) 
R&D 
Dummy -0.063** 0.033 -0.005 -0.033 
 (-2.38) (1.46) (-0.20) (-0.72) 
R&D-TA -0.223 -0.153 0.153 -0.352 
 (-1.38) (-0.96) (0.71) (-0.60) 
IND-MED 0.110*** 0.002 0.056 0.028 
 (2.58) (0.06) (1.42) (0.42) 
N 4,497 7,719 10,351 2,359 
 
Table A.8: Credit rating based on the credit stability 
This table provides detail about the average annual rating of firms based on the different level of credit stability 
index. The credit stability index is the cumulative number of changes in credit rating from the data available in 
Compustat till considered year. 
Credit stability index Average annual rating Credit stability index Average annual rating 
0 BBB− 13 BB− 
1 BBB− 14 BB− 
2 BBB− 15 BB 
3 BBB− 16 B+ 
4 BB+ 17 B 
5 BB+ 18 B− 
6 BB+ 19 B 
7 BB 20 B+ 
8 BB 21 B− 
9 BB 22 BB 
10 BB 23 BB+ 
11 BB 24 BBB− 
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B. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 4 
 
Table B.1: Number of observations for each type of event 
This table provides the details about the number of events for each type of exposure in our data set. To control for 
contamination, we remove the events that the releases of accounting information and announcements of earnings or 
credit ratings occurred on the same day. The third column shows the number of concurrent events. The final number 
of events in our data after removing the outliers is written on the last column.  
Type of Exposure 
Initial 
Number of 
Events in 
Data Sample 
Number of 
Concurrent Release 
Dates (Financial 
Reports with Earnings 
Announcement or 
Credit 
Announcement) 
Number of 
Observations 
after Removing 
the Concurrent 
Dates 
Number of Observations 
after Removing 
Concurrent Dates and 
Outliers in the Final 
Sample 
Quarterly reports 6,312 2,044 4,268 3,625 
Annual reports 2,375 47 2,328 1,892 
Earnings 
announcements 6,311 2,091 4,220 3,620 
Monthly credit rating 
announcements 26,820 497  26,323 15,660 
 
 
Table B.2: Average of change in CDS return after release of periodic financial report by 
leverage 
This table reports the number of observation (N), mean and standard deviation (SD) for CDS price and CDS 
return based on the different level of leverage. We divide data sample into 10 equal group based on the firm’s 
leverage ratio. The Lev1 is the less risky firms and the Lev2 represents the firms with highest leverage ratio (risky 
firms). 
Leverage level N  CDS price CDS return Mean SD Mean SD 
Lev 1 50503 47.732 51.789 -0.030 4.217 
Lev 2 50503 59.318 79.867 -0.022 4.800 
Lev 3 50503 67.124 103.881 -0.043 3.741 
Lev 4 50503 65.854 85.251 -0.031 3.631 
Lev 5 50503 81.025 93.231 -0.039 3.293 
Lev 6 50503 96.642 96.822 -0.027 3.336 
Lev 7 50503 108.510 91.636 -0.030 3.934 
Lev 8 50503 116.216 109.920 -0.036 3.367 
Lev 9 50503 141.691 157.967 -0.045 3.185 
Lev 10  50503 262.170 369.281 -0.024 3.621 
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